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INTRODUCTION

The "pressures and problems that have led to corporate bankruptcy law also operate in the case of a sovereign borrower in financial
distress."' Yet legal scholars have never systematically examined sovereign debt restructuring in light of bankruptcy reorganization law print Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, and Faculty Director, Duke
Global Capital Markets Center. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. The author thanks
Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Michael Bradley, Michael Buchanan, Michael Byers, Clark C.
Havighurst, Benjamin J. Cohen, Enrica Detragiache, David Frisch, Robert Keohane, Donald Korobkin, Richard Portes, Robert Y. Rasmussen, StewartJ. Schwab, Paul M. Shupack,
Joel P. Trachtman, Stephen Wallenstein, Marissa Wesely, and the participants in a Global
Capital Markets Center Workshop at Duke University School of Law, in an Olin Law and
Economics Workshop at Georgetown University Law Center, and in faculty workshops at
the University of North Carolina School of Law at Chapel Hill, Wake Forest University
(School of Law and Babcock School of Management), and William & Mary for helpful
comments on drafts of this Article. The Article also benefitted from discussions with Catherine Admay and Charles R KennedyJr. Finally, the author thanks Daniel M. Bronski, Amy
Grainger, Thomas E. Loeser, Adam Munson, Don Suh, Michael B. Treisman, Haibin Zhu,
and especially Daniel H. Joyner for research assistance.
1 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort, Frank D.
Graham Lecture at Princeton University 8 (Apr. 20, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). A copy of this paper can be found at Professor Sachs's website, http://
www.hiid.harvard.edu/about/people/sachs/sachs.html.
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ciples, which are designed to solve such fundamental problems as the
ability of holdout creditors to undermine collective action toward a
negotiated settlement. Moreover, absent the bankruptcy reorganization incentives that encourage free market liquidity, multilateral governmental institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) must act by default as lenders of last resort. This not only forces
taxpayers to subsidize foreign governments and their creditors, but
also creates problems such as moral hazard: countries anticipating an
IMF bailout might have less reason to take a prudent economic
course, and lenders expecting protection from the consequences of
default might have a greater tendency to take unwarranted financial
risks. This Article proposes that an international convention for sovereign debt restructuring based on three fundamental principles of
bankruptcy reorganization law could address these problems, without
requiring supervision by an international bankruptcy court. The convention also would permit the IMF, through a mechanism of back-toback nonrecourse lending, to continue its current practice of imposing conditionality on funding without triggering the problems presently associated with IMF lending.
A.

The Difficulty of Restructuring Sovereign Debt

This Article addresses the problem of countries, rather than companies, in default.2 Sovereign states or countries ("States"), like companies, often must borrow money to pay for imports or to fund
projects, such as highways or power plants. The borrower, whether a
2 Indirect relationships exist, however, between companies in default (private-sector
default) and countries in default (public-sector default). If companies that a country relies
on for tax revenues and employment are in default, the country's economy may decline,
thereby precipitating a public-sector default. Cf infra note 33 (discussing how raising interest rates in certain Asian countries in order to stabilize their economies actually increased defaults on corporate debt, thereby further impairing those countries'
economies). Moreover, although restructuring the foreign debt of companies is usually
addressed initially by the company's domestic legal framework for bankruptcy reorganization (which may be modified by adoption of the UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, available at
United Nations Commission on International Trade (last updated Apr. 29, 1999) <http://
www.uncitral.org>), foreign creditors confronting both private- and public-sector default
might attempt to link a restructuring of the country's public-sector debt to a restructuring
of its private-sector debt. See Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel
to Agent Banks, Bank Advisoly Groups and ServicingBanks, 23 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 69-

70 (1984); see alsoBANK

FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY R

Vrw: INTERNA-

TIONAL BANKING AND FNANcIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 10 (Nov. 1998) (describing the report of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems on the advances in reducing
foreign debt exchange settlement risk and offering as a "key element" the "ongoing cooperation with existing and prospective private sector groups"); BANco CENTRAL DO BRASIL,
BuLLETIN: STATISTICAL TABLES (Mar. 1999) (indicating that in some countries the amount
of cross-border debt incurred by the private sector exceeds that incurred by the public
sector). This Article focuses on the restructuring of public-sector debt.
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State or company, is then obligated to repay the debt according to a
fixed maturity schedule. If a company fails to pay its debts, a system of
corporate bankruptcy or insolvency law usually regulates the relationship between the debtor-company and its creditors.3 In contrast, if a
State fails to pay its debts-for example, "[d]uring the 1980s and
1990s, more than 50 countries recorded arrears or multilateral debt
restructurings on their external liabilities" 4-no legal system presently
regulates the relationship between the State and its creditors. 5 This
Article examines whether sovereign debt restructuring should be subject to supranational regulation.
I begin this examination by using the legal framework for corporate bankruptcy as a basis for comparison. In the United States, for
example, debtor-companies with inherently good businesses may undergo reorganization, but those with inherently bad businesses are
often liquidated. 6 Courts, the debtor-company, and its creditors all
devote significant resources to determining whether the company is
worth more reorganized or liquidated. 7 In contrast, States are not liq3 The terms "bankruptcy law" and "insolvency law" generally are interchangeable. I
will refer to bankruptcy law, because the term is more commonly used in the United States.
4 Sachs, supra note 1, at 1. The problem of sovereign debt restructuring is becoming
so pervasive that Congress recently established the Financial Institutions Advisory Commission to advise on issues of financial institution reform in this context. See E-mail from Jeffrey D. Sachs, Galen L. Stone Professor of International Trade, Harvard University, to

Steven L. Schwarcz 1 (Dec. 20, 1999) (on file with author). Of course, a State, like a
company, will try to avoid defaulting on its debt. See Benjamin J. Cohen, A Global Chapter
11, 75 FOREiGN POL'Y 109, 111 (1989) (observing that "[wiith rare exceptions, Third World
governments have deliberately chosen not to repudiate their debts or otherwise refuse to
acknowledge their full contractual obligations"); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REv. 1035, 1072 (1997) (noting that only three countries have
outright repudiated their foreign debt since the First World War). Default can have an

adverse effect on the State's credit ratings and financial reputation. Sometimes, however,
default-in the technical sense of "failure of a debtor to make timely payment of interest
and principal as they come due," JoHN DoWNEs & JORDON ELLOT GOODmAN, DIarIoNARY
OF FINANcE AND INVESTMENT TERms 129 (4th ed. 1995)--cannot be avoided.
5 See, e.g., Mechanism Must Be Found to Avoid Moral Hazard in Crises, IMFDepuy Says, 69
Banking Rep. (BNA) 623 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Mechanism] (reporting that IMF First
Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, believes that "[iln a sovereign crisis... there
simply is no accepted bankruptcy procedure"). My examination of the relationship between a State and its creditors focuses on its foreign creditors; a State could impose
whatever regulation it wishes on domestic creditors.
6 United States bankruptcy law is governed by Title 11 of the United States Code (the
"Code"), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7 In other words, these entities all scrutinize whether the company's value as a goingconcern is worth more than the value of its assets sold piecemeal. Under U.S. law, for
example, companies in bankruptcy ("debtors") either will be liquidated or reorganized.
Although a corporate debtor can choose either option at the outset of a bankruptcy case,
most debtors initially attempt reorganization-a process governed by Chapter 11. See 11
U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994) (permitting the debtor to convert a liquidation into a reorganization). However, the judge has the power to convert the reorganization into a liquidation
for various reasons, including instances when losses continue and no "reasonable likeli-
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uidated.8 Reorganization is therefore the goal of any sovereign debt
restructuring.
The genius of bankruptcy reorganization law is that it provides
incentives for debtors and their creditors, notwithstanding their disparate interests, to reach a voluntary agreement on the terms of the restructuring. 9 Agreement on a plan of reorganization ° is rewarded, 1'
failure to agree is penalized. 12 As a result, most corporate restructurings are consensual.1 3 The basis of corporate reorganization law's efficiency rests in the underlying theory of freedom of contract voluntary
14
contracting maximizes value.

Although sovereign debt restructuring is likewise consensual,
achieving consensus is a haphazard affair. The conflicting interests of
hood of rehabilitation" exists, id. § 1112(b) (1), orwhen the debtor is unable to "effectuate
a plan" of reorganization, id. § 1112(b)(2).
8 See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 1, at 8 ("[L]iquidation is ... basically out of consideration for a debt-strapped national government."); see also BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD
PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRIsIs? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 7

(1995) ("The

fundamental difference between a sovereign state and a firm is the public interest in maintaining a country as a going, indeed a well-functioning concern."); Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 57, 75 (1995) ("Debates
over whether reorganization or liquidation is more efficient for failing corporate debtors
are inappropriate in the context of government debtors: there can be no talk of an economically efficient liquidation and distribution of a people's government." (citation omitted)). But see Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to MunicipalBankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 425, 472 (1993) (challenging the
Code's assumption that municipal debtors should not be dismembered because "[mlerely
to give the city a fresh start, but not to address the fundamental causes of its financial
problems, may be no favor"). In a country debt-restructuring context, I show that a State
can at least partially address the fundamental causes of its financial problems while preserving its political and geographical integrity. See infraPart II. Whether a bankruptcy system
should allow liquidation of States is a political question beyond this Article's scope.
9 A debtor-company's shareholders also may be involved in the reorganization process. However, because States have no shareholders, they are excluded from this analysis.
10 The plan of reorganization sets forth both how to reorganize the debtor and how
to repay the debtor's creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1994) (stating the confirmation requirements of a plan of reorganization).
11 Agreement permits both confirmation of the plan of reorganization and payment
of creditors; absent agreement (or a non-consensual plan, discussed infra note 12), a plan
of reorganization cannot be confirmed and therefore creditors cannot be paid. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (requiring acceptance by each class of "impaired" creditor claims for
plan confirmation).
12 If the parties cannot reach a consensus, the debtor may be liquidated or, if viable,
reorganized under a non-consensual plan that follows the absolute priority rule of liquidation. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (granting power to ajudge to convert a reorganization
case to a liquidation) with id § 1129 (b) (2) (granting power to confirm, or "cramdown," a
non-consensual plan only if the plan comports with the absolute priority rule).
13 See, e.g., MARK S. ScARBERRY ET AL-, BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANxauvrcY 839
(1996) ("Most plans are confirmed consensually under section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.").
14 A consensual plan of reorganization is analogous to voluntary contracting. I qualify
the comparison because the plan's voluntariness is subject to legally imposed incentives
and disincentives. See supra notes 11-12.
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the State and its creditors make it difficult, if not impossible, to reach
agreement on a restructuring plan. This difficulty is exacerbated by
the collective action problem of reaching agreement among creditors 5-a

problem that has worsened significantly in recent years as

States have shifted their borrowing source from banks to bond investors in the lower cost capital markets.' 6 One or more creditors may
hold out, hoping that the need to reach an agreement will induce
other parties to buy out their claims or pay them a premium.1 7 Consequently, "[a] t each stage of a financial workout, collective action

15 Creditors themselves may be private entities, such as commercial banks, pension
funds, or even individual investors, or public entities, such as other States or multilateral
agencies.
In the instance of creditor States, their actions tend to accord with policies and procedures that have arisen through historical precedent, an informal arrangement referred to
as the "Paris Club." EICHENGREN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 23. This is in contrast to the
"London Club," an informal framework that has arisen through historical precedent for
rescheduling claims of commercial banks against States. Id. at 26.
Theoretically, the unsecured claims of private and public creditors are equal and ratable (pari passu), see Alexis Rieffel, The Role of the Paris Club in Managing Debt Problems, in
INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 481, 485-88 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 3d ed. 1994), and, in practice, are generally

treated as comparable. See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 24 (observing that Paris
Club agreements commit the debtor-State "to seek debt relief from private creditors as
generous as the official relief granted by the Paris Club," a principle referred to as "comparable treatment"). This Article, accordingly, makes no distinctions based on creditor identity, except with regard to the issue of classification of claims for super-majority voting. See
infra notes 274-89 and accompanying text.
16 See infranotes 280-86 and accompanying text (describing this trend, and explaining
that the greater number of capital market investors, as compared to banks, and the relatively smaller amounts of their respective investments decreases the likelihood of obtaining
creditor consent). Another collective action problem is that creditors that otherwise may
favor a negotiated settlement may be motivated to try to enforce their claims against the
debtor-State because they fear that other creditors will be the first to enforce their claims
against assets that are insufficient to pay all claims-the "'creditor grab race.'" Sachs, supra
note 1, at 7. This problem, however, is less significant in a sovereign debt context than in a
corporate context because creditors can only attempt to attach the State's assets that are
located in other jurisdictions, and "[u]sually, only limited assets exist outside the debtor
country and much of that is legally immune from attachment." James B. Hurlock, The Way
Ahead for Sovereign Debt INT'L FIN. L. Rxv., July 1995, at 10, 11; see also EICHENGREEN &
PORTEs, supra note 8, at 31 ("While the debtor state may have some assets within the jurisdiction of the courts in another country, it is frequently very difficult to levy execution
against such assets, because of the law of sovereign immunity."); Rory Macmillan, The Next
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN.J. INT'L L. 305, 353 (1995). But see Mechanism, supra note 5, at
623 (arguing that "the international community needs to find a mechanism that is 'legally
accepted' by all countries to ensure private investors share in the risks and costs of dealing
with [financially distressed states]").
17 Scholars also refer to this situation as a holdout problem. For example, a schism
recently arose in Russia's debt restructuring when one of 19 banks broke ranks to announce the creation of a ruble-based investment fund, for which the bank indirectly would
be paid a 2% management fee. SeeAlan Cowell, More Trouble Seen on DefaultedRussian Debt,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1999, at C4.
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problems plague the readjustment of debt claims, to the detriment of
the creditors as well as the debtor."18
The recent movie Waking Ned Devine 9 playfully illustrates this
problem. Devine, an heir-less resident of a rural Irish town, promptly
dies from shock after winning a £6.7 million national lottery.2 0 The
fifty-two remaining residents of the town want one of their own to
collect the lottery jackpot by impersonating Devine, and subsequently
distribute the winnings equally among the residents, yielding each approximately £130,000.21 To accomplish this scheme, each resident

would have to agree to identify the imposter as Ned Devine to government lottery inspectors.2 2 Unfortunately, one rather unpleasant resident attempts to hold out for a much larger share, threatening to
reveal the fraud if her demand is not met.23 Similarly, in a sovereign
debt restructuring context, any lender whose consent is needed for an
overall settlement 24 could hold out for a disproportionate share on
the threat of preventing the settlement. Hence, agreement can take
25
years.
Attempts by multilateral governmental entities such as the IMF to
aid the process of sovereign debt restructuring may have further complicated this situation. The IMF has acted as the lender of last resort
to financially troubled States, enabling them to avoid default and its
consequences.2 6 Unfortunately, IMF lending has created a moral hazard risk:27 countries anticipating an IMF bailout might have less rea18 Sachs, supra note 1, at 6. See also Charles Lipson, Bankers'Dilemmas:Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARcHy 200 (Kenneth A. Oye

ed., 1986) (providing an overview of the collective action problem for sovereign debt
restructuring).
19
20
21

22
23

WAKING NED DEvINE (Fox Searchlight Pictures 1998).

See id.
See id.
See id.

See id. In the movie, the holdout could have obtained a 10% government award by
revealing the fraud. See id. That possibility exacerbates the collective-action problem, but
is not a necessary condition for the problem to arise.
24 Cf infra note 278 (explaining why settlements usually require the consent of all
lenders).
25 In the 1980s, for example, Brazil sought to restructure its debt by converting it into
collateralized bonds. See PhilipJ. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and
Its ImplicationsForFutureRestructurings,64 FoP.DHaM L. REv. 2701, 2745 (1996). Hoping for
greater profit, its fourth largest creditor, the Dart family, held out and refused to convert
its debt. See id. at 2746-48. This led to litigation and an almost decade-long impasse. See id.
at 2748-54.
26 Since 1982, "almost all debt restructuring agreements of sovereign borrowers...
have been linked in one way or another with an IMF loan to the debtor country." Sachs,
supra note 1, at 2.
27 The term "moral hazard" has various related meanings. In the insurance context,
in which the term arose, it means "the deliberate efforts by the insured to bring about the
insured event, as when the owner of life insurance commits suicide." Richard A. Epstein,
Products Liability as an Insurance Marke4 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 653 (1985). See generally
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son to take a prudent economic course, 28 and lenders that anticipate
being protected from default might have a greater tendency to take

unwarranted financial risk.29 Notwithstanding the lack of empirical
evidence of the extent, if any, to which the moral hazard risk actually
influences the behavior of States or their creditors, the potential for

moral hazard figures prominently in the media debate:
Some economists believe that bailouts increase "moral hazard" by
rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments and excessive risk-taking by banks....
IMF economists like to argue that these moral-hazard problems
are minimal. But consider the case of the recent $42 billion [IMF]
package for Brazil. How did the Brazilians qualify for this support?
They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their
policies had been better, they would not be in their current difficulties ....
Russia is another example.... Since [1993], the availability of
IMF and other foreign money provided an excuse to avoid making
tough political decisions. Instead of cutting public outlays or increasing tax collections, undertaking efficient privatizations or enacting legal reforms, the government counted on foreign bailouts to
hold things together.
The sequence of unrestrained global bailouts began with Mexico in 1995 [where] the IMF-U.S. lending package was effectively a
Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 QJ. EcON. 541 (1979) (providing an
economic analysis of the standard of care for the insured in the moral hazard context). In
a more general economic context, however, the term simply refers to the greater tendency
of people who are protected from the consequences of risky behavior to engage in such
behavior. See Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start"Policy in ConsumerBankruptcy: A Historcal Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RicH. L. REv. 49, 84 (1986) (relying on the
economic definition of moral hazard: debtors and creditors that are protected from the
consequences of default "could be expected to increase both excessive borrowing and excessive resort to bankruptcy").
28
This is not to say that moral hazard is unrestrained. The IMF's delay in funding
Russia during its economic crisis in 1998, and Russia's resulting default, may have actually
reduced moral hazard. See Paul Blustein, IMFReady to Resume RussiaAid, WAsH. Posr, Apr.
29, 1999, at El. Furthermore, even if States anticipate an IMF bailout, they will want to
avoid (1) the possibility of default and its associated reputational costs, and (2) the reduced autonomy over their economies that results from conditionality, see infra notes 31-36
and accompanying text, imposed by the IMF on its loans.
29
See Mechanism, supra note 5, at 623.
IMF lending to countries in trouble does create a "moral hazard." But that
hazard does not result because IMF lending encourages countries to "behave recklessly," .....
"Instead, the hazard is that the private sector may be too willing to
lend, because it knows that a country in trouble will go to the fund rather
than default...."
Id. (quoting Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF).
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reward for corrupt and
macroeconomic policies....

risky

bank lending

and

poor

[T] he IMF might consider changing its name to the IMH80
the Institute for Moral Hazard.
The IMF has attempted to reduce moral hazard by imposing con-

ditions of fiscal responsibility on its lending, such as requiring balanced domestic budgets and devaluing local currency in order to

attain better exchange rates. 3 ' This approach is known as conditionality.32 These attempts to alleviate moral hazard, however, sometimes
fail. 33 Failure is not surprising given the IMF's history of raising
money through taxpayer dollars, 34 and the politics of deciding which
States should benefit from loans and on what conditions. 35 Alternatively, the IMF could attempt to reduce moral hazard by refusing to
act as a lender of last resort. This refusal, however, may be politically
36
untenable absent an alternative source of financing.
Multilateral governmental lending is also problematic to the extent it depends on taxation as a funding source. The IMF, for example, collects money from its member-States in order to make its
30
RobertJ. Barro, The IMFDoesn'tPut Out Fires,It Starts Them, Bus. WiL, Dec. 7, 1998,
at 18, 18. When a realistic risk of default exists, creditors have more incentive to monitor
their loans. Conversely, if a lender of last resort reduces the chances of default, creditors
have less incentive to monitor. IMF loans provided at subsidized interest rates may also
increase the risk of moral hazard. See Charles W. Calomiris, The IMFs Imprudent Role as
Lender of LastResort, CATOJ., Winter 1998, at 275, 277; STAFF oFJoiNT EcoN. COMM., 105TCONG., IMF FINANCING: A RmEVw OF TIM IssuEs 8 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter IMF
FINCING].
31 See Power, supra note 25, at 2712 & n.50. These conditions are often called "austerity measures." Id.
32 See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a PeopleCentered TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 Am. U.J. IrN'L L. & PoL'Y 1, 5 n.17 (1993) (discussing
IMF's use of "conditionality").
33 In 1997, for example, the IMF pressured Asian nations to raise their interest rates
and impose other austerity measures in return for IMF funding. See Ben Wildavsky, Curing
the Asian Flu: Two Views on the ProperMedicine, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Dec. 14, 1998, at
43, 43. This strategy could have backfired by raising borrowing costs for many businesses
in those States, causing them to default. See id. (alleging that World Bank officials feared
that austerity measures "would scare off investors [to private companies located in those
countries] and make credit so scarce that [those] companies would not get the capital they
need to survive").
34 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
35 I later show, however, that the IMF can impose conditionality without these impediments. See infra notes 199-204.
36 See, e.g., Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Casefor a
Payments Standstill (Non-Technical Summary) 2 (Centre for the Study of Globalisation &
Regionalisation Working Paper No. 35/99, May 1999), available at <http://
www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/glob-fin.html> ("What can the IMF do to avoid being
[forced to fund bailouts]?"). I later propose that the private credit and capital markets can
constitute this alternative source of funding. See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying
text.
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loans.3 7 The member-States in turn raise this money directly or indirectly through their taxing power.3 8 This practice has sparked controversy over whether taxpayers of wealthier IMF member-States are
effectively subsidizing the defaulting States, as well as the defaulting
States' creditors. For example, one scholar has criticized the IMF's
use of taxpayer funds to bail out foreign commercial banks that invest
in debt-strapped nations.3 9 Another commentator similarly observes
that
[f]or all their vigorous rhetoric about the glories of the free market
and financial deregulation, the money-center banks would not get
out of this mess unless the government stepped in and rescued
them. As the IMF lent huge sums to the debtor nations to keep
them going, the taxpayers of the United States and other industrial
nations were effectively assuming the obligations in behalf of the
banks. The more that the public treasuries lent to Mexico and the
others, the safer would be the managers and shareholders of Citibank, Morgan Guaranty, Chase and Chemical and the others. 40
Others argue, however, that dealings with the IMF have not
forced taxpayers to bear additional costs. As Robert Rubin asserts,
"over the past fifty years, our contribution to the IMF has not cost the
taxpayer one dime. There are no budget outlays. Our contribution
37 The IMF's primary means of financing is by "capital subscriptions," which represent
quotas assessed against each member-State in amounts "broadly determined by its economic position relative to other members." IMF Quotas and Quota Reviews (visited July 25,
1999) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/quotas.ht7> [hereinafter IMF Quotas]. In 1999, for example, total quotas assessed increased by 45%, from approximately
$200 billion to $290 billion. See id.
38 A government also could choose borrowing as the funding source. See, e.g., Foreign
Operations,Export Financing, and Related ProgramsAppropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1999: Hearings
on H.R. 4569/S. 2334 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,105th Cong., 2d
Sess. 93 (1998) [hereinafter AppropriationsHearings] (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury) (observing that "over time [the U.S.] Treasury generally needs to
increase its issuance of securities to the public [to fund IMF costs].... Any such issuance
would increase the national debt and interest payments on it"). Because the national debt
and interest thereon ultimately would be paid through taxation, however, the ultimate
funding source would be taxes. Cf Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for
Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 214 (1996) (noting that "[u]nder Ricardian equivalence
theories, a state's debt load represents anticipated future taxes" (citation omitted)); Neal
E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CAsE W. Rxs. L.
REV. 1605, 1625 (1997) (arguing that because Congress must usually rely on unpopular tax
increases to check the national debt, a statute that places more of the blame on the Executive Branch is very appealing).
39 See InternationalEconomic Issues, and TheirImpact on the U.S. FinancialSystem: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 360-64 (1989)

(statement of Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Economics, Harvard University).

Professor

Sachs asserts that, because international organizations such as the IMF were being "misused as conduits of taxpayer dollars to pay interest to banks," the United States should not
support these organizations in the short-term. Id. at 362.
40 WILUIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 520-21 (1987).

20001

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING

965

does not increase the deficit, or divert resources from other spending
41

priorities."

The view that there is no cost to taxpayers appears to rest more
on form than substance. Although some characterize IMF capital subscriptions as "investments," because "member countries earn interest
on their deposits in the IMF," 42 repayment by the IMF, although anticipated, 43 is not assured; 44 and the IMF pays less than a market rate of
interest. 45 In some cases, this interest rate is even below the member-

41
Implications of Asian FinancialCrisis: Before the House Comm. On Banking & Financial
Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Robert E. Rubin, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
Jan. 30, 1998). C. Fred Bergsten argues that the American taxpayer incurs zero cost from
U.S. contributions to the IMF because every dollar contributed produces an equal amount
of U.S. claims to draw currencies from the IMF. See The InternationalMonetaiy Fund and the
NationalInterests of the United States: HearingBefore theJoint Economic Comm., 105th Cong., 2d
Sess. 136-37 (1998) [hereinafter Hearingson the IMl] (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics). Professor John Head even argues that the
United States enjoyed a net gain on its IMF deposits during most of the 1980s due to
interest accruing to the United States from the IMF's use of those deposits. SeeJohn W.
Head, Lessonsfrom the Asian FinancialCrisis: The Role of the IMP and the United States, KAN.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 70, 88-89. I later demonstrate that these types of arguments
exalt form over substance. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
42
Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF, Speech at the Midwinter
Conference of the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade (Jan. 22, 1998) (transcript on
file with author). The U.S. Treasury Department similarly characterizes the payment of
the U.S. subscription as an investment because of the "equivalent increase in the U.S. reserve position in the IMF." AppropriationsHearings,supranote 38, at 92 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury).
43 See AppropriationsHearings, supra note 38, at 92 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury) (arguing that "[t]he likelihood that the IMF would fail to repay the
U.S. is extremely remote"). Because the IMF is a financial cooperative, member-States pay
capital subscriptions when they join, and theoretically have the right to a return of capital
if they ever withdraw as members. See IMP Quotas, supranote 37.
44
See, e.g., IMF FINANCING, supranote 30, at 3 (concluding that "[i] t is doubtful that
[payment of the U.S. quota subscription to the IMF] will ever be fully recovered"); see also
Hearings on the IMP, supra note 41, at 112, 115 (statement of Dr. Lawrence B. Lindsey,
Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute) (observing that "at least one private
sector analysis of the IMF balance sheet found that if it were a bank, serious questions
could be raised about the IMIF's capital adequacy"). One might question whether the IMIF
would ever have sufficient funds to repay its largest member, especially at a time when
other members are seeking to withdraw their subscriptions or IMF loans are in default.
45
The IMF pays interest on the U.S. reserve position at a rate "determined as the
weighted average of representative short-term [government borrowing] rates in the United
States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom." AppropriationsHearings,supra
note 38, at 93-94 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury). Unfortunately,
that blended rate often is lower than the rate for three-month U.S. Treasury bills, making it
not only below-market for U.S. government investments but also below the U.S. government's cost of funds (i.e., the rate on U.S. Treasury bills). See Hearings on the IM, supra
note 41, at 69 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics). Only a foolish investor would seek a rate of return that is equal to or less than its cost
of fimds.
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State's own cost of funds. 4 6 IMF funding therefore does appear to
47
impose a cost on taxpayers.
To be sure, taxpayers benefit indirectly from IMF loans that preserve the integrity of the world's financial system. 48 But this Article
asserts that these same benefits can be achieved by privatizing the
funding of sovereign debt restructuring. 49 Moreover, this type of
privatization would avoid the politics of relying on taxation as the
source of IMF funding, which can delay funding availability, thereby
impairing a debtor-State's restructuring efforts and deepening the
crisis.

50

For all of these reasons, I argue for the adoption of an international convention for sovereign debt restructuring based on bankruptcy reorganization law principles. Such a convention could help to
solve the collective action problem, minimize the moral hazard problem, and avoid any taxation problems. 5 1 Under the convention, finan46 See Hearings on the IMF,supra note 41, at 69 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics).
47 See IMF FIIANCrNG, supra note 30, at 3. The Joint Economic Committee explains:
One diversion in an IMF performance review is the dubious contention that
under existing budget rules the IMF appropriation is not a net outlay and
therefore involves no taxpayer cost. Although current accounting rules
mask the cost of the IMF quota increases to the U.S., economic analysis
clarifies the true nature of the transaction: real economic resources are
transferred at subsidized interest rates from the U.S. economy to other
nations.
Id. Taxpayer cost is also exacerbated by the intertemporal nature of taxation and repayment. See Ouvixa JEN BLANcHARD & STANLEY FIsCHER, LEcTuRES ON MACROECONOMICS
128-29 (1989) (discussing intertemporal reallocation of taxes); DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED
MACROECONOMICS 185 (1996) (same). Taxes always create intertemporal distributional issues because taxes are imposed on people today, but create benefits that arise in the future; they always impose burdens and confer benefits on different people. See Richard L.
Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discountingof Human Lives, 99
COLUM. L. Rxv. 941, 1007 (1999). In the present case of IMIF quotas, even if a memberState's capital subscription is ultimately repaid, theoretically enabling that State to reduce
taxes, the taxpayers who benefit from the reduction are not the same as those who paid the
original taxes. The usual justification is that the benefit to future taxpayers counter-balances harm to current taxpayers. See Richard A. Epstein, JusticeAcross the Generations, 67
Tax. L. Rxv. 1465, 1487-89 (1989) (examining why future generations should receive benefits from past generations). But raising taxes to fund IMF loans lacks this justification:
these taxes do not benefit the State's taxpayers, but rather the citizens of foreign debtorStates that borrow from the IMF.
48 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 42.
49 See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying text (discussing capital market funding
for loans to debtor-States). Therefore, this Article does not attempt to balance the cost to
taxpayers against the intangible benefits of funding loans to troubled States. Some scholars also may contend that rich States have an obligation to subsidize poor States. Yet, even
that contention would fail in the common IMF funding scenario where the debtor-State
uses the loan proceeds to repay its debts, thereby primarily benefitting the debtor-State's
creditors.
50 See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
51 This solution would also avoid the related politicization that results from having to
decide which States should benefit from loans, and on what conditions.
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ciers of a State's debt restructuring would have priority over claims of
other creditors, and creditors would be bound to a plan of reorganization that is agreed to via super-majority voting, whereby an affirmative
vote by a specified majority of each class of creditors binds all creditors in that class, even those that vote negatively or fail to vote.5 2 In
these contexts, I demonstrate that an international convention would
be superior to private contracting. 53 Contrary to assumptions made in
the economic literature, this type of approach should be largely selfexecuting and would not require supervision by a bankruptcy court.
Although occasional scrutiny and monitoring by a neutral international institution such as the IMF would be necessary to ensure that
the priority financing does not result in overinvestrnent, existing institutions could perform that role. By acting merely as a funding intermediary, the IMF could also impose appropriate conditionality,
without creating the moral hazard and taxation problems presently
associated with direct IMF lending. This approach can best be understood in the context of the current academic debate.
B. The Academic Debate
There are remarkably few scholarly works on sovereign debt restructuring, and none are by bankruptcy law scholars.5 4 This section
will briefly survey the current debate, which primarily exists among
economists. Professor Sachs, a leading economist at Harvard, argues
that "[tihe IMF's own tactics-and failure to act like a bankruptcy
manager-help to breed failures."5 5 For example, the IMF's reliance
on taxpayer dollars, which may not be immediately available, can
render this institution incapable of providing timely financial assistance to a State in order to prevent the collapse of critical governmental functions. 5 6 Sachs believes that the IMF could solve this problem
by implementing an international legal framework to encourage mar52
See infra notes 172-74, 274-89 and accompanying text (discussing 11 U.S.C. §§ 364,
1126 (1994)).
53 See infranotes 209-11 and accompanying text (analyzing why the priority should be

granted under international law) and Part ll.C.1 and accompanying text (analyzing why
international law must provide for super-majority voting, and why private contracting

would fail).
54 The world's political leaders have also debated the concept of an international
bankruptcy system, but have yet to take action. SeeJohn H. Chun, Note, "Post-Modern"Sovereign Debt Crisis:Did Mexico Need an InternationalBankruptcy Forum?,64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2647
(1996) (evaluating the two proposals for dealing with a sovereign debt crisis offered by the
Group of Seven after their summit on June 15-16, 1995, in Halifax, Nova Scotia). The G-7
debated over the creation of an Emergency Financing Mechanism or an International
Bankruptcy Agency (IBA). See id. at 2651-52. I discuss the IBA proposal infra notes 356-58
and accompanying text.
55 Sachs, supra note 1, at 13.
56 See id. Sachs also discusses the problems of moral hazard and collective action in
his condemnation of the IMF. See id. at 6-9, 13-14.
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ket lending to States, which it could accomplish by "supervis[ing] the
extension of 'administrative priority' [loans] for new private-market
borrowing for a liquidity-strapped member government."57 Consequently, Sachs calls for "the review and harmonization of private-sector bankruptcy practices."5 8
Professors Miller and Zhang, also economists, argue for legalization of a "standstill" or freezing of claims against a debtor-State by
analogizing to the stay of claims 59 that automatically arises in U.S.
bankruptcy cases. 60 Miller and Zhang claim that the freeze "might be
used to stop creditor races and to allow for debt restructuring." 61 This
argument relies on the central assumption that a standstill will necessarily cause creditors to take a "hit" by canceling the payment of interest during the standstill period. 62 That assumption may be partly
flawed, however, because a standstill need only suspend the payment
of interest, which would continue to accrue. Indeed, permitting a
debtor-State to use the stay to cancel its interest costs invites strategic
manipulation by States that ultimately are able to pay those costs, and
also would be unfair to creditors of those States. For these reasons,
Chapter 11 requires a solvent debtor ultimately to pay interest that
accrues during the bankruptcy case, notwithstanding the stay.6 3 If,
similarly, a debtor-State ultimately must pay accrued interest, then the
temporary freezing of payment would merely be an annoyance to
creditors. 64
Professor Cohen, a chaired professor of international economic
affairs, asserts, without supporting analysis, that there are "five crucial
safeguards" to consider in developing a reform plan for sovereign
debt restructuring, 65 and that Chapter 1I's procedures already incor57 Id. at 11-12. According to Sachs, the IMF should play a role "far more like an
international bankruptcy court and far less like the lender of last resort to member governments." Id. at 14; see also id. at 15 (analogizing the IMF's role in an international context to
the role played by a central bank in a domestic context).
58 Id. at 15.
59

This is the automatic stay provided for under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
Miller & Zhang, supra note 36, at 18-22.
61 Id. at 11.
62 Id. at 5, 20.
63 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1994). See also ChaimJ. Fortgang & Lawrence P. King,
The 1978 Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1148, 1151, 1160-61 (1981)
(arguing that to disallow the accrual of interest in this situation would be a "patently unjust
result" and would permit strategic manipulation).
64 Technically, a temporary payment freeze could reduce a creditor's effective rate of
return if the creditor accrues neither penalty interest nor interest on delayed interest payments. That reduction, however, is likely to be minimal because interest payments constitute only a fraction of a loan's principal amount.
65 Cohen, supra note 4, at 123. Cohen actually refers to the debt restructuring of less
60

developed countries, but he does not appear to differentiate that from generic sovereign
debt restructuring. See id.
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porate those safeguards. 66 First, he would grant debt forgiveness to
States that face "real insolvency. '6 7 This Article later argues that limited debt forgiveness, or "discharge," would be appropriate under a
sovereign debt restructuring plan that is agreed to by super-majority
voting. 68 Next, Cohen advocates changing or reinterpreting accounting regulations so that creditors could stretch out capital losses for
debt reduction.6 9 If this change is necessary, however, it should be
implemented in the same manner as are accounting changes generally, through the process established by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), 70 and not through a sovereign debt restructuring law.7 1 Third, Cohen would make debt relief contingent upon
implementation of needed reforms. 72 Alternatively, this Article argues
that privatizing funding under bankruptcy reorganization principles
will motivate States to adopt those needed reforms at an earlier stage,
when they are more effective. 73 Cohen's fourth safeguard is to ensure
mutual recognition of rights and obligations of both creditors and the
State. 74 Because any sovereign debt restructuring law would naturally
set forth mutual rights and obligations, this proposal is not problematic. Finally, Cohen would preserve a voluntary and market-oriented
negotiating framework to avoid further politicization of the debt issue. 75 Similarly, this Article claims that applying bankruptcy reorganization principles to sovereign debt restructuring will effectively
preserve a consensual, market-oriented negotiating framework and,
by shifting lending strategies away from tax-based funding, will avoid
6
further politicization.'
See id. at 124.
Id. at 123. Cohen refers to his proposal as "selectivity." Id. (typeface altered). He
would not, however, grant debt forgiveness for States that merely face illiquidity. See id.To
that extent, Cohen and I are clearly in agreement. See infranotes 226-33 and accompanying
text (discussing liquidity).
68
See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
69
See Cohen, supra note 4, at 123. Cohen labels this proposal "flexibility." Id. (typeface altered).
70
See FASB, An Open Deision-Making Process (visited August 11, 1999) <http://
wvw.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/facts/fasfact4.html>.
71
The appropriateness of that change is beyond the scope of this Article. A complete
analysis must balance the need to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring with the need for
dear disclosure.
72
See Cohen, supra note 4, at 123. Consistent with IMF terminology for imposing
conditions on loan funding, Cohen calls this proposal "conditionality." Id. (typeface
altered).
73
See infranotes 178-81 and accompanying text. Moreover, in this Article, I propose a
convention under which the IMF, to the extent necessary, could continue to impose conditionality without causing the problems presently associated with IMF lending. See infra
notes 197-208 and accompanying text (discussing nonrecourse back-to-back lending).
74 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 124. He labels his fourth proposal "mutuality." Id.
(typeface altered).
75
See id Cohen refers to his final proposal as "autonomy." Id. (typeface altered).
76
See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
66
67
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After articulating these safeguards, Cohen briefly attempts to explain the manner in which Chapter 11 procedures already embody
them:
Mutuality and autonomy are preserved by an essentially voluntary
and market-oriented negotiating framework based on explicit recognition of respective rights and obligations. Selectivity is maintained in the debtor's right to make the initial decision to seek
protection. Flexibility is inherent in the virtually unlimited scope
provided for final terms of settlement. And conditionality is reflected in the court's assignment
to a supervisory role over the
77
debtor's ongoing operations.
He concludes that "[t]he challenge is to translate [these five safeguards] into a specific design that is likely to be practicable and
effective." 78
Economists Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes have written
perhaps the most comprehensive work on sovereign debt restructuring.79 Inspired by the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, they first examine the
ways that "financial markets, governments and multilateral institutions
respond to" that type of crisis.8 0 After reviewing the history of sovereign debt restructuring,8 ' Eichengreen and Portes then examine how
to make the process of restructuring, which often "take[s] years to
complete,"8 2 more efficient.8 3 In this context, they consider the feasibility of "a 'bankruptcy court' and procedure modelled on Chapter
11."8 4 These scholars conclude, however, that "there are significant
obstacles" to feasibly implementing such a reform, and that those obstacles are "insurmountable for the foreseeable future."8 5 Nonetheless, Eichengreen and Portes make several other useful
recommendations,8 6 including the establishment of a "mediation ser87
vice for conciliation and voluntary arbitration."
Cohen, supra note 4, at 124.
Id. For example, he assumes that instituting these safeguards on an international
level would require a supranational institution analogous to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
court, or at least a mediator. See id. at 124-25. I later argue that the creation of a new
institution may not be necessary. See infra notes 361-86 and accompanying text.
79 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8.
77
78

80
81

Id. at xv.

See id. at 19-28.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 28-46.
Id. at 42.
85 Id. (referring to obstacles such as the "great divergences that exist among national
perspectives and laws on the best ways of dealing with problems of bankruptcy"). As this
Article will show, I disagree that such obstacles are insurmountable. See infra Part II.C.
86
See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 48-51. One of their recommendations
is for the creation of official bondholders' committees. See id.at 48. I later argue, however,
that official creditors' committees are unnecessary. See infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
87
EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 49.
82
83
84
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Although Chapter 11 inspires the arguments of Miller and
Zhang88 and of Cohen, 89 little normative rationale supports their assertions. Eichengreen and Portes base their arguments on certain
economic assumptions about bankruptcy theory, 90 but they do not systematically explore the normative basis of Chapter 11 itself, which is
only partly economic. 9 1 The task of applying bankruptcy reorganization principles to sovereign debt restructuring, however, would appear to be primarily normative:
There is considerable confusion as to how the principles of bankruptcy should translate to the case of sovereign borrowers ....
Therefore, the question is mostly a normative one-how should international practice, and specifically IMF practice, be arranged in
92
view of the lessons of bankruptcy law.
This Article now turns to that task and to the more general analysis
that it engenders.

H
ANAL-YSIS

This Article outlines a conceptual basis for sovereign debt restructuring by examining the conceptual basis of Chapter 11-including in
that examination other related chapters of the Code, such as Chapter
9 which focuses on municipal government reorganization 9 3-and
then by analyzing how that conceptual basis should be modified to
address sovereign debt restructuring and its problems. This Article
then uses that modified conceptual basis to propose model rules for
an international convention on sovereign debt restructuring. Finally,
it examines possible ways to implement those rules. Contrary to the
assumptions that many scholars make in economic literature, this Article illustrates that sovereign debt restructuring based on principles of
Chapter 11 reorganization would not require a bankruptcy court's
supervision.
This analysis does not assume that Chapter 11 is always a perfect
system for debt restructuring. 94 Some scholars have criticized Chapter
11, most notably Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig who advo88
89
90
91
92

See Miller & Zhang, supra note 36.
See Cohen, supra note 4.
See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 8-11.
See infra Part II.A (analyzing the normative basis of Chapter 11).

Sachs, supra note 1, at 8.
93 See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. Unless the context otherwise requires, references in this Article to Chapter 11 or to principles of Chapter 11 reorganization shall also include those other related Chapters of the Code.
94

Cf Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 8, at 14 (cautioning that "proponents of an

international Chapter 11 must recognize that Chapter 11 is seriously criticized in the
United States").
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cate its repeal. 95 They claim that agency costs make Chapter 11 inefficient by prolonging management and by allowing companies that
should liquidate to attempt reorganization. 96 In place of Chapter 11,
Bradley and Rosenzweig would institute a market solution requiring
residual claimants to either cure the defaults of more senior claimants, such as by raising money in the capital markets to repay the company's debt, or risk losing their claims to the next-most senior
claimants. 97 Regardless of whether these criticisms are valid in a corporate context, 98 they have little application to sovereign debt restructuring because liquidation is not an option. 99 Further, their proposed
market solution would also be inapplicable because States have no
residual claimants or owners. 10 0
This Article's methodology nonetheless risks being incomplete in
two ways: (1) the conceptual basis of corporate reorganization under
one or more foreign insolvency laws might be better suited to sovereign debt restructuring than Chapter 11, or (2) the matters compared
are too dissimilar to be meaningful. 10 1 With respect to the first risk,
my examination of corporate reorganization under several foreign insolvency laws reveals that the conceptual basis of those laws is remarkably similar to that of Chapter 11.102 Four of those countries' laws are
actually based on Chapter 11 or its antecedent statutes in the United
States, and the one law not actually based on Chapter 11 is based on
95

See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11, 101

YALE Lj. 1043 (1992).
96

See id. at 1076, 1078.

97 See id. at 1078-86. In effect, their proposal gives residual claimants the option of
buying out the senior creditors in order to retain their residual claim. See id. at 1081. The
process continues until either a class of residual claimants buys out the senior creditors or
the most senior creditors become the residual claimants. See id. at 1081-82.
98 See Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Casefor Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YAn Lj. 437
(1992) (challenging the Bradley and Rosenzweig thesis). Professor Warren argues, among
other things, that the data do not prove Bradley and Rosenzweig's case and that plausible
alternative hypotheses may explain many of their statistical findings. See id. at 440-67. She
also counters that Bradley and Rosenzweig focus only on bankruptcy's goal of preserving
value for public shareholders and bondholders, thereby omitting its distributional goals.
See id. at 467-77. She concludes that Congress should not repeal Chapter 11 because, "thus
far, no one has come up with a good substitute." Id. at 478.
99 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing why sovereign States are not
liquidated).
100
See supra note 9 (observing that States have no shareholders).
101
See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On AnalogicalReasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741,
744 (1993) ("For analogical reasoning to work well, we have to say that the relevant, known
similarities give us good reason to believe that there are further similarities and thus help
to answer an open question.").
102 With the help of LL.M. students Ori Demb from Israel, Mike Perry from Canada,
Yasuto Hashinaga from Japan, Tomas Allende from Argentina, and Till Hafner from Germany, I examined corporate reorganization under the bankruptcy and insolvency laws of
their countries. Although this group is not a statistically meaningful sample, it does represent a range of both civil and common law States on different continents.
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principles that are remarkably similar to those of Chapter 11.103
Moreover, preliminary research also suggests that
[for countries that] have market economies and share the same assumptions and broad objectives for formal reorganization, it [is]
highly likely, if not inevitable, that [those] countries [will] develop
[bankruptcy] reorganization systems that function in essentially the
same ivay ... [because] [t]he functional aspects of these systems
104
[are] shaped not by culture or politics, but by necessity.
103 Japan modeled its corporate reorganization law, Kaisha k6sei h6 [Corporate Reorganization Act], Law No. 172 of 1952, after Chapter X of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
as amended-the predecessor statute to Chapter 11. See HAIjm KANEKO ET AL., JoKAI KAI-

sHA KEsEi Ho, (Jo) 11, 14 (1973) Like the most important sections of Chapter 11 that I
will discuss, see infra notes 172-234 and accompanying text, Law No. 172 gives priority to
loans made in order to enable a company to continue in business, see Law No. 172 of 1952,
arts. 119-3, 208, 209, and also provides for super-majority voting of creditors, see id. art. 205.
For a general discussion of Law No. 172, see Tasuku Matsuo, CorporateReorganization, in 7
DOING Busrxss IN JAPAN §§ 8.01-.06 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1999).
Chapter 11 forms the basis of the essential elements of German corporate reorganization law as well. See MIcHAEL BLxTz & ANDREA K. BuTH, RE TRuicruRIERuNG, DA-mERuNG,
INSOLVENZ 84 (1998). Further, the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) was
influenced by, and is largely reflective of, Chapter 11. See, e.g., L. Shorten, BIA: Help or
Hindrance,17 CAN. LAw. 37 (1993) (characterizing the 1992 amendments to Canada's BIA
as "Canada's Chapter 11");Jacob S. Ziegel, The Modernizationof Canada'sBankruptcy Law in
a Comparative Contex 33 Tax. INr'L LJ. 1 (1998) (discussing the substantive and procedural similarities of Canada's BIA and Chapter 11).
The reorganization provisions ("Concurso Preventivo") of Argentina's insolvency law,
Law No. 24522, Aug. 7, 1995, [LV-D] A.D.LA 4381, also are based on Chapter 11. See, e.g.,
Julio C. Otaegui, Commentaro del Articulo 48 de la Novisima Ley de Concursos en Homenaje al
Maestro Raymundo L. Fernandez, in DERECHO EMPREDARrO AcruA 799, 803-04 (Osvaldo R.
Gomez Leo ed., 1996) (observing that the Argentine Congress expressly took U.S. Chapter
11 as the model for corporate rehabilitation). Thus, it includes what I show to be Chapter
1I's two most important contributions to sovereign debt restructuring: super-majority voting (binding each class of creditors to a reorganization plan by a vote of holders of a
majority in number and at least two-thirds by amount of the claims, under Concurso
Preventivo Art. 45) and priority financing of the reorganization (at least in a limited form
under Concurso Preventivo Art. 13).
Israeli reorganization law, codified in Companies Ordinance Chapter 10, sections 233,
333-34, 307(a), & 300, 1983, is the only one that does not appear to be based on Chapter
11; nonetheless, its principles, as interpreted by the courts, are remarkably similar to those
of Chapter 11. The Israeli Supreme Court has found the Ordinance to advance three reorganization goals: (1) rehabilitation of viable debtors, including abrogation of the traditional "absolute priority" rule in order to encourage consensual plans of reorganization;
(2) equality of distribution for creditors; and (3) economic efficiency. See CA. 217/88,
Hapoalim-Bank v. Trustee of the Scheme of Arrangement Between the Encyclopedias Publishing Firm et al., 44(2) P.D. 698, 703. These goals are remarkably similar to U.S. bankruptcy reorganization norms. See infranotes 115-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
same norms under Chapter 11). Furthermore, section 233(b) of the Ordinance provides
for a form of super-majority voting-each class of creditors is bound to a reorganization
plan by a vote of a majority of those present holding at least three-quarters by amount of
the claims. See also CA. 700/71, Otzar Kablanim Ltd. v. Sherf, 27(1) P.D. 561, 564 (confirming section 233(b)'s power to override contrary contractual voting provisions).
104
Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and
Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 267, 342
(1994).
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In contrast, scholars may assert that existing differences between
national bankruptcy systems could make a bankruptcy reorganization
approach to sovereign debt restructuring impractical. 10 5 But those
differences may be less significant than at first perceived. A national
bankruptcy system must address both companies that liquidate and
those that reorganize. From this perspective, the differences between
national bankruptcy systems are significant because some favor liquidation while others favor reorganization. 10 6 As previously discussed,
however, States do not liquidate.' 0 7 Therefore, a broad comparison of
bankruptcy systems would highlight differences that are not applicable to debtor-States. Because they always reorganize, the more precise
comparison for debtor-States would be between national bankruptcy
reorganizationsystems. My analysis already compares five of those systems and concludes that they are conceptually similar to Chapter
11.108 Furthermore, I focus on those aspects of Chapter 11 that come
into play once a debtor decides to reorganize.
Additionally, even if national bankruptcy reorganization systems
were not conceptually similar, the analogy to Chapter 11 serves only as
a starting point for inquiry. Absent an overarching theory of sovereign
debt restructuring, which does not exist because sovereign debt structuring is purely a matter of contract negotiation' 0 9 thus rendering

105
See, e.g., E-mail from Richard Portes, Distinguished Global Visiting Professor, Haas
School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, to Steven L. Schwarcz 1 (October
24, 1999) (on file with author) (stating that the differences between national bankruptcy
systems constitute "one of the bases for our [Portes & Eichengreen's] conclusion that an
international bankruptcy procedure of the type you [Schwarcz] suggest will not be
acceptable").
106
See, e.g., Julian R. Franks et al., A Comparison of US, UK and German Insolvency Codes,
FIN. MGMrT., Autumn 1996, at 86, 93-94.
107 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
108
See supranotes 102-03 and accompanying text Professor Portes states that the primary article that he and Professor Eichengreen relied on for their conclusion that a bankruptcy reorganization approach to sovereign debt restructuring is impractical was Franks et
al., supra note 106, which compares U.S. and U.K. bankruptcy law to German insolvency
law. See E-mail from Richard Portes, supra note 105 (stating such reliance). Nonetheless,
the corporate reorganization part of the new German insolvency law, Insolvenzordnung
(InsO), v. 5.10.94 (BGB1. I S.2866) (eff. Jan. 1, 1999), is not only based on U.S. Chapter
11, see BLATZ & ButH, supra note 103 but also includes super-majority voting and priority
financing provisions similar to what I propose for the Convention. See InsO §§ 244, 264,
5511, 56, 80.
109
See, e.g., Mudge, supra note 2, at 59 ("Sovereign debt restructure is contractual
agreement between individual debtor and individual creditor with respect to the debt in
question, and nothing more.").
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each situation unique, 110 analogy can help suggest rational legal
outcomes."'
Turning to the second risk, I believe that the matters being compared under this analogy are indeed similar enough to be meaningful.
Although sovereign States and non-sovereign corporations are fundamentally different, this Article's analysis takes into account the reorganization of sovereign entities by examining municipal
reorganization under Chapter 9 of the Code. 112 Although bankruptcy
judges supervise Chapters 9 and 11 cases (whereas equivalent judicial
supervision may be impractical for sovereign States), this fact does not
weaken the analogy because those matters that require judicial super3
vision are inapplicable to States."1
A.

Deriving a Normative Framework for Regulation

In deriving a normative framework for regulation, I first examine
the conceptual basis of Chapter 11 and then analyze possible modifications that address sovereign debt restructuring problems. 114 The
first analysis is complicated, but also universalized, by disagreement
on Chapter 11's normative underpinnings.
Traditionally, Chapter 11 attempts to advance two overall goals:
to rehabilitate viable debtors and to ensure equality of distribution
among creditors. 1 15 Some scholars, however, argue that the only nor110 See id. at 60 ("Each restructure is negotiated separately in its own factual context
.... There are no general rules, and the solution to yesterday's problem is not the answer
to today's question. The solution for the Kingdom of Oz simply will not work for the Republic of Zo.... Each situation is unique....."); see also Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen

Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy
Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 966 (1991) (expressing "distrust of any all-embracing, formal
model of bankruptcy law and policy").
1I
See Sunstein, supra note 101, at 767 (arguing that when there is insufficient information to agree on an overarching theory to deduce the "right" outcome, analogy can help
produce a rational legal outcome). But see RicHARD A. PosNER, OVERCOMING LAW 518-22
(1995) (arguing that although "[a]nalogies can be suggestive, even illuminating," their use
should not exclude attempts to find facts and policies for deciding the case at hand).
112 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
113
See infra notes 359-74 and accompanying text (observing that bankruptcy courts do
not play a role in debt negotiations in the United States-the parties themselves do the
negotiating-and that while certain administrative oversight functions are delegated to a
U.S. trustee, those functions do not appear relevant to sovereign debt restructuring).
114 My analysis does not necessarily differentiate between short-term and long-term
debt. Although short-term debt may be a greater problem for States than long-term debt,
see, e.g., Miller & Zhang, supra note 36, at 8 (arguing that short-term debt is the "Achilles
heel" of recent countries in crisis), a default on short-term debt almost always permits
holders of long-term debt to accelerate their maturities, essentially converting it into shortterm debt. Moreover, covenant breaches in long-term debt may permit acceleration-irrespective of the short-term debt. Finally, the claims of holders of long-term and short-term
debt generally are pan passu.
115 See Steven L. Schwarcz, RethinkingFreedomof Contract:A Bankruptcy Paradigm,77 TL-x.
L. REV. 515, 542-43 (1999). A third, lesser, goal is efficient administration of the bank-
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mative goal of bankruptcy reorganization law should be economic efficiency."16 These contrasting views represent two distinct, and possibly
7
irreconcilable, philosophies of corporate reorganization."
Traditionalists believe that bankruptcy law plays a unique role
that "advances substantive goals that are both important and distinctive."" 8 In contrast, scholars who follow principles of economic efficiency ("free marketers") believe that "a coherent bankruptcy law
must recognize how it fits into both the rest of the legal system and a
ruptcy process. See id. at 543. Other scholars, however, have proposed different articuladons of bankruptcy's traditional goals. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymakingin an
Imperfect World 92 MIcH. L. REv. 336, 343-73 (1993). Professor Warren, for example, has
argued that there are four such goals: to "enhance the value of [the] failing [debtor]," id.
at 344; to provide for equality of distribution (except for deliberate deviations from equality); to "constrain externalization of business losses to parties not dealing with the debtor,"
id. at 361; and to create reliance on private monitoring; see also id. at 370 (arguing that
"It]he debtor is typically the only party with access to full information about its outstanding
obligations, future business plans, and income projections," and thus is "usually best able
to assess how successful the business is likely to be in meeting its continuing obligations,
and to determine whether bankruptcy provides an opportunity to enhance the value of the
business"). Professor LoPucki has argued that Chapter 11 addresses four problems: liquidity, so that assets are not disposed of at bargain prices; communication and coordination
among all interested parties; relief from contract provisions that depress the value of the
estate; and oversight of shifts in management and ownership that accompany insolvency.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Correspondence, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig 91 MacH. L. REv. 79, 100-06 (1992). Both Warren and LoPucki's
goals, however, are included within the goals of debtor rehabilitation and equality of distribution. See Schwarcz, supra, at 544 n.168.
116 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIc AND LIMrrs OF BANRuPrcy LAW 1-6
(1986); Barry E. Adler, Finance's TheoreticalDivideand the ProperRole of Insolvency Rules, 67 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1107, 1107-11 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is CorporateBankruptcy Efficient?,
27J. FIN. EcoN. 411 (1990); Robert IL Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1159-65 (1994).
117 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE LJ. 573, 595-99
(1998). Professor Baird concludes that these two philosophies cannot be reconciled by
empirical data because the split "is at bottom normative."

Id. at 596. Therefore,

"[bJridging the gap between [these philosophies] ... 'must ultimately dissolve into a study
of aesthetics and morals.'" Id at 599 (quoting R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cos4 3J.L. &
ECON. 1, 43 (1960)); see also Donald R. Korobkin, The Role ofNormative Theoy in Bankruptcy
Debates, 82 IOWA L. REv. 75, 76 (1996). Professor Korobkin observes that
[b]ankruptcy scholars are profoundly divided over the proper direction of
bankruptcy law. One school-the 'free-market critics'-argues that the law
of corporate reorganization frustrates the voluntary choices of commercial
actors and therefore should be replaced with various proposals designed to
maximize allocative efficiency. The other school-the 'traditionalists'-defends the basic structure of current law, while also attacking free-market
proposals as ill-conceived and impractical.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For an approach to bankruptcy law analysis that accommodates
both of these philosophies, see Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 523 (considering each philosophy separately before advocating a hybrid approach, thereby allowing readers with a pristine philosophical bent to focus on their own perspectives).
118 Baird, supra note 117, at 576. Legal scholars have described these goals as debtor
rehabilitation, equality of distribution, and minimizing cost of administration. See, e.g.,
Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 542-43.
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vibrant market economy." 1 9 A dean of American bankruptcy jurisprudence, Professor Douglas Baird, suggests that the differences between traditionalists and free marketers arise out of their different
starting axioms. 120 I therefore examine the disputes over these axioms
in an attempt to understand which axioms might apply to sovereign
debt restructuring.
Baird identifies three disputes. 12 1 The first addresses the rehabilitative role of bankruptcy law, questioning the role the law should play
in "keeping a firm intact as a going concern."1 22 Free marketers contend that bankruptcy law's only role is "determining whether keeping
the firm intact makes economic sense."12 3 A firm that has a sound
business, but that is likely to fail because of the amount of debt in its
capital structure, 124 should be kept intact. 12 5 But a firm with an inherently unsound business should be allowed to fail "to ensure that [its]
assets are put to their best use."'1 26 Traditionalists, on the other hand,

argue that bankruptcy law "serves an important purpose in rehabilitating firms that, but for bankruptcy protection, would fail. Jobs would
be lost and communities damaged, economically and otherwise, if the
1 27
protections that bankruptcy law provides were unavailable."
This dispute over rehabilitation applies, however, only indirectly
to sovereign debt restructuring. At least in the present world order,
119
Baird, supra note 117, at 577. Professor Baird uses the term "proceduralist" in lieu
of the term "free marketer." Id. The latter term, however, is more commonly used in the
literature. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supranote 115, at 523.
120 See Baird, supra note 117, at 575.
121
See id. at 576-80.
122
Id. at 577.
123
Id. Thus, free marketers posit that "[a]ll bankruptcy can do is ensure that fights
among creditors and other investors of capital do not accelerate a firm's liquidation." Id. at
578. As part of their focus on economic efficiency, free marketers would oppose rules that
allow parties "to take actions without bearing their full costs." Id. at 583.
124
Such a firm is sometimes referred to as a "good company, bad balance sheet." See
Debtor-in-PossessionLoan Rating Citewia, DEBToR-rN-PossEsoN Loals SPECiAL REPORT (Fitch
Investors Service Inc., NewYork, N.Y.), Mar. 25, 1991, at 4 (stating that Fitch favors rating
loans to such bankrupt companies). Professor Baird describes such a firm as having financial but not economic distress. See Baird, supra note 117, at 580-81.
125 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 117, at 581-82 (observing that "[flor the [free marketer],
bankruptcy law exists to solve the problem of financialdistress" and further that "[the
mission of bankruptcy is to ensure that firms do not fail
simply because they have creditors
they cannot pay").
126 Id. at 582. Professor Baird illustrates this re-use of assets by the example of a restaurant in a large city. "If a bad restaurant is replaced by a much better one, employment
levels in the city may even increase. Keeping a bad restaurant in business postpones the
inevitable and delays a desirable shift of labor and capital to somewhere the inputs can be
put to better use." Id. at 580.
127 Id. at 577. Professor Baird says that traditionalists "do not distinguish sharply between economic and financial distress." Id. at 582. Whether or not that is true, the parties
participating in the bankruptcy case do make such a distinction. For example, lenders are
reluctant to advance debtor-in-possession financing to bankrupt firms with inherently unsound businesses. See Debtor-in-PossessionLoan Rating Criteria,supra note 124.
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sovereign States are not liquidated and their assets then redistributed
for more valuable economic uses. 128 Thus, there is no need to determine whether keeping the State intact makes economic sense, nor am
I advocating that such a determination be made. The only goal here is
rehabilitation, and any sovereign debt restructuring scheme should
facilitate, or at least not impede, that goal.
Professor Baird next identifies the debate over whether bankruptcy law should be a closed or an open system. 129 Free marketers
believe that bankruptcy should be an open system, and that consequently its rules should "be crafted with an eye to the way they affect
the incentives of those who are involved with firms that are not in
bankruptcy and have no immediate prospect of getting there."' 3 0
Their concern is that "[s]ubstantive rules implemented exclusively in
bankruptcy are suspect because of the effects they may have on investment beforehand ....

Inconsistency may do more harm than good

Traditionalists, on the other hand, believe that bankruptcy is
a self-contained, closed system, because "the breathing space that
bankruptcy law gives distressed firms and the other costs it imposes on
the participants have only a modest effect on how creditors and others
behave ex ante."' 3 2 Thus, traditionalists justify the goal of avoiding
certain preferential but nonfraudulent prepetition transfers, 133 be...

..

131

128
129

See supra note 8.
See Baird, supra note 117, at 578.

130

Id.

Id. at 578 (footnote omitted); cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)
(reasoning that "[u]niform treatment of property interests [inside and outside bankruptcy] serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a
[debtor] from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy'"
(quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961))). Because of the
problems associated with differing incentives, free marketers argue that economic forces
should operate in bankruptcy just as they do outside of bankruptcy. See Baird, supra note
117, at 578. Therefore, the burden should rest on traditionalists to justify bankruptcy rules
that are different from nonbankruptcy rules. See id. at 590 & n.50.
132
Baird, supranote 117, at 578. Baird also observes that "[t]raditionalists are able to
pay ex ante effects so litfle heed because of the sheer difficulty of identifying these effects
with any certainty. Hard evidence that these [effects] matter is elusive." Id. at 589.
133
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). Section 547(b) states in relevant part:
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition...
...and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
131
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cause this avoidance advances the goal of equality of distribution 3 4
while, they argue, only modestly affecting prepetition dealings between the debtor and its creditors.
This dispute appears more directly relevant to sovereign debt restructuring. States, unlike corporations, require less "breathing
space" because their sovereignty already provides that. Therefore,
States have less need for special bankruptcy rules. Alternatively, ex
post modification of creditors' rights by "[s]ubstantive rules implemented exclusively in bankruptcy" can have adverse effects such as
increasing sovereign borrowing costs.13 5 Sovereign debt restructuring
rules should therefore be crafted to minimally affect the incentives of
those who negotiate with nonbankrupt States.
Baird's third dispute concerns the implementation of bankruptcy
law and focuses on the judge's role in the bankruptcy process. 136 Free
marketers "see the judge as a disinterested arbiter" 3 7 in a system in
which parties make their own decisions, and the judge acts simply "to
ensure that the biases of the parties are taken into account and all
relevant information is gathered and disclosed." 3 8 Those biases, for
example, include the desire of institutional creditors to liquidate the
firm and the agency costs of the shareholders. 3 9 In contrast, traditionalists believe that "[i]mplementing the goals of bankruptcy requires investing the judge with broad discretion to ensure that
bankruptcy's goals are vindicated," 140 a belief that free marketers may
14 1
consider "hopelessly sentimental."
This dispute is also relevant to sovereign debt restructuring.
Granting judicial arbiters broad discretion to bind sovereign States
may simply be politically unacceptable. 14 2 Accordingly, any frame(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this tide.

IM
134
See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 578 ("The dominant expression of equality of distribution under bankruptcy law is found in Section 547(b) ...
135
Baird, supra note 117, at 578.
136
See id. at 579.
137 Id.
138
Id.

See id.
Id.
141 Id. at 593 (explaining that free marketers disagree with giving judges broad discretion because the court-administered bankruptcy process would impose even more unnecessary costs). Indeed, giving the judge equitable discretion, coupled with the concomitant
vagueness in bankruptcy rules, "merely gives the parties more cause for litigation and
hence increases the cost of the reorganization without providing any offsetting benefit."
Id. at 595.
142 See Chun, supra note 54, at 2677 n.237 ("A sovereign cannot realistically be expected to submit to a court-like entity who [sic] can issue binding rulings.").
139
140
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work for sovereign debt restructuring should minimize adjudicatory
discretion.' 4 3
Hence, a supranational legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring has at least three normative underpinnings: (1) it should
foster, or at least not impair, the State's ultimate economic rehabilitation; (2) it should minimally affect nonbankruptcy incentives; and (3)
it should require only minimal adjudicatory discretion in its administration.14 Moreover, any complete framework must take into account
the following major problems associated with sovereign debt restructuring: collective action, moral hazard, and taxation. Thus, a complete framework requires that any international convention for
sovereign debt restructuring foster the three normative underpinnings above as well as attempt to relieve the major problems associated with sovereign debt restructuring.
The next section of this Article attempts to use this framework to
model a system of rules for an international sovereign debt restructuring convention (the "Convention"). I begin by identifying the provisions of the Code that might be relevant to sovereign debt
restructuring and then analyze those provisions in light of the proposed framework.
B.

Modeling Regulatory Rules for an International Convention

The only provisions of the Code that might be relevant to sovereign debt restructuring are included in Chapter 11, which governs
corporate reorganization, and in the Code's related chapters: Chapter
9, which governs adjustment of debts of municipal governments;
14 5
Chapter 3, which governs administration of the bankruptcy case;
and Chapter 5, which contains provisions concerning the relationship
between creditors and the debtor. (At first, I considered focusing on
Chapter 9 because it contains the Code's only provisions for reorganization of a political entity; analysis showed, however, that Chapter 9
adds little to the other Chapters because it primarily incorporates
their provisions by reference 146 and contains few provisions that are
143 Undeniablyjudicial arbiters should not have the power to interfere with the State's
political or governmental powers, property or revenues, or use or enjoyment of incomeproducing property. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1994) (prohibiting the bankruptcy court
from interfering with "(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2)
any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any
income-producing property"). The Convention I propose does not purport to interfere
with these powers or rights. See infra notes 360-70 and accompanying text.
144 Adjudicatory power would be based on consent of the State, as expressed through
an international convention. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
145 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1994).
146 See id. § 901.
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unique to municipal debtors. 147) I analyze these provisions in light of
148
the proposed framework.
Commencing the Case. Sections 301 and 303 of the Code set forth
the procedures for initiating a bankruptcy case. 149 Under § 301, a
debtor has the discretion to voluntarily file a bankruptcy petition without being insolvent or meeting other requirements, except those discussed below. The rationale behind this Section is that a debtor knows
best when bankruptcy protection is appropriate.' 50 Courts, however,
have imposed the requirement that a debtor must file any voluntary
petition in good faith. 15 1 Creditors may only file an involuntary bankruptcy case against debtors under § 303 in limited circumstances, such
as when a debtor is generally not paying its debts when due. This
requirement prevents creditors from using the threat of bankruptcy to
harass ordinary debtors. 152 This rationale applies even more strongly
147 Those few provisions are obvious anyway. For example, unless a municipal debtor
consents or the reorganization plan provides otherwise, a court may not interfere with a
municipal debtor's political or governmental powers, property or revenues, or use or enjoyment of income-producing property. See id. § 904. Municipal debtors are the only parties allowed to file a plan for adjustment of their debts. See id. § 941 (varying 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121's authorization of judicial modification of the debtor's exclusive right to fie a
plan). Further, the court may confirm municipal plans only if any needed regulatory or
electoral approval either has been obtained or its being obtained is an express condition of
the plan. See id. § 943(b) (6). Perhaps the only non-obvious provision provides, apparently
to protect the common municipal financing technique of issuing tax-exempt, nonrecourse
industrial revenue bonds, that "special revenues" acquired by a municipal debtor after the
commencement of its bankruptcy case remain subject (after subtraction of any operating
expenses needed to generate the special revenues) to pre-bankruptcy liens. See id. § 928.
That result would be obvious but for the special provision in 11 U.S.C. § 552 cutting off
many pre-bankruptcy liens of corporate debtors.
148
Relevant provisions under these Chapters include §§ 301, 303 (providing procedures for instituting a bankruptcy case); §§ 362, 922 (automatically staying actions against
the debtor); § 364 (c), (d), (e), (f) (obtaining credit); § 365 (assuming or rejecting contracts); § 507 (a) (1) (providing priority to certain creditor claims); §§ 524 (a) (1) & (a) (2),
727, 1141(d) (discharging unpaid debts); §§ 547, 549 (avoiding preferences); § 1102 (creating committees to represent creditors); § 1123 (setting forth contents of plan of reorganization, other than irrelevant subsections (a) (6), (a) (7), (c), and (d)); § 1126 (providing
for acceptance of plan of reorganization, other than subsection (d) because a State has no
equity owners); and § 1129 (setting forth confirmation standards for a reorganization
plan).
149 Id. §§ 301, 303.
150 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 115, at 370 (arguing that "[t]he debtor is typically the
only party with access to full information about its outstanding obligations, future business
plans, and income projections," and is thus "usually best able to assess how successful the
business is likely to be in meeting its continuing obligations, and to determine whether
bankruptcy provides an opportunity to enhance the value of the business").
151
See 2 COLUER ON BANKRuPTCY 1 301.04[1] (15th ed. rev. 1996) [hereinafter COLUER]. In a municipal bankruptcy, § 921(c) of the Code explicitly permits a court to dismiss
a bankruptcy petition not filed in good faith. Cf McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 46061 (questioning why the good faith requirement is explicit only for municipal bankruptcy
filings).
152 See ROBERT L. JoRDAN ET AL., BA~muPTcy 224 (5th ed. 1999).
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to municipal debtors, and hence the Code flatly prohibits creditors
53
from filing involuntary bankruptcy cases against municipalities.1
Curiously, however, § 109(c) of the Code allows municipalities to
file a bankruptcy petition only if they are insolvent on a cash flow
basis, which means that the municipality is "generally not paying its
debts as they become due [or is] unable to pay its debts as they become due."154 Unfortunately, a cash flow insolvency standard
almost certainly makes both creditors and debtor worse off in those
cases actually culminating in bankruptcy [because it] postpones the
day of reckoning, while the city continues to pile on new debt at
ever-increasing interest rates, further burdening the municipal
budget and guaranteeing that each creditor will receive less value in
bankruptcy. The problem is not easy to solve, because the insulation
of municipal assets from seizure and sale makes the idea of balance
sheet insolvency meaningless, and there is no obvious alternative. 155
Absent an insolvency requirement for filing, the foregoing approach for commencing a bankruptcy case appears sensible for sovereign debt restructuring. Few States would willingly subject themselves
to a Convention under which creditors could force the State into involuntary bankruptcy. Moreover, in a case in which creditors might
want to subject the State to the Convention's rules, the State itself
would have an equal or greater interest in choosing those rules. 15 6
Identification of the interests of the State and its creditors would
therefore obviate the need for creditors to act as "monitors and instigators of outside intervention." 157 Furthermore, imposing an insolvency requirement could be counter-productive-discouraging the
153 See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), which makes § 303 (involuntary bankruptcy) inapplicable
to municipalities; see also In reRichmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1991) (noting that permitting involuntary filings against municipalities "may constitute an invasion of State sovereignty contrary to the Tenth Amendment, and would constitute bad policy" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 321 (1977)).
11 U.S.C. § 101 (32) (C) (defining insolvency for a municipality). This test "reflects
154
the pre-Code common law view, which treated the municipal debtor as having few physical
assets available for creditors and instead focused almost exclusively on the ability of the
debtor to generate revenues through property taxes." McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at
456.
155
McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 456-57.
156
Under the Convention, financiers of the State's debt restructuring would have priority over claims of other creditors. Also, the Convention would bind all creditors to a plan
of reorganization that is agreed to by super-majority voting of creditors and, upon such
agreement, the Convention would discharge debts not provided for in the plan. See infra
notes 241-54 and accompanying text. A creditor might want the first rule to apply in order
to provide liquidity to the State. However, if the State needs liquidity and cannot obtain it
elsewhere, the State would want to file. Likewise, a creditor who is frustrated by unanimity
requirements in loan agreements might want the second rule to apply in order to achieve
an overall debt restructuring plan. Similarly, the State would be frustrated by its inability to
reach such a plan and, therefore, would want that rule to apply.
157
McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 478.
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Convention's use by States that wish to avoid being branded as insolvent.1 58 Thus, this protocol should empower only the State itself, and
not its creditors, to commence the case. Further, provided that the
State files its case in good faith, 159 the filing should be upheld. As
discussed above, imposing other filing requirements might prevent
the State from taking advantage of bankruptcy protection when the
State needs it the most,

60

thereby harming both the State and its

creditors.
This approach to commencing a case appears neutral from the
standpoints of collective action and taxation. Although the approach
might appear to foster moral hazard to the extent external observers
cannot reliably ascertain whether a State is acting in good faith when
commencing a case, the substantive rules of the Convention that I
later propose are themselves neutral from the standpoint of moral
hazard.' 6 ' Therefore, commencing a case in order to implement
those rules would not foster moral hazard. Depending on the applicable bankruptcy rules, 162 the approach could potentially foster economic rehabilitation; moreover, except in the presumably rare case in
which creditors allege a bad faith filing, application of this approach
eliminates adjudicatory discretion. The only potential disadvantage to
this approach is that rules that operate only in bankruptcy could adversely affect nonbankruptcy incentives. The magnitude of that effect,
however, depends on the substantive nature of the rules, and this Article proposes bankruptcy rules that do not materially adversely affect
nonbankruptcy incentives.' 63 Thus, the Convention should provide
that the debtor-State alone may commence the case.
158
Indeed, the Convention does not differentiate between exogenous and endogenous factors that lead to default (except to the limited extent that irrational exogenous
factors would justify IMF temporary liquidity to a State that is otherwise economically
sound, see infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text). Differentiation would be counterproductive because political leaders that might be blamed for the economic failure would
be reluctant to have their States use the Convention.
159 I later discuss, however, the possibility of disputes arising out of a good faith filing
requirement. See infra text accompanying note 385.
160 A balance sheet insolvency test for States, as for municipalities, also would be meaningless because "the solvency of a country is not well defined." EICHENGREEN & PORTES,
supra note 8, at 14.
161 Each of these rules having been selected in part for their neutrality from that standpoint, if not their potential to reduce moral hazard. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (arguing that shifting the source of funding to priority funding in private markets
would reduce moral hazard), p. 999 (arguing that any increase in State moral hazard resulting from discharge would be offset by a decrease in creditor moral hazard), p. 1005
(arguing that super-majority voting would be neutral from the standpoint of moral
hazard).
162
I discuss these rules infra notes 164-312 and accompanying text.
163 Adoption of explicit bankruptcy rules would even reduce the impact on non-bankruptcy incentives to the extent creditors, ex ante, have greater certainty of ex post bankruptcy events. See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 77-78.
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Stays- Section 362 of the Code in a non-municipal context, and

§ 922 in a municipal context, provide that commencement of the
bankruptcy case automatically stays the enforcement of all lawsuits
and claims against the debtor, as well as any other actions to obtain
possession of the debtor's property. 64 Would a stay also make sense
in the context of sovereign debt restructuring? After weighing the relevant criteria, I propose that the Convention not include a stay.
A stay's net effect on moral hazard may be neutral. A stay would
increase moral hazard to the extent that a State protected by the stay
will be less careful to avoid default. It would reduce moral hazard,
however, to the extent that creditors fearing the stay will be more
careful when extending credit. Thus, in the context of moral hazard,
these counterbalancing effects may cancel each other out. Further, a
stay's effect on taxation would also be neutral.
A stay could provide some modest benefits. It could minimize
part of the collective action problem by preventing an enforcement
race among creditors. This problem, however, loses significance in the
sovereign-debtor context because creditors could only attempt to attach the State's relatively few assets located in other jurisdictions. 165 A
stay could also theoretically foster economic rehabilitation by permitting the State to suspend payments while attempting to restructure
its economy. However, the State's unilateral decision to suspend
166
payments would produce virtually the same effect as a stay,
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922 (1994).
See Hurlock, supra note 16, at 11. Potentially a stay could avert the "rush to grab
foreign exchange reserves by selling domestic currency or redeeming foreign-currency obligations issued by the government or domestic firms." EICHENGREEN & PORTrS, supranote
8, at 16. The Convention may better address this type of grab race, however, by providing
emergency liquidity to inherently viable States. See infra notes 226-33 and accompanying
text. The only drawback is that short-term creditors could attempt to grab the liquidity to
satisfy their maturing debt. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the PrivateSector: Burden
Sharingin InternationalFinancialCrisisManagement 23 FLETCHER WoRLI) AYr. 57, 57 (1999)
(observing that the Mexican "government used its U.S. and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) loans to retire its short-term, dollar-indexed debt obligations at full value as they
matured"); E-mail from Richard Portes, supra note 105 ("Providing emergency liquidity
simply permits short-term creditors to grab it all."). States can reduce that drawback, however, by limiting their short-term debt exposure. See Timothy A. Canova, Banking and FinancialReforn at the Crossroadsof the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1571, 162229 (1999) (arguing that a grab of emergency liquidity by short-term creditors can be
avoided by restricting the issuance of short-term debt). States indeed will have less incentive to issue short-term debt once the IMF ceases acting as a lender of last resort.
166
See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TowARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINAcI. ARCHITECTURE 92 (1999) (questioning "whether there really is the need to create [an international
bankruptcy court] with the ability to impose a standstill, because governments can already
declare a unilateral moratorium"). Two differences exist between a stay and a State's unilateral decision to suspend payments. First, a State's unilateral decision to suspend payments would not prevent the State from later making preferential payments to certain
creditors, whereas a formal stay imposed on the State would prevent the State from doing
so. Addressing this preference problem separately, however, may be more efficient. See
164
165
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except with respect to the relatively few assets located in other
167
jurisdictions.
The costs of a stay, however, would outweigh these benefits. Application of a stay will likely generate significant litigation on issues
including when the stay should apply, when it should end, and what
exceptions should be allowed. 168 Furthermore, the possibility of a stay
could adversely affect nonbankruptcy incentives: for example, creditors anticipating the possibility of non-payment during the restructuring period might charge the State higher interest rates.
Moreover, the policy reasons supporting a stay in the corporate
bankruptcy context do not apply to sovereign debt restructuring.
There are two rationales for a stay: (1) the belief that stopping creditor collection efforts will "accomplish the orderly and even administration of the debtor's property and financial affairs,"' 69 and (2) the
hope that preventing a grab race among creditors intent on seizing
assets will promote equality of distribution.' 7 0 As discussed above,
however, a State itself can prevent creditor collection efforts or a grab
race even without a stay, except with respect to the few assets located
7
outside its borders.' '
Thus, although a stay could provide benefits to a State, that
State's unilateral decision to suspend payments would have much the
same effect without incurring the costs of implementing a formal stay.
As a result, I propose that the Convention not include a stay.
infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text. Second, States may be hesitant to unilaterally
suspend payments "for fear that they will jeopardize their future credit market access
[whereas] a government which received [de jure] approval for its standstill would suffer
relatively little damage to its reputation." EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supranote 8, at xvii. If
States adopt the Convention, however, its implicit assumption that States will unilaterally
suspend payments should provide a measure of de jure justification therefor.
167
In this context, some scholars have argued that a stay might help to mitigate damage to the reputation of a State that unilaterally suspends its debt payments. See EICHENGREN & PORTES, supranote 8, at 40. Even then, however, "[r] eputation will be preserved
only if the markets believe that financial distress was not the debtor's 'fault"-a determination that is difficult to make. Id. Moreover, if the problem was the debtor's fault, then "a
standstill might still be justifiable, but then the debtor's reputation should suffer." Id. at 41.
168 See DAviD G. EPSTEiN T At-, BANR uTrcy § 3-1, at 63 (1993). According to Epstein,
Nickles, and White,
[e]very year there are hundreds of reported proceedings that implicate
[the stay under] section 362 [of the Code]. More often the difficulty is
deciding the facts required to apply section 362 rather than construing the
law that it states.... Also, [the stay] is stretched and pulled by many unusual circumstances and by very many clever lawyers. The tension regularly
produces novel issues of interpretation and application.
Id.
169
Id. § 3-1, at 59. Professor Baird describes this as a "mechanism to preserve the status
quo while we sort out the affairs of the debtor." DOUGLAS G. BAiRD, THE EI MErs OF
BANKRUPTCY 193 (rev. ed. 1993).
170
See EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 168, § -1, at 60-61.
171

See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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Reorganization Financing. Section 364 of the Code outlines a procedure for a debtor to obtain financing for its reorganization from the
credit and capital markets. 172 This financing is commonly referred to
as debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. In order to attract DIP financing, the Code gives priority to lenders and investors that provide
such financing. 173 Without this priority, financing would likely be unavailable because the information asymmetry between the State and
potential financiers may be large (a bankrupt company rarely has full
financial transparency) 1 74 and also because new financiers will not
want to be "taxed" by the claims of existing creditors.
The technique of granting priority in order to attract credit and
capital market financing may be even more compelling in a sovereign
than a corporate debt restructuring context. In both cases, access to
funding is critical to economic rehabilitation: a financially troubled
State will need "fresh working capital during restructuring, so that
critical governmental functions don't collapse."' 75 Without a priority,
however, States could not obtain credit and capital market financing
for the same reasons such financing would be unavailable in a corporate context: the information asymmetry between the State and potential financiers may be large-indeed, there may be even less
transparency for sovereign debtors, which are not ordinarily subject to
financial reporting and whose officials might not be held accountable
under national law for providing misinformation-and new financiers
will not want to be taxed by existing claims. 176 Financially troubled
States therefore can presently look only to the IMF as lender of last

172 The capital markets are "markets where capital funds-debt and equity-are
traded. Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well as organized

markets and exchanges."

JOHN

DowNEs & JORDAN

ELLIOT GOODMAN,

DiCTIoNARY OF FI-

term "credit markets" refers to banks,
finance companies, and other traditional institutional lenders. All of these are private,
free-market sources of funds.
173 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1994). Moreover, if the priority scheme laid out in § 364(a)
is inadequate to attract sufficient financing, the judge may authorize the granting of collateral. See id.§ 364(c), (d). If necessary, the judge may even authorize the obtaining of
credit secured by a senior lien on property already pledged as collateral if the original
secured party is adequately protected. See id. §§ 364(d), 361 (defining adequate
protection).
174 Section 1125 of the Code attempts to address this problem for bankrupt companies
by replacing the transparency requirement of the federal securities law with a more pragmatic standard of "adequate information," which considers the type and detail of information that is "reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the
condition of the debtor's books and records." Id. § 1125(a)(1).
175 Sachs, supra note 1, at 13.
176
See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that granting a priority
prevents under-investment and therefore "is
desirable if the implications for moral hazard
can be contained").
NANCE AND INVEnMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991). The
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resort, creating the taxation and moral hazard problems described
177
earlier.
Shifting the source of funding from the IMF to private credit and
capital markets would help to solve these problems. This shift to private markets would eliminate the need for taxpayers to pay for the
funding and would avoid politicizing the decisions of when and to
whom the IMF should make funding available. 178 The shift would also
significantly reduce the problem of moral hazard.17 9 Although the
size of the credit and capital markets is large enough to accommodate
the legitimate financing needs of restructuring States, 8 0 a State will
have no assurance that private credit will be available. The risk of
potential default will make the State more careful when obtaining
credit, and arguably more disciplined in its economic planning. Existing creditors will face that same risk of default and will find their
claims subordinated even if private credit is available. Therefore,
those creditors will lend more carefully.
Furthermore, the shift to private markets could significantly
shorten a State's time frame for obtaining credit. Private financiers
can usually arrange credit within weeks, whereas the IMF can sometimes take months to arrange funding. As a result, "IMF loans are
usually too little, too late[;] [bly the time they arrive, the government
may have lost control of the situation." 81
In giving priority to the financiers of a sovereign debt restructuring, this framework potentially could adversely affect nonbankruptcy
177
See supra notes 27-53 and accompanying text (describing the moral hazard and
taxation problems arising out of IMF funding). Despite these problems, I later argue that
the IMF nonetheless should remain as a lender of last resort for fundamentally sound
States that merely have liquidity problems. See infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
178 Professor Sachs additionally argues that this shift would enable States to remain in
contact with the private markets, thereby enabling them to make a "rapid transition back
to market borrowing once the panic had subsided," and would impose "a market test on
each loan... (albeit a weak test, since the new loans would be supported by the assignment of... priority over existing debts)." Sachs, supra note 1, at 12.
179 An interesting inverse relationship exists between priority and moral hazard.
Although granting priority to new lenders helps to ensure that the debtor-State can obtain
funding, subordinating prior creditors to that funding increases the likelihood that, if the
restructuring ultimately is unsuccessful, the prior creditors will suffer losses.
180 See, e.g., Mois~s Naim, Mexico's Larger Story, 99 FoREIGN POL'Y 112, 122-23 (1995)
("Today, the magnitude of the funds controlled by private investment managers makes the
volumes typically supplied by the IMF and the World Bank almost irrelevant."); Chun,
supra note 54, at 2671 n.185 (observing that "the amount of money controlled by bondholders and mutual fund managers dwarfs a typical loan granted by the IMF").
181 Sachs, supra note 1, at 14; see also EICHENGREEN, supra note 166, at 61 & n.4 (arguing
that "international assistance as currently constituted" cannot protect debtor-States from
"serious damage," because "[a]il too often, IMF-led rescues are ineffective in containing a
panic because the Fund's resources are limited and doled out a drop at a time," and that
"this is inevitably the case"); Sachs, supra note 1, at 13-14 (comparing the three weeks
needed for Macy's Department Store to obtain funding in Chapter 11 with the year needed
for Russia to obtain IMF funding).
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incentives by effectively subordinating the State's unsecured creditors.
However, this potential drawback helps to reduce moral hazard, and
no other adverse effects appear likely.182 Furthermore, the adverse
effect on nonbankruptcy incentives should not be excessive. From the
State's standpoint, granting priority should only minimally affect ex
ante availability and cost of credit; this is because granting priority will
not lower the State's debt rating, 8 3 and also because an IMF loan already has de facto priority over other claims.' 8 4 My proposal only
privatizes the source of the funding. From a creditor's standpoint, the
adverse effect on nonbankruptcy incentives similarly will be minimal,
at least on a relative basis, because current policy already de facto subordinates creditor claims to IMF loans. Even on an absolute basis, that
effect may be minimal. I have argued that, in a corporate lending
context, permitting debtors to grant priority to attract new money
credit "tends to create value for unsecured creditors," even though
those creditors' claims are subordinated to the new money. 185 The
availability of new money credit increases a debtor's liquidity, thereby
reducing its risk of failure and increasing the expected value of unsecured claims. 186 Likewise, permitting a debtor-State to grant priority
in order to increase liquidity will reduce the risk of economic failure 18 7 to that extent. 18 8
182
Granting a priority appears neutral from the standpoint of collective action. Private lenders are less likely to demand collateral in a sovereign context than a corporate
context because the amount of corporate assets available to pay creditors is fixed, see 11
U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994), whereas States have indefinite existence and taxing power and are
therefore more likely to pay creditors in the long term. Because they are less likely to
demand collateral, less need should exist for adjudicatory discretion in deciding if and
when to grant it.
183
See infra note 88 and accompanying text (referring to discussions with Standard &
Poor's, a leading rating agency).
184 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 24 (stating that the IMF is regarded as a
preferred creditor).
185 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Casefor the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47
DuKE Lj. 425, 425 (1997). Although this Article deals with secured lending priorities, its
argument applies equally to any set of lending priorities that arise merely by operation of
law.
186 See id. at 430. Without liquidity, the debtor-State cannot order crucial imports,
purchase equipment, or continue with modernization. The effect can be similar to an
economic boycott.
187
Although not dispositive, one can make an empirical argument for the beneficial
effect of priority lending on a State's unsecured creditors by analogy to the response of
trade creditors in a corporate context. Suppliers to bankrupt companies often refuse to
extend trade credit until those companies enter into loan agreements with third parties,
such as banks or finance companies, to enable them to borrow postpetition. See id. at 47071. Those loan agreements are all made on a priority basis under Chapter 11 of the Code.
See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994); Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 471. Once debtors obtain these
lending commitments, suppliers generally re-extend trade credit to the debtor. See
Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 471.
188
The extent to which liquidity will reduce the risk of a State's, as opposed to a corporation's, economic failure is unclear. Because there is likely to be a difference, I caution
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Despite the advantages of new investment, new money credit
could decrease value to unsecured creditors if overinvestment occurs. 189 In a corporate lending context, I have argued elsewhere that

monitoring and inherent disincentives limit the risk of overinvestment. 190 Those disincentives would not apply in a sovereign or DIP
financing context, however, because they arise out of imperfections in
the corporate bankruptcy process' 9 1 that do not affect either of these
situations. 192 In a DIP financing context, therefore, the Code compensates by allowing creditors that are concerned about overinvestment to scrutinize and object to an excessive amount of DIP financing
193
and, where appropriate, to monitor its use.
Unfortunately, creditors of a State have no similar mechanism to
protect their rights. Creditors cannot rely on the new lender to protect their rights because the new lender's priority claim usually ensures repayment notwithstanding overinvestment. Therefore, in
order to prevent overinvestment, 9 4 a sovereign debt restructuring
scheme might utilize a neutral entity to scrutinize and object to excessive amounts of new priority financing and to monitor its use when

that one cannot simply apply the numerical analysis used in my earlier work to debtorStates. See Schwarcz, supra note 185.
189 In this context, overinvestment means that a debtor invests proceeds of the new
money credit in a project that is less valuable than the proceeds. Cf id. at 436 & n.45
(discussing how debtors can misuse loan proceeds). Scholars sometimes refer to overinvestment as "excessive investment." EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supranote 8, at 11. In contrast to overinvestment, underinvestment refers to a situation in which insufficient credit is
available to permit investment in a valuable project. See id. For example, Professors
Eichengreen and Portes observe that the United Kingdom receivership code, under which
the equivalent of DIP lending priority is possible only with the permission of existing creditors, has been criticized for leading to underinvestment. See id.
190 See Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 436-40 (describing the benefits and limitations of
monitoring); id. at 455-62 (examining disincentives). A rational corporate debtor is also
economically motivated to avoid granting priority prematurely because of the costs associated with doing so. See id. at 446-49.
191 See id. at 456-58.
192 Those imperfections are irrelevant because sovereign debt restructuring is not governed by the Code, see supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text, and DIP financing is governed by special bankruptcy rules that transcend those imperfections, see Schwarcz, supra
note 185, at 470-71 & nn.206-07.
193 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c), 1109(b) (1994) (permitting DIP financing only after notice
and a hearing, at which creditors have the right to appear and be heard). As a practical
matter, however, creditors rarely object. See infra note 426 and accompanying text.
194 Cf. infra Part II.C (discussing further the IMF's potential role in implementing the
rules proposed in this Article). The recent Russian experience has shown that even the
IMF cannot absolutely protect against overinvestment or misuse of loan proceeds. If those
problems occur, however, they should be no worse for loans made under the Convention
than for loans from the IMF's own funds.
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appropriate.1 9 5 The IMF, which is already "the central coordinating
institution of sovereign debt,"' 9 6 could potentially serve in this role.
That neutral entity-here, the IMF-could most effectively perform the tasks of scrutiny and monitoring by acting under the Convention as an intermediary funding source. The IMF would borrow
funds from the capital markets on a nonrecourse basis' 97 and re-lend
those funds to the debtor-State. 198 Simultaneously, the IMF would assign the debtor-State's priority loan to the capital market lenders as
collateral. As a credit matter, the lenders thus would be in the same
position as if they had made the loan directly to the State. 19 9
Priority Loan Obligation
Nonrecourse Borrowing
Secured by
Assignment of
Priority Loan
Obligation

DebtorState

Relending Funds ($)

EMF

Capital
Markets

Lending Funds ($)

195 For example, a neutral entity could serve a monitoring role by imposing conditionality on disbursement of the financing. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. My
proposal enables the IMF to continue to impose conditionality as appropriate. Furthermore, if a State were to misuse loan proceeds or fail to comply with loan terms it could be
in breach of the loan agreement, and thus in immediate default-a situation the State will
want to avoid.
196 Chun, supra note 54, at 2692.
197 In the present context, the term nonrecourse means that "the obligation to repay
borrowed money is secured by specific assets of the debtor [in this case, the IMF's right to
repayment of the loan made to the debtor-State], but the [capital market] creditor does
not have general recourse to the debtor's [i.e., the IMF's] remaining assets." Schwarcz,
supra note 185, at 462-63; see also BLAcx's LAW DICrIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
nonrecourse debt as "[d]ebt secured by the property that it is used to purchase").
198 I will refer to this process as "nonrecourse back-to-back lending."
199 The lenders are entitled to proceeds of the collateral-the debtor-State's promise
to repay the IMF loan on a priority basis-but have no claim against the IMF or its assets.
Structuring the loan in this manner entails slightly higher, but still relatively de minimis,
transaction costs.
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Although the IMF would continue to involve itself in the transaction, this intermediary funding approach would avoid many of the
moral hazard and taxation problems presently associated with direct
IMF funding. By acting solely as an intermediary, the IMF would reduce its dependence on taxation because loan funding would come
from the capital markets, 2 0 0 and not from the IMF's capital subscriptions.20 1 By borrowing on a nonrecourse basis, the IMP would avoid
liability for the debtor-State's potential default, thereby reducing
moral hazard, because capital market lenders could look only to their
collateral-the debtor-State's assigned loan-for repayment.2 0 2 Moreover, the intermediary funding approach would enable the IMF to
continue its current practice of imposing conditionality on funding.2 0 3 The IMF's role as intermediary would also be neutral from the

200
Capital market investors have widely accepted the use of nonrecourse financing,
especially in the context of securitization, which is similar to the type of nonrecourse financing I propose. See Schwarcz, supranote 185, at 463 (discussing the "widespread use of
non-recourse debt" in "project financing, securitization, and other forms of structured finance"). In a securitization, capital market investors advance funds to a "bankruptcy-remote" intermediary (the special purpose vehicle, or SPV), which simultaneously transfers
the funds on a nonrecourse basis to a company (the originator). See Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 135-36 (1994). As consideration for the funds, the originator assigns its right to receive payments at future dates (receivables) to the SPV. See id. Because the investors' sole claim is against these receivables,
they "are concerned only with the cash flows coming due on these receivables, and care
little about the originator's financial condition." Id. at 136. Nonrecourse financing using
the IMF-an institution not subject to bankruptcy-as an intermediary is similar to securitization. Capital market investors would advance funds on a nonrecourse basis to the IMF,
which represents the SPV because it is a bankruptcy-remote intermediary. However, the
IMF also represents the originator because it originates the receivable-the debtor-State's
obligation to repay the IMF loan-by simultaneously (1) lending the funds to the debtorState to create the receivable, and then (2) assigning the receivable to the investors. Because their sole claim is against the receivable, the investors should care little about the
IMF's financial condition. As a credit matter, the real difference between a securitization
and this type of nonrecourse financing is that investors in the former will typically look to a
statistically large number of receivables, see id. at 135, whereas investors in the latter would
look to a single receivable due from the debtor-State. Nonetheless, the priority status of
that receivable and the fact that its obligor is a sovereign State should compensate for that
difference.
201
Cf. IMF FNAIIciNG, supranote 30, at 9 (suggesting that the IMF consider alternative

sources of funding, such as borrowing from the capital markets).
202 Thus, a State's ability to obtain capital market financing and the interest rate
thereon would depend entirely on the credit of the State, not of the IMF.
203 For a discussion of the IMF's practice of imposing conditionality on its lending, see
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. The IMF is well situated to impose conditionality; by agreeing to keep the information confidential, it maintains the most comprehensive
financial information on its member-States. See International Monetary Fund, County Information (visited March 26, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm>.
This Article assumes that economic efficiency guides the IMF's imposition of conditionality. The extent to which such conditionality reflects political rather than economic considerations is a topic for further study.
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standpoint of the other considerations discussed in this Article, and
20 4
might even facilitate the administration of the debt restructuring.
The only drawback to the intermediary funding approach is that
the IMF would bear administrative costs for acting as an intermediary.
The IMF could pay these costs out of its normal budget or it could
require States that are parties to the Convention to ratably share these
costs. Alternatively, the IMF could recoup these costs by charging a
higher rate on the loan to the State than is payable to the capital market lenders, 20 5 although the State would then be paying more interest
than it would if borrowing directly from the capital markets. Because
of these administrative costs, the intermediary approach may not be
quite as efficient as facilitating direct debtor-State access to capital
market funding. Nonetheless, the continuing involvement of the IMF
20 6
may make the intermediary approach more practical.
Whether a State secures funding directly or through an intermediary, even unsecured creditors should want the State to have access
to priority credit once a neutral entity undertakes to monitor and prevent overinvestment. 20 7 Thus, the Convention should authorize a priority in order to attract financing from the credit and capital markets,
while also mandating that a neutral entity such as the JEF scrutinize
and object to an excessive amount of new priority financing, monitor
its use as appropriate, and potentially act as a nonrecourse funding
20 8
intermediary.
Although one might argue that the priority need not be granted
under supranational law, I believe that it should. First, a State that
gives priority to particular lenders under its internal law could later
change that law, creating uncertainty for lenders. 20 9 A supranational
law, however, could penalize States that grant and then attempt to
204 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
205 Once the State repays those lenders, the IMF would be entitled to surplus collections constituting the interest differential. See U.C.C. § 9-608(a) (1) (A) (1998).
206 Some scholars have queried whether the IMF would need to co-lend in order to

maintain its incentive to monitor. For example, the IMF might participate in 10% of each
private market loan. Although co-lending is possible, it is unnecessary because the IMF
already has a significant reputational stake in sovereign debt restructuring. Furthermore,
co-lending has costs: it would (1) require financing from taxation, and (2) increase moral

hazard to the extent that it reduces the amount private market sources must finance. See
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 185-206; see also infraPart ll.C (discussing imple-

mentation of these constraints).
208 Section 507(a) (1) of the Code similarly establishes priority for the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the debtor's estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) (1), 503(b)
(1994). I analogize the ability to grant this priority, which permits a State to obtain goods
and services on credit, to the ability to grant priority in order to obtain lending credit. See
supra note 187 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Convention might provide a priority for the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the State.
209 Conceivably, a State might even mislead lenders by a bait-and-switch tactic-give
priority in order to attract financing, and subsequently unilaterally reverse the priority.
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reverse these priorities.2 1 0 Second, giving priority to later creditors
under a State's internal law might offend nonpriority creditors,
thereby impairing that State's access to future private credit. In con-

trast, an international convention would gain legitimacy through the
very process of its adoption as well as the normative reasons advanced
21
in support thereof. '
Granting the priority under supranational law in order to attract
private funding will reduce moral hazard only if multinational governmental entities such as the IMF will allow the market to work, and
avoid acting as de facto lenders of last resort. This goal is an in21 2
dependent good regardless of whether the Convention is ratified.
Eliminating a multinational lender of last resort creates a risk, however, that even by offering priority, a State might sometimes be unable

to obtain private market funding at any cost, thereby forcing the State
into default. On balance, though, allowing default in those circumstances may be the best means of reducing moral hazard: "[T] he IMF
approach is seriously flawed because ... [it] wrongly assumes that a
debt default or moratorium is unacceptable. The main problem with
this [assumption] is that it creates moral hazard.... Prospective loss
keeps the banks careful, and if that entails default by country debtors,
214
so be it."213 Default can therefore have a positive long-term effect.
210
For example, the Convention could subject a State that repudiates a priority
granted under the Convention to a monetary penalty. That State would be subject to an
additional reputational cost, including impairment of its future ability to borrow. If the
IMF acts as a supervisory authority under the Convention, it also could take steps to enforce the priority in the same manner that it presently enforces obligations among its
member-States, such as by using peer pressure, publicity, denial of membership benefits,
and potentially even expulsion from membership. See Robert M. Barnett, Exchange Rate
Arrangements in The InternationalMonetary Fund: The FundAs Lawgiver, Adviser, and Enforcer,7
TEMP. INT'L & Cossi'. LJ. 77, 89-93 (1993).
211
Cf.1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF CoMMUNICATIVE AcnoN: REASON AND THE

RATIONALIZATION OF SocIr

264 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (arguing that the justifi-

cation for legal norms derives from "principles whose validity could in turn be criticized").
Moreover, DIP financing and its priorities enjoy widespread legitimacy in the United
States. See, e.g., SCARBERRY Er AL., supranote 13, at 204-14 (discussing the importance of DIP
financing to a corporate reorganization).
212 To the extent IMF funding would not foster moral hazard, that funding should be
able to co-exist with the private funding discussed in this Article. Cf infra notes 224-31 and
accompanying text (proposing that the IMF continue to offer liquidity in limited
circumstances).
213
HAL S. ScOrr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANcE 1243 (5th ed. 1998).
214 Even the IMF now appears to prefer default to a bailout. See EmergingMarket Bonds,
A Crash Course in Default; EUROMONEY, Oct. 10, 1999, at 47, 50 [hereinafter EmergingMarket
Bonds] (noting that permitting default is a new approach by creditor-States and the IMF).
Thus, the IMF suggested to Romania that it may have to renegotiate at least 80% of its
eurobond payments falling due in May andJune 1999 in order to obtain IMF funding. See
From Bail-Out to Bail-In, ECONOMSr, Mar. 27, 1999, at 71, 71. But see Richard Waters, Concern OverEmerging Market Rescue, FiN. TIMEs (LONDON), Apr. 14, 1999, at 4 (arguing against
a bail-in policy); Deepak Gopinath, Who's Afraid of the BigBad Bail-In?, INSrnUTIONAL INvEsTOR, June 1, 1999, at 79, 79 (arguing that default could jeopardize a State's access to finan-
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A defaulting State and its creditors may attempt to negotiate a restructuring plan, 21 5 but any consensual plan would require concessions on
both sides. Consequently, the State may have to impose the austerity
measures that it sought to avoid, 216 and its creditors might have to
lower interest rates, extend maturities, or write-off some of their
claims. These sacrifices would ultimately eliminate moral hazard; the
State bears the cost of not having taken a prudent economic course,
and its creditors bear the cost of having taken unwarranted financial
risk.
Nonetheless, commentators have argued that default can "trigger
failures of foreign banks," and therefore must be avoided.2 17 Whether
or not that risk was once realistic, it is no longer a significant concern. 218 For example, in the recent Asian financial crisis, the loans
from U.S. and Japanese banks to Korea represented merely six per2 19
cent and nine percent of the capital of those banks respectively,
which is "small potatoes even assuming an extremely improbable default on all debt."220 Even in the worst case scenario, when default is
likely to trigger the failure of smaller, regional banks, the solution
should not be to subsidize all banks but only those in need:
Even when one considers the problem as regional, the numbers are
manageable.... In the worst case, the few foreign banks at serious
risk could receive targeted support from their own central banks-it
is foolish to funnel funds through debtor countries so all foreign
banks get aid [whether or not they need it] .221
In the future, the risk of bank failure should diminish even further as
bank loans are increasingly replaced by bonds.2 22 The risk of States

cial markets at a time when it most needs money); Belinda Rabano, Tired After Asia, Russia
and Brazi Lenders Seek Private "Bail-Ins",AsLAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1999, at 25 (arguing
that higher costs effectively could shut off access to international capital markets for States
rated "B" or lower).
215 Perhaps this plan might implement the super-majority voting provisions of the
Convention. See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
216
By the same token, States that are too poor even to attempt to impose austerity
measures should continue to receive IMF (and World Bank) assistance because it would
not increase moral hazard. Thus, the Convention should not restrict such programs as the
World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Debt Initiative which gives debt relief to "poor countries with good policy performance," such as Bolivia, Guyana,
Mozambique, and Uganda. See The HPC Debt Initiative (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://
vvw.worldbank.org/hipc/about/hipcbr/hipcbr.htm> (describing this program).
218
219

Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 213, at 1244.
See id.
See id.

220
221
222

Id.
Id.
See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.

217
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defaulting on their bonds does not create the same systemic risk as
2 23
does the risk of bank failures.
Nonetheless, the balance between default and moral hazard
might shift when the debtor-State has been economically and financially prudent, and the factors causing default are largely exogenous.
In that case, IMF funding would not foster moral hazard. Whether the
IMF or other nonmarket entities should provide funding in these circumstances depends on political considerations, 224 as well as the ability of administrators to assess whether a given default is caused by
22 5
exogenous or endogenous factors.
Although this assessment sometimes may be difficult, the IMF or
some other multilateral entity almost certainly should consider acting
as a lender of last resort when a default would result from irrational
exogenous factors, such as a financial panic, even though the State is
economically sound.22 6 IMF funding then would not foster moral hazard,2 27 and the debtor-State should be able to repay the IMF when the

panic subsides. 22 8 The IMF would merely provide a form of temporary
"liquidity,"229 and would not assume a credit risk that a State taking
223 For example, bond market investment is not regulated, whereas bank investment is
heavily regulated. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MnIzER, BANING LAW AND

REGULATION 73-85 (2d ed. 1997) (asserting that banks are among the most regulated industries and discussing the basic rationales for bank regulation).
224 For example, political considerations might enter the IMF funding decision if a
State allocates significant resources to social programs which it cannot objectively afford,
and consequently faces default.
225 In comparison, the Code, which presumes that corporate bankruptcies generally
result from exogenous factors, relies solely on private-market funding and does not contemplate governmental funding.
226 The Mexican financial crisis of 1994-1995 exemplifies such a liquidity crisis to some
extent. Because of market volatility, Mexico was unable to roll over its $28 billion in shortterm bonds and-with only $6 billion in foreign reserves-was unable to pay those bonds.
See Eichengreen, supra note 165, at 57. Some commentators argue that Mexico was
healthy, but for the market volatility. See Chun, supra note 54, at 2656, 2659, 2664-65 (arguing that the 1994-95 Mexican crisis was one of liquidity rather than solvency, in contrast to
the Mexican financial crisis in 1982).
227 Critics nonetheless might argue that even liquidity funding fosters moral hazard.
See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AccOUNTnG OFuncE, INTERNATIONAL FNANcAL CRisIs-EroRTS TO ANTICIPATE, AvoID, AND REsOLvE SOVEREIGN CiusEs (1997) (GAO/NSIAD/GGD 97-168);
Naim, supra note 180, at 128 (arguing that the 1994-95 "Mexican bailout sent the wrong
signal to governments and investors.., that the potential losses of private investors eventually could be absorbed by governments and multilateral financial institutions, thus blurring
the principle that both governments and investors should enter the game of portfolio investments at their own risk").
228 See ScorT & WELLONS, supra note 213, at 1244 ("If... the contagion were irrational

(like a bank run panic), the IMF should lend funds as international lender of last resort.
Once the runs stopped, the loans could be repaid.").
229 The IMF's organizers originally envisioned this role at Bretton Woods in 1944. See
Chun, supra note 54, at 2696-97. The IMF already may be offering this type of liquidity.
"[A]s of April [1999], the Fund instituted so-called contingent credit lines. The idea is to
provide financing for up to a year to countries that have sound economic fundamentals
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prudent fiscal measures 230 would have been able to avoid.2 31 Moreover, liquidity would help solve the so-called multiple equilibrium
problem that Sachs identified: the value of assets in financial markets
often depends on market expectations, which in turn depend on asset
values.2 32 For example, if depositors have confidence in the ability of
a bank to repay their deposits, they will keep their money on deposit,
and accordingly the bank will repay those deposits in the normal
course. But depositors who suspect that others are about to withdraw
their money may panic and attempt to withdraw their money first.
The result is a bank run, which can create problems even for healthy
and solvent banks. The same problem could arise in a sovereign
context:
Assume a government which can maintain service on its debts as
long as its creditors renew their maturing obligations. In the absence of expectations of substantial redemptions, each creditor is
willing to renew maturing obligations. But if the number of creditors refusing to roll over their maturing obligations reaches a critical threshold, the government will lack the resources needed to
redeem them and also maintain service on its other debts. In this
233
setting a run on the debt can be self-fulfilling.
Liquidity would assure investors that fundamentally healthy States will
be able to forestall this type of response ab initio.
Finally, I recognize that leaving the funding decision to the markets removes that decision from the foreign relations arena, a result
that may or may not be politically acceptable. The ultimate balance of

but are faced with a sudden loss of confidence in the markets." Laura Cohn & David
Fairlamb, Will the IM Get a Dose of Its Own Medidne?, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 1999, at 36, 37.
230
Thus, a State that incurs short-term debt without regard to the source of repayment
should not be entitled to liquidity if a default on such debt is primarily endogenous-the
result of imprudent financial management. Cf. Canova, supranote 165, at 1622-29 (arguing
that a grab race for emergency liquidity by short-term creditors can be avoided by restricting the issuance of short-term debt).
231
This distinction between liquidity and credit enhancement is well established in the
capital markets. For example, a rating agency, such as Standard & Poor's or Moody's, usually will not provide a rating on short-term debt securities unless creditworthy third parties,
such as banks, ensure timely payment. See Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 140. Those third
parties, however, do not expect to suffer losses. They only provide liquidity to creditworthy
companies, and therefore expect repayment as soon as the company receives the cash that
it would otherwise use to pay the securities. See id. This minimal risk is reflected in the fee
that third parties charge for providing liquidity, which is typically much lower than the fee
that would be charged for credit enhancement. See id. at 141 n.30.
232
See Sachs, supra note 1, at 3-6.
233
EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 16-17. Eichengreen and Portes explain
that even if all creditors would be better off by rolling over their maturing debt, the suspicion that some creditors will redeem their debt may cause other creditors to seek repayment first. See id.
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political and economic interests, however, is beyond the scope of this
23 4
Article.
Executory Contracts- Section 365 of the Code permits a debtor in
bankruptcy to assume or reject certain executory contracts and leases,
subject to court approval. 23 5 This provision fosters debtor rehabilitation by allowing the debtor to choose between continued performance of beneficial contracts and termination of burdensome
contracts. 2 36 In the latter case, a debtor that rejects the contract or
lease is deemed to breach that contract as of the date immediately
preceding the bankruptcy petition.2 37 Accordingly, any claim arising
out of the breach is treated as a prepetition, and therefore nonpriority, claim, which is pani passu with other prepetition claims against
the debtor.238 The debtor may thus be able to settle that prepetition
239
claim for a fraction of its face amount.

These rights are likely to be less important in a sovereign than a
corporate debt restructuring context. The first right-to elect to continue performance of beneficial contracts-is unnecessary in a sovereign context because nothing in the Convention would restrict a
debtor-State from continuing to perform its contracts. The second
right-to elect to terminate burdensome contracts-is also unnecessary. If a debtor-State wishes to terminate a contract, it may do so
according to standard international contract law doctrine: any party to
a contract may breach the contract. 240 The breaching party simply
234 For example, the IMF, an inherently political body, might decide to provide
loans-were private-market funding unavailable-to an economically imprudent State with
a large nuclear arsonal in order to preserve the political stability of the State. Also, States
sometimes might decide to act as lenders of last resort to States that are strategic partners.
See EICHENGREEN, supranote 166, at 60 (observing that the "rationale for the [1997] South
Korean [loan] package [led by the United States and the IMF], in security circles at least,
was that the Korean Peninsula is too important geopolitically for [its] economy to be left
unaided").
235
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994). A contract is executory where the "obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other." Ven Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: PartI, 57
MxINNr.
L. REv. 439, 460 (1973).
236
See David S. Kupetz, The Bankruptcy Code Is Part of Every Contract: Minimizing the Impact of Chapter 11 on the Non-Debtor's Bargain,54 Bus. L'Aw. 55, 61 (1998).
237
Seel U.S.C. §365(g)(1).
238
See id. (assuming such other claims are unsecured); see also 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)
(describing the order of distribution of claims).
239 "'[1]n the United States, general unsecured creditors can expect to receive nothing
in bankruptcy 80% of the time and an average of 4-5 cents on the dollar 20% of the time.'"
Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 455 n.130 (quoting Lucian Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The
Uneasy Case for the Piority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857, 886 n.107
(1996)).
240

See, e.g.,

PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNAM

(UNIDROIT 1994) [hereinafter

ONAL

COMMERCIAL

CoNT Acrs

Art. 7.1.1

PRINCIPLES] (defining non-performance); OsCAR
SCHAC-TER, INTERNATIONAL L v IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 311 (1991) ("It can now be said
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assumes liability on a nonpriority basis for damages caused by the
breach. 24 1 Because the Convention does not give priority to such a
claim for breach, a debtor-State's liability for contract breach would
be pari passu with other nonpriority claims against the State. This
mirrors the result under § 365, whereby a corporate debtor's liability
for contract breach would be pari passu with other nonpriority claims
against the corporation. Thus, § 365's primary benefit to a corporate
debtor-the ability to terminate a burdensome contract without in24 2
curring a priority claim-is unnecessary in a sovereign context.
Discharge. Sections 524, 727, and 1141 of the Code address the
discharge, or nullification, of a corporation's debts. 243 Corporate
24
debtors that are liquidated are not discharged from their debts. 4
The rationale for disallowing discharge is that the corporate form is
artificial, and hence assets should be re-applied to their highest
uses. 245 The Code discharges reorganized corporate debtors, how-

ever, from debts that are not provided for in the plan of reorganization. 24 6 The rationale is that "the debtor corporation . . . may
continue in business after confirmation of the plan. If its debts were
not discharged, typically it would immediately be in financial distress."2 47 For the same reason, the Code discharges municipal governments from all debts except those provided for in the plan of
reorganization.248
that it is widely agreed that a breach of a contract by a State in itself is not a violation of
international law... A private party does not obtain remedies on the international law
level against a State that has breached the contract."); cf. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 235 (1981) [hereinafter RSrATEMENT] (setting forth the general principle of
breach upon non-performance of a contract).
241 See PRINcIPLEs, supra note 240, at Art. 7.4.1; see also REsrATEMENT, supra note 240,
§ 346 (describing the same right to damages).
242 From the standpoint of the framework I use to test the neutrality of other Code
sections, the right to assume or reject executory contracts does not affect the outcome of
the analysis, and therefore is generally neutral. This right could, however, marginally increase the need for judicial discretion. See Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks (In
reOrion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that "[iln reviewing a
trustee's or debtor-in-possession's decision to assume an executory contract... a bankruptcy court sits as an overseer of the wisdom with which the bankruptcy estate's property
is being managed by the trustee or debtor-in-possession"); Warren, supra note 115, at 352
(noting the discretion of bankruptcy courts to decide whether to permit a debtor to assume executory contracts).
243 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727, 1141 (1994).
244 See id. § 727(a) (1) (prohibiting discharge of non-individual debtors in liquidation).
245 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankrupty, LAW & CoNTEMp. PROBS.,
Spring 1987, at 173, 182-83.
246 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (discharging only those debts not provided for in the plan
of reorganization).
247

SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 13, at 956.

248 See 11 U.S.C. § 944(b), (c). Section 901(a) also makes § 524(a) (1) and (a)(2) applicable to municipal bankruptcies by reference. There is a technical difference between
corporate discharge and municipal discharge: The former binds all creditors, whereas the
latter does not bind creditors that "had neither notice nor actual knowledge of the [bank-
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By analogy, a sovereign debt restructuring plan should discharge
a reorganizing debtor-State, which does not liquidate, from debts that
are not provided for in its plan of reorganization. Discharge would be
neutral from the standpoints of collective action and taxation.
Although it might increase a State's moral hazard by excusing repayment under certain circumstances, to some extent that increase would
be offset by the decrease in creditor moral hazard. Discharge, however, could have a significant effect on a State's economic rehabilitation, to the extent it permits a State that is greatly overburdened with
debt to attempt to cancel at least a portion of those debts.
The arguments against discharge appear to be minor. It might
seem that a process of discharge would require an arbiter to exercise
discretion, 2 49 but that discretion arises primarily in the case of an individual debtor, not a corporate or municipal one. 250 Also, it might

seem that discharge would radically undermine nonbankruptcy incentives of creditors. Those creditors would be protected, however, by the
requirement of super-majority voting by classes of claims, which I later
show gives veto power to each voting class, thereby preventing a State
from devising a plan to harm creditors. 25 1 The same rationale justifies
corporate discharge:
Where the plan does not provide for creditors to be paid 100%
of their claims, creditors may initially think that it is unfair for the
chapter 11 debtor to receive a discharge of prepetition debts. However, creditors can require that all of the value of the debtor's assets
be distributed to them by voting against the plan; if a class of unsecured claims does not accept the plan, then... the plan cannot
be confirmed .... 252
Indeed, from this perspective, one can view discharge as a corollary of
the super-majority voting requirement: there would be no need for
2 53
this voting requirement if creditors were paid in full.

The Convention therefore should discharge debts not provided
for in an approved plan. 25 4 This limited discharge would not, howruptcy] case." Id. § 944(c) (2). This Article expresses no view as to which result should

apply to the discharge of debtor-States.
249

The questions of whether a debtor should apply its assets to payment of creditor

claims before discharge and, if so, which assets should be applied, can be controversial. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 523 (listing exemptions and exceptions to discharge).

250
See id. § 522(b) (restricting exemptions to individual debtors); § 523(a) (restricting
exceptions to discharge to individual debtors).
251
See infra notes 274-93 and accompanying text (discussing super-majority voting by
classes of claims).
252
ScAu yT aET
Al., supra note 13, at 956.
253
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (deeming creditors who are paid in full under a plan
to have accepted the plan).
254
Compare Kordana, supra note 4, at 1038-39, 1090, 1096-99 (favoring discharge of
bankrupt municipalities on the basis that investors are wealthier than average municipal
citizens and are able to diversify their investments).
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ever, restrict programs such as the World Bank's HIPC Debt Initiative
25 5
which gives general debt relief to the poorest countries.
Avoiding Powers: Sections 547 and 549 of the Code address the
avoidance of preferential payments and other transfers under certain
circumstances. 25 6 Should preferential payments by debtor-States also
be subject to avoidance? To analyze this question, one must distinguish between payments made prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition (prepetition payments), which are governed by § 547,257 and
payments made after filing (postpetition payments), which are governed by § 549.258
The avoidance of prepetitionpreferential payments would be neutral from the standpoint of taxation, and would marginally reduce
creditor moral hazard and collective action by reducing the chance
that a creditor could keep any prepetition payments. On the other
hand, avoidance would marginally impair economic rehabilitation by
reducing the likelihood that a State's suppliers of goods and services
will extend trade credit. 259 It would also increase the need for an arbiter to exercise discretion when deciding which prepetition payments
to avoid, and it would impair nonbankruptcy incentives by making
creditors uncertain about whether they can retain prepetition payments. Moreover, from a policy standpoint, the need to avoid preferential payments appears less significant in a sovereign than in a
corporate context. The vast majority of corporate debtors in bankruptcy are liquidated, 260 in which case unpaid creditors remain unpaid. However, sovereign States are not liquidated, and therefore a
State is more likely to repay its creditors over time.2 61 The Code im255 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
256 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 549. Section 547(b) (4) (A) avoids payments or other transfers
made by an insolvent debtor filing within 90 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, to the
extent that such payments enable a creditor to receive more than it would be entitled to in
the event of the debtor's liquidation. Section 549 is designed to avoid unauthorized payments or other transfers the debtor made while in bankruptcy.
257 Seell U.S.C. §547(b)(4)(A).
258 See id. §549(a) (1).
259 To address this concern, § 547(c) (2) of the Code provides that preferential prepetition payments made to corporate debtors in the ordinary course of business, and on
ordinary business terms, cannot be avoided. See id. § 547(c) (2). This exception, however,
is the subject of much litigation. See, e.g, Jeff Bohm & David B. Young, Preferences and
Fraudulent Transfers: A Lender's Perspective, in 2 18TH ANNuAL CuRmNT DEVELOPMENTS IN
BANKRupTcy AND REORGANIZATION 95, 142 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-737, 1996) ("One of the most frequently litigated defenses to a preference acdon is the ordinary course of business exception established by 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2).").
Therefore, its adoption would significantly increase the need to exercise adjudicatory
discretion.
260 See CHARLESJORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANRuPTcv 2 (1997).
261 Because the Convention permits discharge, there is no assurance that a State's
creditors always will be repaid. Any discount on payment will be subject, however, to supermajority voting of the State's creditors. See infra notes 274-93 and accompanying text. Thus,
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plicitly recognizes that ultimate repayment of creditors should excuse
avoidance of an otherwise preferential payment.2 62 I therefore propose that the Convention need not avoid prepetition preferential
payments.
The avoidance of postpetition preferential payments2 63 would be
neutral from the standpoints of moral hazard and taxation, and would
have no effect on nonbankruptcy incentives. It would marginally reduce the postpetition collective action problem by discouraging creditors from attempting to gain an advantage over other creditors. To
that extent, however, such avoidance would marginally impair economic rehabilitation by preventing a debtor-State from using a divideand-conquer tactic of paying creditors that agree to the State's restructuring conditions. Furthermore, it would increase the need for an
arbiter to exercise discretion when deciding which postpetition payments to avoid.2 64 One can argue that avoiding postpetition preferential payments enhances economic rehabilitation by preventing a
debtor-State from using the proceeds of priority new money credit to
repay existing creditors, thereby preventing the transfer of wealth to
those creditors at the cost of reducing the debtor-State's liquidity.2 65
However, a rational debtor-State would not choose to squander its liquidity by repaying existing creditors. 2 66 Finally, from a policy standpoint, sovereign debtors are more likely than corporate debtors to
creditors always will be repaid unless they voluntarily agree, voting on a class by class basis,
to a discount. (The foregoing result assumes that any securities exchanged for debt as part
of a restructuring plan yield their anticipated value. I also recognize that some States could
refuse to pay their debts indefinitely, see, e.g., Robert Plehn, Securitizationof Third World Deb
23 INT'L LAW. 161, 180 n.92 (1989) (referring to defaults by successor governments on
bonds issued by Czarist Russia and pre-revolutionary China), and that unless repayment
includes accrued interest, creditors would lose the time value of their money. Those cases,
however, are the "rare exceptions." See supra note 4.)
262 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (3) (allowing a solvent debtor to make preferential
payments).
263 Technically, § 549 permits a debtor to avoid any unauthorized postpetition payment, whether or not that payment is preferential. See id. § 549. The real goal of that
section, however, appears to be to avoid preferential or fraudulent postpetition transfers.
Cf 5 COLLIER, supra note 151, 549.02, at 549-4 (stating that the section's purpose is to
allow avoidance of transfers that would deplete the estate).
264 See, e.g., 5 COLIER, supra note 151, 1 549.05, at 549-11 (discussing protection of
postpetition transfers).
265
See supranotes 182-99 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of priority new money credit).
266 Although a State might repay creditors if doing so would enable the State to meet
its remaining commitments over the long term and thereby avoid a liquidity crisis-a strategy that itself can enhance the State's economic rehabilitation. Reputational concerns
about the reaction of the unpaid creditors should similarly influence the State to avoid
selective repayment of existing creditors. The fact that debtor-States sometimes use the
proceeds of IMF loans to repay existing creditors does not undermine my argument, because future application of the Convention would significantly reduce the moral hazard
that has encouraged such repayment.
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repay creditors, 26 7 again making avoidance of postpetition preferential payments less important in a sovereign than a corporate context. I
therefore conclude that the Convention need not avoid either pre- or
postpetition preferential payments.
Creditors' Committees- Section 1102 of the Code authorizes the appointment of at least one committee of creditors holding unsecured
claims that are "representative of the different kinds of claims to be
represented." 268 The costs and expenses of committee members are
paid from the debtor's estate. 269 The committees' purpose is to make
the representation of creditors in the reorganization process economically feasible, because few creditors would have claims large enough to
2 70
justify the cost of participating on an individual basis.
Official creditors' committees do not appear to be necessary in
sovereign debt restructuring cases. Although the appointment of a
committee would be neutral from the standpoints of collective action,
moral hazard, and taxation, and might even foster economic rehabilitation by institutionalizing creditor involvement in the reorganization,
the appointment of committees would affect nonbankruptcy incen27 1
tives by increasing administration costs, perhaps significantly.
Moreover, official committees appear unnecessary because the claims
against a State are so large that many creditors, or at least a de facto
committee of creditors chosen consensually, should find it economically feasible to participate in the restructuring process. 2 72 Thus, the
Convention does not provide for the formal appointment of
2 73
committees.
267
See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (observing that the vast majority of
corporate debtors in bankruptcy are liquidated, in which case unpaid creditors will remain
unpaid; whereas sovereign States are not liquidated, and therefore creditors are more
likely to be repaid over time).
268 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (7) (1994). The committee does not include secured creditors
because their claims are not at risk to the same extent as are unsecured claims.
269 See id. § 503(b) (3) (F) (providing for payment of the actual and necessary expenses,
other than compensation, that committee members incur in the performance of the committee's duties).
270 Because of this role, the committee has the right to retain the expertise of attorneys, accountants, or other agents such as investment bankers. See id. § 1103(a). These
experts' costs are paid from the debtor's estate. See id. § 328(a).
271 The debtor typically pays these costs in priority to creditors' claims. See id. §507 (a)
(granting priority to such claims over general unsecured claims).
272 Moreover, as a practical matter, "out of pocket expenses of [these creditor] advisory group[s] are frequently paid by the debtor[-State]." Mudge, supra note 2, at 65. Another reason not to appoint a formal committee is to avoid the need for adjudicatory
discretion in administering the appointment of the committee and in monitoring the reasonableness of their ongoing costs and expenses. But see EIOHENcREEN & PORTES, supra
note 8, at 48 (arguing in favor of formal bondholders' representative committees on the
basis that "a confusing proliferation of committees can spring up in the absence of official
accreditation").
273 Professor Eichengreen argues, however, that "[e]stablishing a standing committee
of representatives from the various classes of creditors-bondholders, banks and other in-

20001

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING

1003

Super-Majority Voting Sections 1123, 1126, and 1129 of the Code
govern the contents, acceptance, and court confirmation of the
debtor's reorganization plan. 274 Its analogy in the context of present-

day sovereign debt restructuring is the de facto workout plan between
the State and its creditors. There is, however, a very significant difference between these approaches.
Section 1126(c) provides for a form of super-majority voting that
supersedes contractual or statutory voting restrictions. For example,
large loans are often made by groups, or syndicates, of institutional
lenders such as banks or insurance companies. 2 75 These loan agreements typically require unanimous consent of the lenders in order to
alter essential lending terms such as the amount of principal, the rate
of interest, or the maturity schedule. 276 Section 1126(c) overcomes
this collective action problem by providing that an affirmative vote by
creditors holding "at least two-thirds in amount and more than onehalf in number" of the claims binds all creditors-even those who vote
negatively or failed to vote. 277 In contrast, sovereign debt restructur-

ings that change essential lending terms still require unanimous creditor approval, 278 which is difficult and sometimes impossible to
stitutional investors-that meets regularly with [sovereign] borrowers would open lines of
communication and help overcome information problems." Eichengreen, supra note 165,
at 69. His argument recognizes that the "shift from bank to bond finance," which I have
already observed, will make it harder for creditors to coordinate their efforts. Id. at 70.
Historically, "standing committees of creditors were precisely the channel for disseminating information and for organizing negotiations the last time bond financing was important, from the late nineteenth century through World War II." Id. I do not reject out of
hand the potential need for these committees, because future circumstances might warrant
them. If so, however, there would appear to be greater flexibility in creating standing committees under national, as opposed to international, law (the Convention being the latter).
Bondholders of a particular State could be represented by a standing bondholder committee consisting of representative investors from that State. States such as the United States,
in which large numbers of institutional investors reside, might want to create a standing
bondholder committee. Consequently, those States would bear the committee's cost (or
pass that cost on to the protected investors); States that do not have a significant number
of institutional investors would bear no cost. In fact, that is precisely what occurred during
the period of time which Professor Eichengreen describes. See id. at 70-71 (describing the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders created under the law of Great Britain in 1868 and
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council similarly created under U.S. law).
274 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1126, 1129.
275 SeeJoseph J. Norton, InternationalSyndicated Lending The Legal Contextfor Economic
Development in Latin America, NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM., Summer 1996, at 21, 21-24.
276
277

See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 26.

11 U.S.C. § 1126(c); cf.TABB, supranote 260, at 7 (observing that "[o]ne primary
reason that workouts do not succeed [outside of bankruptcy] is that dissenting creditors
cannot be bound to the restructuring agreement").
278 Although a debtor-State could theoretically attempt to settle with creditors individually notwithstanding their contractual protection of unanimity, that settlement would not
bind other creditors, who could then sue the State on the original claims. See infra note 430
(discussing Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), in
which a member of a bank syndicate that refused to join a restructuring agreement that a
debtor-State proposed, successfully sued for repayment of its defaulted loan). The right of
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achieve. Therefore, "efforts [by States] to organize significant concessions by [creditors] have foundered on the notorious free-ider
279
problem."
In recent years, this problem has become even more intractable.
Whereas sovereign debt restructurings in the 1980s and early 1990s
primarily involved bank debt, the advent of Brady Bonds28 0 in the
mid-1990s began a trend in which States obtained financing through
28
the public issuance of bonds in the lower-cost capital markets. '
Bondholders that invest in a particular State tend to have smaller individual investments and therefore are more numerous than banks that
lend to the same State. 2 82 Bondholders are also less likely than banks
to agree to any accommodations in order to maintain a commercial
relationship with the State.2 8 3 Moreover, because bonds are actively
such holdout creditors to recover their original claims could undermine the willingness of
other creditors to settle their claims. Also, if the State must grant significant concessions to
induce the settlement, it may only want to settle on an overall basis.
279 Cohen, supra note 4, at 110; see alsoMiller & Zhang, supranote 36, at 18-20 (arguing
that the lack of an orderly procedure for resolving sovereign liquidity crises de facto forces
the IMF to bail out troubled States). The existence of a few holdouts with relatively small
claims should not sabotage a sovereign debt restructuring. If other creditors are willing to
agree to the restructuring, a State could choose to structure a deal around the holdouts
and simply let them sue. However, that approach is inefficient because it fails to achieve
an overall settlement. Even more troublesome is that bond issues increasingly dominate a
State's borrowings, and their unanimity requirement makes them almost impossible to
restructure. See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
280
Debtor-States have issued Brady bonds in connection with U.S. plans for sovereign
debt reduction. These plans encourage banks to exchange their debt claims for lower
amount (usually below-market interest), 30-year U.S. dollar-denominated bonds ("Brady
Bonds") issued by the debtor-State. Usually, the bonds are secured by 30-year U.S. Treasury securities that the debtor-State purchases, using the proceeds of IMF loans. Banks
relying on this collateral typically do not need to write off the principal amount of their
investments. Because Brady Bonds are tradeable securities, banks often choose to sell them
to other investors, thereby reducing their sovereign debt exposure. See Macmillan, supra
note 16, at 313-15.
281 See Chun, supra note 54, at 2664 ("In the 1990s, large volumes of highly mobile
international bonds and portfolio investment replaced relatively stable syndicated bank
loans to developing economies." (footnotes omitted)). For example, Business Week reported that during the period from mid-March to mid-April 1999, Mexico and Argentina
each issued $1 billion in bonds, and Panama issued $500 million; moreover, Brazil may be
about to issue an additional $1 billion of bonds. See Ian Katz & Geri Smith, The Latins Are
Back in the Game, Bus. WiL, Apr. 26, 1999, at 54, 54. See generally Power, supranote 25, at
2702-03 (describing the sovereign debt crisis in Latin America).
282 See Ruth Rosauer, EmergingMarket Debt Instruments Play Siren Songfor PensionPlans,7
MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 211, 225 & n.123 (1998). Bondholders will therefore find it much
more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the type of creditor solidarity that banks have
sometimes achieved. See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the
Effects of ReorganizationLaw, 46J. FIN. 1189, 1193 (1991) (observing that "bank debt restructrings ... are substantially easier to organize than public debt [i.e., bond] restructurings"); see also Power, supra note 25, at 2711-12 & n.44 (detailing the number of banks
involved in the Mexican and Brazilian debt restructurings).
283 See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, Russian Arrears Deepening On Debts to Foreign Group, N.Y.
TimEs, June 1, 1999, at C3 (discussing the conflict of interest between investors, who in-
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traded, the identity of bondholders constantly changes. 2 4 These
characteristics of sovereign debt restructuring make the required
285
unanimous bondholder consent much more difficult to obtain.
Solving the collective action problem is therefore essential to success28 6
ful sovereign debt restructuring.
Super-majority voting can solve this problem. This voting scheme
is neutral from the standpoints of moral hazard and taxation. To the
extent that it permits a debtor-State and its creditors to agree more
rationally on a settlement of claims, this voting technique fosters economic rehabilitation. It might also be applied without exercising adjudicatory discretion. The only potential drawback under the framework
is that super-majority voting would affect nonbankruptcy incentives by
modifying voting procedures that require unanimity. However, that
impact should be economically insignificant if, as under the Code, the
super-majority voting is done by classes of claims that are "substantially
similar to the other claims ...of such class." 28 7 The presumption is
that a vote by holders of the requisite super-majority that benefit their
claims will also benefit holders of substantially similar claims. 288 Thus,

creasingly want to vote to accelerate the debt, and bank lenders, who "want future business
with Russia" and therefore "may be unwilling to pressure the Government on the [debt]
arrears").
284 See, e.g., Enrique PR Carrasco & Randall Thomas, EncouragingRelationalInvestment
and ControllingPortfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 542 n.3 (1996) (noting the highly volatile
nature of portfolio investments).
285
See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ppp(b) (1994)) (requiring consent of holder of indenture security for changes in payment terms); see also MarkJ. Roe, The Voting Prohibitionin Bond Workouts, 97 YALE LJ. 232,
250-51 (1987) (discussing the prohibition of "modification by majority action of any core
term of the bond"). Bondholders who are not institutional investors may also be more
willing than banks (which maintain ongoing institutional relationships with each other) to
hold out for a special deal. But cf PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 733 (6th ed. 1997) (noting that an issuance of bonds under the law of the United
Kingdom may provide for "the variation of the holder's rights with the consent of a prescribed majority of the holders or an extraordinary resolution of the holders"). Thus, issuing bonds under U.K. law could mitigate the collective action problem.
286
The collective action problem renders the imposition of comparability on bondholders so difficult that it has not even been attempted until recently. The first effort was
an ultimatum in February 1999 by the Paris Club, requiring Pakistan to renegotiate $620
million in Eurobonds as part of any agreement to reschedule their $3.3 billion of debt
owed to creditor States. See Gopinath, supra note 214, at 79. Ultimatums, however, are
likely to lead to default, as exemplified by Ecuador's September 28, 1999 default on its
Brady Bonds. See Emerging Market Bonds, supra note 214, at 47.
287
11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994); see also id. § 1126(c) (requiring voting by classes of
claims).
288
Cf.BarbaraJ. Houser et al., Plan Issues: Classification,Impairment,SubordinationAgreements, in CmRAVTR 11 BusIN ss RE ORx ATzrIoNs 317,328 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Mater-

ials S024, 1998) (noting that the proper classification of claims ensures that voting on the
plan will result in an equitable distribution among creditors).
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the Convention might provide for super-majority voting that binds all
289
parties.
A discussion of how the Convention should divide claims into
classes for super-majority voting purposes is beyond the scope of this
Article. I simply note here that courts have interpreted substantial
similarity under the Code to mean that claims have the same priority
in bankruptcy,29 0 and in a sovereign debt context all unsecured claims
appear to have the same priority.2 91 Nonetheless, the Code does not
require that all claims of the same priority be classed together; it
merely prohibits claims from being classed together unless they have
the same priority.29 2 Thus, pari passu claims could be classed separately if there was a rationale for separate classification. If the Convention followed a similar approach, each claim of a State or
multilateral agency could have its own classification. Additionally, private foreign creditors could be classified separately from private domestic creditors. Separate classification may be appropriate because
domestic creditors have no jurisdiction outside the debtor-State in
29 3
which they can sue, and consequently possess weaker remedies.
Cramdown: Finally, § 1129 of the Code sets the standards for confirmation of a restructuring plan.2 94 Most significantly, it implements
the super-majority voting provisions of § 1126 by requiring acceptance
of the plan by each class of claims.29 5 However, § 1129 also recognizes
that a class of claims might sometimes vote to reject the plan, and
therefore it provides an exception: the plan may still be confirmed if
creditors in each class receive value under the plan equal to the
amount of their claims, or if creditors whose claims are junior in pri289
Compare infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (showing why recent proposals
to institute super-majority voting by contract, as opposed to international convention, are
unlikely to be successful).
290
See, e.g., In re Bloomingdale Partners, 170 B.R. 984, 998 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994)
(holding that a tort-based claim is substantially similar to a contract-based claim for purposes of plan classification).
291 See supra note 15.
292
See In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 32 B.R. 106, 108 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983),
rev'd, 39 B.R 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
293
See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 16 (discussing the effects of jurisdictional issues on sovereign debtor cases).
294 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994).
295
See id. § 1129(a) (8). To some extent, § 1129(a) (7) (A) protects objecting creditors
whose class has accepted the plan by super-majority voting. This subsection requires that
objecting creditors receive value under the plan at least equal to the amount they would
receive if the debtor were liquidated and its assets distributed according to the absolute
priority rule. Because sovereign States are not liquidated and have an indeterminate liquidation value, I do not propose that objecting creditors of sovereign debtors receive the
same protection. Rather, they must rely on the fairness of the classification of their claims.
See supranotes 287-92 and accompanying text (discussing classifications of claims for voting
purposes).
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ority receive nothing.2 96 This rule is referred to as "cramdown," 29 7
298
and incorporates the principle of absolute priority.

Cramdown indirectly provides creditors with an incentive to
reach agreement on a plan. In order to confirm a cramdown plan, it is
necessary to value the debtor as a going-concern to ensure that distri299
butions are made in accordance with the absolute priority rule.
That valuation, however, entails some cost and delay. 300 Consequently, senior creditors may be willing to "give something to Uunior
creditors], enough to gain [their] consent and avoid cramdown."3 0 '
Moreover, "[v]aluation of the company is something that sophisticated participants in any significant chapter 11 reorganization avidly
302
desire to avoid."
A cramdown rule may not be appropriate for sovereign debt restructuring, however. Although the benefits of such a rule include
minimizing the collective action problem and fostering economic rehabilitation,30 3 the rule is extremely difficult to apply to sovereign
States.3 0 4 Valuation of a corporation as a going-concern is complex,
but it nonetheless is feasible.3 0 5 However, merely conceiving of a
method by which to value a State is difficult.30 6 Any attempted valua296 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
297 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Basics of Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy, J.
COM. BANK LENDING, Nov. 1985, at 36, 43-44 (discussing the cramdown valuation costs that
parties can avoid by a consensual plan). Professor Baird describes cramdown as the "most
important" right in the event that consensual agreement cannot be reached. BAiRD, supra
note 169, at 18.
298 Absolute priority mandates the distribution of a liquidating debtor's estate in accordance with the strict priority of claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 726. Confirmation of a plan of
reorganization under Chapter 11 does not, however, require absolute priority except to
the extent that it is incorporated through cramdown. Absolute priority is dispensed with
elsewhere in order to maximize flexibility when negotiating a plan of reorganization. Increased flexibility makes it easier to reach a successful plan and thereby preserve the
debtor's value as a going-concern. See, e.g., In reAtias Pipeline Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846, 848
(W.D. La. 1941).
299
See Schwarcz, supra note 297, at 43; see also Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441, 452-53 (1984)
(describing the absolute priority rule and its effect on secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders).
300 See Broude, supra note 299, at 453.
301
Id. at 453.
302 Id. at 454.
303 A cramdown rule would provide these benefits by creating an incentive for creditors and the State to reach agreement on a restructuring plan, in order to avoid a valuation
of the State. The rule would also be neutral from the standpoints of moral hazard, taxation, and non-bankruptcy incentives.
304
Cf McConnell & Picker, supranote 8, at 464-65 (concluding that the incorporation
of cramdown into municipal bankruptcy law is ineffectual).
305
See generallyPeter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, ReorganizationValue, 51 Bus. Lw.
419 (1996) (discussing the complexities of valuing companies in cramdowns).
306 Cf EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supranote 8, at 75 ("If it is difficult to establish the net
worth of a firm, it is almost impossible to do it for a country."); Kordana, supra note 4, at
1057 (concluding it is problematic "to apply the absolute priority rule to a bankrupt mu-
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don would therefore be inherently speculative and likely to generate
costly disputes and protracted litigation. Thus, the threat of invoking
cramdown would lack credibility, and creditors would have little incentive to reach a consensual plan solely to avoid that threat.
Nonetheless, a potentially simplifying but flawed assumption
exists that would make valuation of States possible, and would therefore make cramdown feasible as well. Unlike a corporation, a State
has the power to tax its citizens. One therefore might assume that a
State can always generate sufficient tax income in the future to pay its
claims over time. That assumption is problematic, however, because
at some point an increase in the tax rate will cease to raise tax revenues.30 7 Furthermore, a cramdown rule based on that assumption
would invite abuse. The State would be able to cram down, over creditor objections, a restructuring plan that pays creditors in full according to debt maturities that are extended over time.30 8 Such a plan
would adversely affect prebankruptcy incentives.
This abuse does not occur in a corporate context because in that
context cramdown is a double-edged sword: it harms the corporation's shareholders as well as its creditors.3 0 9 Hence, a debtor, whose
managers often own stock, will be reluctant to impose a cramdown
plan if there is any realistic chance of a negotiated settlement. This
reluctance stems from the fact that, in such a settlement, shareholder
claims always receive some recovery in order to induce shareholders
to accept the settlement.3 10 In contrast, a State has no true residual
31
claimants who would lose in a cramdown. '
nicipality"). Even the extent to which the valuation should take into account a State's
power to tax its citizens is unclear. See McConnell & Picker, supranote 8, at 466-67 (noting
the uncertainty of whether, and to what extent, a bankrupt municipality's valuation should
include potential tax revenues).
307 A tax increase may reduce economic output, and citizens might also be unable or
unwilling to pay the increase. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 466 (discussing the
difficulty of "identifying the tax-maximization point on this implicit 'Laffer Curve'").
308 My analysis assumes that debtors will make payments on a present value basis;

otherwise, the adverse impact on creditors will be even greater.
309
If the corporate debtor is insolvent, its shareholders, being the most junior claimants, will receive nothing. In contrast, if the corporate debtor is solvent, potential litigation
costs arising out of a cramdown would reduce the recovery to shareholders before affecting
any creditors. See Schwarcz, supra note 297, at 242-44.
310
See id.
311
Cf McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 465 (concluding that, in a municipal bankruptcy context, "[t ] he incorporated Chapter 11 cramdown standard is... of cold comfort
to unsecured creditors," and asserting that unsecured creditors "would instead look for
protection to § 943(b) (7), which requires the court to determine that the plan is in the
'best interests of creditors and is feasible'"). However, even the requirement that objecting
creditors receive at least as much from the plan as they would receive in a liquidation of
the debtor under Chapter 7, "could not be the standard under Chapter 9 because municipalities are not liquidated in bankruptcy." Id. Some courts have therefore reinterpreted
the best-interests test to simply require that creditors receive all they could reasonably ex-

20001

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING

1009

Theoretically, one could minimize the potential for abuse by imposing restrictions on cramdown, such as permitting its use only when
the State is unable to pay its debts and negotiations to consensually
restructure those debts have failed. This type of condition, however,
would add considerable uncertainty to the restructuring process and
would greatly expand the need to exercise adjudicatory discretion.
One also must place the need for a cramdown provision into perspective: the Convention's goal is not necessarily to eliminate problems
inherent in sovereign debt restructuring, but to mitigate those
problems. From that perspective, even if the absence of a cramdown
provision means that consensual agreements cannot always be
reached, the Convention will accomplish its goal if, through supermajority voting, it makes consensual agreements more feasible. Accordingly, I propose that the Convention not include a cramdown
provision unless experience later demonstrates that debtor-States and
their creditors cannot reach consensual agreements without it.312
Proposed Convention: In summary, I propose that the Convention
comprise the following rules: (1) only a State itself, and not its creditors, may commence the restructuring case, and must do so in good
faith; (2) financiers of the debtor-State's debt restructuring have priority over claims of other creditors, but the IMiF (or another neutral
multilateral institution) has the right to scrutinize and object to an
excessive amount of new priority financing, to monitor its use as appropriate in order to prevent overinvestment, and potentially to act as
a nonrecourse funding intermediary; and (3) all creditors be bound
to a plan of reorganization that is agreed to by super-majority voting
by classes of claims, and, upon such agreement, debts not provided
for in the plan be discharged. The Convention would also require
each ratifying State to enact the Convention's rules into national
13
law.3
Implicit in these rules lies the assumption that entities such as the
IMF will allow the market to work and will no longer act as de facto
lenders of last resort in a way that fosters moral hazard.A' 4 Nonetheless, the IMF should act as a lender of last resort in order to provide
liquidity in cases where the debtor-State is economically and fiscally
pect under the circumstances. See id. at 465-66. This reinterpretation, "however, leaves
considerable room for judicial discretion and municipal gamesmanship." Id. at 466.
312
Cf infra notes 360-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the potential self-execution of sovereign debt restructuring negotiations by comparing corporate bankruptcy negotiations with the effect of bankruptcy law incentives).
313 See infraAppendix .
314

Specifically, the IMF should not discriminate against States that adopt these rules,

such as by cutting off funding for adopting States but holding out the possibility of funding
for other States. The INEF may therefore wish to gradually eliminate funding for all States
in order to motivate States to adopt the rules and adapt to capital market funding.
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sound, but a default would result from irrational exogenous factors,
such as a financial panic. This liquidity funding is needed to avoid a
multiple equilibrium problem, and will not foster moral hazard; furthermore, the debtor-State should be able to repay the IMF once the
3 15
panic subsides.
Appendix I proposes a possible model of the Convention. I do
not claim this model is the only, or even the best, model logically consistent with the framework; it is merely a rational model that exhibits
this consistency. Another model, for example, could add an automatic stay,3 1 6 or could adopt a "menu approach," making the rules
optional in order to permit the debtor-State to avoid costs. 3 17 The

primary goal of this Article is to illustrate the importance of imposing
conceptually sound rules on sovereign debt restructuring to address
existing problems, not to propose definitive rules.
Next, I analyze implementation of the Convention and address
issues raised thereby.
315
316

See supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text.
For example, after observing that the "problem with most sovereign debt restruc-

turings... has been the failure to apply the lessons learned long ago in the private bank-

ruptcy process," another commentator advocates "three principles governing the
bankruptcy process that should be incorporated into sovereign restructurings": the ability
to "regain liquidity by borrowing funds" on a priority basis, the automatic stay to give "the
breathing space needed to return a debtor to economic health," and avoiding control of
the "rogue creditor" by permitting "a reorganization plan to be adopted by less than a
unanimous vote of the creditors." Hurlock, supranote 16, at 10.
317 Professor Rasmussen partly inspired a menu approach when he first observed, in
the context of corporate bankruptcy, that a one-size-fits-all rule is inefficient where bankruptcy covers a wide range of companies and creditors. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to CorporateBankruptcy, 71 Tax. L.REv. 51, 66-67 (1992) (arguing
that companies should be able to choose from a menu of standardized bankruptcy options
at the time when they are formed). For example, binding creditors to super-majority voting
could anger dissenting creditors whose rights and remedies, but for the law, could not be
affected without their consent. A State may want the right to decide whether the benefits
of this provision outweigh its costs. The rules might even include the option of a stay. See
id.at 106. A menu approach, however, is likely to generate high transaction costs. See id. at
100-21 (discussing the menu approach and addressing potential problems with this
scheme).
If States follow a menu approach, questions arise with respect to when the State
should choose its restructuring options, and whether those options may later be changed.
Presumably, the choice should be made when the State becomes party to the restructuring
law. See, e.g., Robert K Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: PromotingForum
Shoppingby Insolvent Corporations,94 Nw. U. L. Rzv. (forthcoming 2000) (draft on file with
the author) (examining a corporation's ability to choose venue for bankruptcy filing). Because investors would price their financing based on the State's choice of options, the
options should be fixed thereafter. See id.at 5-6 (arguing that allowing managers to choose
where to file for bankruptcy when the corporation is financially distressed produces illeffects, because by that time the interests of managers have diverged from the interests of
the firm as a whole; alternatively, selecting the bankruptcy forum "prior to when the firm
has to seek capital in the financial markets [would give] the managers ... an incentive to
select the venue which promises to maximize the value of the firm as a whole").
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Implementing the Convention

Implementing the Convention in an international law context
raises at least three issues: (1) how the Convention should bind States
and their creditors; (2) how the Convention should be administered;
and (3) how questions arising under the Convention should be
318
adjudicated.
1. Binding States and Their Creditors to the Convention
The diminishing distinction between public and private international law provides an interesting perspective from which to analyze
how States and their creditors should be bound by the Convention.
Traditionally, public international law dealt with rules between States,
whereas private international law was concerned with private entities
to the extent their activities crossed national borders. 3 19 Thus, one
can view the recently proposed United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) draft Convention on Assignment in
Receivables Financing as a private international law convention because it would regulate cross-border receivables financing between cit3 20
izens of different States.
In recent years, however, "[t] he distinctions between public and
private international law have become increasingly artificial as many
states and their instrumentalities have entered the marketplace in a
major way... and as commerce and foreign policy have become increasingly intertwined." 32 1 A sovereign debt restructuring convention
based on the Convention would further blur the distinction between
public and private international law by regulating the relationship between a debtor-State and its creditors that are private citizens of other
States. 322
If all of these States ratify the Convention, the debtor-State would
be directly bound, and its creditors would be bound by their own
318 The analysis of implementation in this Part is broader than Professor Baird's analysis of the dispute over how bankruptcy law should be implemented. See supra notes 136-43

and accompanying text. While Baird primarily focuses on the role of the judge in the
bankruptcy process, this analysis also examines jurisdictional, enforcement, and compliance issues.
319

See BARRY E. CARTER & PHnLP R. TmNiBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 19 (3d ed. 1999)

("In contrast to the public international law of rules between states, there has long been
private international law dealing with the activities of individuals, corporations, and other
private entities when their activities crossed national borders.").
320 The convention aims to enhance the viability of cross-border receivables financing
and to reduce its cost. See Spiro V. Bazinas, An InternationalLegal Regime For Receivables
Financing. UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 Dutr J. COMP. & INT'L L. 315, 358 (1998) (noting
that the convention's "work may considerably facilitate the flow of lower-cost credit to a
number of countries where such credit is currently not available").
321
CARTER & TRIMBtE, supra note 319, at 19-20.
322 Foreign commercial banks and private investors in foreign capital markets primarily fund sovereign lending.
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States' ratification of the Convention and enactment of its rules into
national law.3 23 If the Convention were given retroactive effect, it
would bind even existing creditors.3 24 The importance of retroactivity
extends equally to the sovereign debt restructing context because of
the need to address the rights of existing creditors:
It is a familiar canon of statutory construction that statutes normally
only operate prospectively. Bankruptcy laws, however, test this canon, because by their very nature such laws usually affect the preexisting rights of creditors, in order to provide relief to troubled
3 25
debtors with respect to preexisting obligations.
Legal retroactivity might appear controversial in an international
law context,3 26 but it is permitted so long as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary. 327 None of the substantive provisions of the Convention-super-majority voting, discharge, and the granting of
priority to financiers of the State's debt restructuring-would fall
323
This statement assumes that the States have also incorporated the Convention as
part of their national law, therefore, the Convention should require each ratifying State to
enact the legislation necessary to make the Convention's provisions part of the State's national law. Alternatively, Greenwood and Mercer have argued in a different context that

States might use Article VIII(2) (b) of the existing IMF Articles of Agreement to deny dissenting private creditors access to foreign courts. See Christopher Greenwood & Hugh
Mercer, Considerationsof InternationalLaw, in CRisis? WHAT C isis? ORDERLY WORKOUTS
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 103, 111-12. Article VIII(2) (b) provides in part
that "[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." Id. at
111 (typeface altered). According to Greenwood and Mercer's argument, a broad interpretation of the term "exchange contracts" would include loan agreements payable in foreign currency; hence, "where a state suspended repayment of its debt in foreign currency
in order to protect its reserves, and did so with the approval of [super-majority voting by]
the IMF, a debt contract which required payment to be made in a foreign currency would
be contrary to that state's exchange control regulations." Id. The authors nonetheless
conclude that because courts have interpreted Article VIII(2) (b) narrowly, "[i]t seems unlikely... that any reliance can be placed upon the text as it stands." Id. at 112.
324 Even without retroactivity, however, the Convention would be valuable by binding
future creditors.
325 TABB, supra note 260, at 680-81.
326 On the other hand, alternative sovereign debt restructuring proposals, such as the
inclusion of collective action clauses in bonds, see infra notes 334-36 and accompanying
text, raise controversy themselves. See, e.g., Diane Coyle, IMF Moves to Get Tough on Private
Creditors in Crisis-HitEconomies, THE INDEP. (London), Oct. 4, 1999, at 17 (observing that
there is little prospect that emerging-market States will permit collective action clauses in
their bond indentures unless developed States do likewise, because of fear that doing so
will signal that they are more likely to default); Martin Wolf, How to Avoid the Debtors'Prison,
FIN. TImsS (London), Oct. 20, 1999, at 27 (citing William Rhodes, vice-chairman of Citigroup, as arguing that imposing these clauses selectively would "reduce private capital
flows to both public and private sector borrowers in the emerging markets" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
327 See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 918-921 (Sir RobertJennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (discussing retroactivity in the context of expropriation and
confiscation).
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under this test. None discriminates based on the nationality of the
bondholders; the rights of nationals and aliens holding bonds would
be equally affected. And none is arbitrary because all are essential to a
debtor-State's ability to restructure its debt.
Where retroactivity amounts to expropriation, however, the State
would be liable under international law to compensate the injured
parties.3 2 8 Nonetheless, lawful State actions "may affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to expropriation." 329 For example, "foreign assets and their use may be subjected to taxation, trade
restrictions involving licenses and quotas [may be imposed], or measures of devaluation" may be taken without constituting expropriation.33 0 Non-discriminatory "taxation or other fiscal measures" also
need not be compensated.3 31 Indeed, in the context of breaching a
contract, only "the situation in which the state exercises its executive
or legislative authority to destroy the contractual rights as an asset
comes within the ambit of expropriation." 332 The rationale excusing
compensation appears to be that contracting private parties should be
aware of the possibility that a State may retroactively alter its contracts
by changing its national law, and therefore the private party should
333
assume the risk of such changes occurring.
Imposing super-majority voting (and its corollary, discharge) or
granting priority to financiers of a State's debt restructuring is unlikely to destroy the contractual rights of the bonds as an asset. In the
328 In international law, the terms "expropriation" and "confiscation" have "no precise
accepted technical meaning. 'Expropriation' conveys in a general sense the deprivation of
a former property owner of his property, and is equivalent to a 'taking' of property; 'confiscation' usually connotes an expropriation without compensation...." Id. at 916 n.9.
329 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 535 (5th ed. 1998). Some
judicial authorities even hold, under the so-called principle of national treatment, that "an
alien cannot complain provided he receives the same treatment as nationals." Id. at 538.
This principle, however, is not universally followed. See id.
330 Id.
331
Id. at 538.
332 Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
333 See SCHACMrR, supranote 240, at 311-24; see also F.V. Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility in Case of "Stabilization"Clauses, 2J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 23, 24, 33-34 (1993) (argu-

ing that, in general, a State may exercise its sovereign right to alter or repudiate its
contractual obligations, possibly subject to constitutional limitations, and that such alteration or repudiation does not automatically constitute a breach of international law unless
such a failure is confiscatory or discriminatory in nature). Stabilization clauses-under
which a State "undertakes neither to annul the agreement nor to modify its terms, either
by legislation or by administrative measures"-are sometimes included in contracts to respond to this risk. BRowumu,

supra note 329, at 554. However, the "legal significance of

such clauses is inevitably controversial," and it is an "unsettled question" whether they are
effective under international law. IM; see Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing
InternationalInvestment Commitments: InternationalLaw Versus Contract Interpretation,31 TLx.
INT'L LJ. 215, 236 (1996) (noting that a stabilization clause is "an attempt to bind the state
to a greater extent than a normal contract would seem to do"). In our case, the question
only would become relevant as to those bond indentures that contain stabilization clauses.
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former case, any change in the underlying terms of the bonds, such as
interest rate, maturity, or even principal amount (discharge being
merely a change that reduces the principal amount), would be subject
to super-majority consent of the bondholders.3 3 4 The only contractual
right that would be destroyed is an individual bondholder's right to
hold out for greater gain by threatening to veto a plan desired by
other bondholders. But legal systems would not likely protect such an
unreasonable private expectation. 33 5 In the latter case, I have shown
that by increasing the availability of new money credit, granting priority may actually increase the expected value of existing claims notwithstanding their subordination to the new money.3 36 Accordingly,
making the Convention retroactive would not appear to cause
expropriation.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the relevant debtor-State and
each relevant creditor's State have all ratified the Convention. In
many cases, that may well occur because most States will likely want to
ratify the Convention. Its rules generally benefit States by providing
incentives for new credit and by imposing super-majority voting to
minimize the collective action problem.3 3 7 Some States nonetheless
may fear that the priority and super-majority voting provisions of the
Convention might decrease the availability of credit or make it more
expensive. Although the ultimate effect of the Convention on availability and cost of credit is an empirical determination, that effect
should be minimal as long as the Convention's ratification does not
lower the rating of the State's debt securities. Discussions with Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, a leading rating agency, suggest that
ratification would not lower these ratings. 338 Additionally, one should
334 Recall that super-majority voting gives the creditors veto power over a plan, and
hence over discharge. See supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
335 Compare infra note 350 (similarly arguing that retroactively imposing super-majority
voting would not constitute a "taking" under U.S. constitutional principles).
336
See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
337 States have an interest similar to that of corporations residing in countries with
undeveloped, or inconsistent, commercial laws: these States welcome advances toward clarity and uniformity in the law because they increase the ability to obtain credit. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized System for Cross-BorderReceivables Financing,20 U.
PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 455, 476 (1999) (concluding that a centralized registration system for
perfection and priority of receivables financing would increase corporate access to lower
cost credit by increasing clarity and uniformity).
338 See Telephone Interview with Joanne W. Rose, Senior Managing Director, General
Counsel and Chair of the Ratings Policy Board, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services (June
10, 1999) (notes on file with author). Ms. Rose said that ratification of the Convention
should not affect Standard & Poor's ratings-which are based on the likelihood of default
and not on the amount of recovery expected in default-because the Convention does not
affect the likelihood of default. See id. Thus, a State whose debt was rated investment
grade would not experience a ratings change as a result of ratifying the Convention. Ms.
Rose suggested, however, that a sovereign debt analyst might be tempted to slightly reduce
the rating of a financially troubled State that had ratified the Convention, such as from "B"
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not expect ratification of the Convention to increase costs because an
IMF loan today has defacto priority over other claims,33 9 and my proposal only privatizes the source of the funding. Nonetheless, some
States may choose not to ratify the Convention. I therefore consider
below the Convention's effect on creditors from nonsignatory States.
In some cases, the Convention would bind creditors from nonsignatory States that make loans to a signatory State. Under international law principles, the law of the State-in this case, the Convention-may well apply to contracts between the State and foreign
private parties absent a contractually chosen governing law.3 40 The

rationale is that a sovereign entity "cannot be presumed to have made
the substance of its debt and the validity of the obligations accepted by
3 41
it in respect thereof, subject to any other law than its own."
Realistically, however, any financing agreement is likely to specify
its governing law.3 42 If the law chosen is other than that of the debtorState, the Convention alone would not bind creditors from nonsignatory States. For example, New York or United Kingdom law governs many existing sovereign bond issues.3 43 A State that wishes to
ensure the Convention will apply to such creditors therefore might try
to include a provision in its new financing agreements that contractuto "B-." See id. Incidentally, although I previously observed that allowing the markets to
work creates a risk that a State might default because it will be unable to obtain private
market funding, that risk of default does not arise from the Convention per se, but rather
from the IMF's determination to stop lending in a way that fosters moral hazard. That
determination is an independent good, regardless of whether the Convention is ratified.
339 The debtor-State will not dare to default on its IMF loan lest it lose access to future
emergency funding. See, e.g., AppropriationsHearings,supra note 38, at 92.
340 See Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of
InternationalLaw, 35 CATH. U. L. Rxv. 929, 931-32 (1986); Rainer Geiger, The Unilateral
Change of Economic Development Agreements, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 80 (1974) (referring
to contracts between a State and foreign private investors and observing that if contracting
parties do not refer to a particular legal system, "the contract, as a general rule, will be
governed by the internal law of the host state"). For cases dealing with the role of the hostState's law in foreign investment contracts, see Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, 1929
P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 20 at 42, No. 21 at 121, and Saudi Arabia v. ArabianAmerican Oil Comp.
(ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117, 167 (1958) (Sauser-Hall, Ref.) (explaining the Arbitration Tribunal's decision to adopt "the law of the country with which the contract has the closest
natural and effective connection" when no governing law is explicitly expressed by the
contracting parties). But cf Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the InternationalLaw Governing Concession Agreements, 6 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 54, 65-67 (1988) (asserting that an increasing number of contracts have recently been found to be "internationalized," i.e., not
subject to the law of the contracting State).
341
Serbian & Brazilian Loans Cases, 1929 P.C.I.J. at 42, 121. This principle especially
applies where the State is bound by its own laws to contract in accordance with a convention. See Bowett, supranote 340, at 931-32. Thus, a State that wishes to maximize the binding effect of the Convention on creditors could adopt a law providing that all borrowing
and other financing arrangements to which the State is a party shall be governed by the
Convention unless the State specifically provides otherwise.
342 See Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 323, at 106.
343 See Macmillan, supra note 8, at 87.
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ally binds its creditors to the Convention's rules, and also might try to
amend existing financing agreements similarly. 34 4 A contractual approach, however, would only bind consenting creditors. Existing
creditors might refuse to consent, and involuntary creditors, such as
346
tort creditors, 345 would not have the opportunity to consent.
These limitations illustrate why recent proposals to contractually
solve the collective action problem in bonds by introducing super-majority voting clauses in new bond issues3 47 are unlikely to be successful.
Absent an international convention, all bondholders would be in the position of creditorsfrom nonsignatory States, hence, only consenting bondholders would be bound. As a result, a State cannot rely on a
contractual approach to bind holders of the large stock of existing
long-term bonds, much less future creditors that choose not to con348
sent and involuntary creditors that have no opportunity to consent.
In contrast, the Convention would effectively solve the collective action problem for all creditors from signatory States.
Because New York and United Kingdom law governs so many
bonds, it also might be feasible to bind the nonconsenting bondholders (even those from non-signatory States) to the Convention's provisions.3 49 Those jurisdictions could legislatively provide that their
344
Alternatively, the debtor-State could attempt to require its own law to govern financing agreements. However, a State's private creditors often insist that their own State's
law or the law of a major financial center such as the United States or the United Kingdom
apply. See Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 323, at 106.
345
States are unlikely, however, to have many involuntary creditors because of sovereign immunity.
346
See Greenwood & Mercer, supranote 323, at 110. A contractual approach nonetheless gained support when the Group of Seven ("G-7") Heads of State endorsed a report by
G-7 Finance Ministers that encourages clauses in international bond issues permitting renegotiation after default in order to help solve the collective action problem. See -7 Chairman's Statement at the Birmingham Summit 1 8 (visited March 29, 2000) <http://equity.stern.nyu.edu/-mrpibomo/asia/g7birmingham.html>; see also EICHENGREEN &
PORTES, supra note 8, at 30-34 (proposing that sovereign loan agreements include clauses

explicitly permitting a specified majority of creditors to have the right to alter terms of the
loan after default).
347
See, e.g., EICHENGREEN, supra note 166, at 65-70 (proposing that loan contracts contain clauses requiring a form of super-majority voting); Greenwood & Mercer, supra note
323, at 110; Peter Cook, The Next InevitableDebt Crisis, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct 20, 1999, at B2
(noting that collective action clauses would allow for an orderly restructuring of a country's
bond debt, thereby shifting some of the burden from the IMF to the private sector); Wolf,
supra note 326, at 27 (calling inclusion of collective action provisions a "modest step" towards the necessary goal of making it easier to reschedule loans); DiminishingReturns: There
Are Scores of New Designsfor the International "Financial
Architecture,"ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999,
at 98 (advocating collective action clauses for all sovereign bond contracts, in accordance
with recommendations by the Council on Foreign Relations).
348 See Eichengreen, supra note 166, at 70 (cautioning that loan contract clauses are
"no panacea" because private placements would not be affected, and it would be difficult
to add these clauses to existing loan contracts).
349
Some bonds which are governed by U.K. law already may contemplate some form
of super-majority voting. See E-Mail from Michael Buchanan, Capital Account Issues Divi-
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national law apply the Convention's provisions in cases where a State
files for relief under the Convention. This legislation, even if retroactive, should be enforceable under the legal systems of both New York
(including, to the extent applicable, that of the United States)3 5 0 and
the United Kingdom. 35 1 Nonetheless, whether New York (or the
United States) and the United Kingdom would enact such legislation
352
is a political question.
sion, PDR, International Monetary Fund, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Oct. 22, 1999) (on file
with author) (stating that bonds issued under U.K law "(nearly) all have some form of
majority restructuring provision"; see also DAVIES, supra note 285, at 733 (noting that bonds
issued under U.K. law may provide for super-majority voting).
350
If the United States Congress enacts this legislation, it would preempt New York
law. Such legislation would be enforceable provided the retroactivity is not unconstitutional. In a bankruptcy context, retroactivity should be constitutionally permitted; that was
the effect, for example, when 11 U.S.C. §§ 364, 1126, & 1141 were enacted as federal law,
which granted priority to DIP financing and imposed super-majority voting in both bankruptcy and discharge regardless of unanimity requirements in state law contracts. Cf Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998) (holding that Congress generally has the
power to affect contractual obligations between parties); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181 (1902) (holding that Congress has power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution to retroactively impair contractual obligations);James Steven Rogers, The
Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization:A Study of the RelationshipBetween the
Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HAgv. L. REv. 973, 987 (1983) (arguing that
secured creditors know, or should know, of U.S. bankruptcy law's restrictions on their
rights, and therefore take their rights subject to those restrictions).
If New York State enacts the supplemental legislation, it would likewise face the retroactivity challenge. See People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645, 650-51 (1999); Americorp Securities, Inc. v. Sager, 656 N.Y.S.2d. 762, 764 (1997). The constitutional issue is somewhat more
complex because the retroactivity is imposed by a state legislature, not by Congress. Nonetheless, retroactive legislation is constitutional so long as it does not constitute a "taking" by
completely destroying property rights in a way that the affected parties could not have
anticipated. See Eastern Enterprises,524 U.S. at 528-29 ("[L]egislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not
have anticipated the liability .... ."); United States v. Riverside Bay Homes, 474 U.S. 121,

128 n.5 (1985). If the legislation did constitute a taking, it still would be constitutional if
adequate compensation was paid, but that would impose a cost on the state. See id. at 128.
The consensual relinquishment of rights-a plan being subject to super-majority votingshould not constitute complete destruction of the bonds. The only right that is completely
destroyed is an individual bondholder's right to hold out for greater gain by threatening to
veto a plan desired by other bondholders; that right, however, is an unreasonable private
expectation that would not be protected. SeeJan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity,52 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 81, 100 (1997). Further, granting priority to a financier of the
State's debt restructuring may actually increase the expected value of existing claims, much
less completely destroy their value.
351

See, e.g., 44(I) LoaD H.LsHAm OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND

para. 1283, at 764 (4th ed. reissue 1995) ("[A]n amending enactment may say, expressly or
by implication, that its effect is retrospective."); R.J. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL Sysrml 99
(6th ed. 1985) ("Parliament is sovereign and statutes may be, and occasionally are, expressed to be retroactive even where this operates to deprive a person of a vested right in
property.").
352 If thosejurisdictions were prepared to enact the necessary legislation, they theoretically could do so without reference to the Convention. That does not, however, eliminate
the need for the Convention. Different laws may govern some bond issues and other types
of creditor claims. The Convention also would provide legitimacy and a model for uni-
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Administering the Convention

Scholars assume that a neutral international institution is necessary to administer a sovereign debt restructuring case, especially the
debt negotiations. For example, Professor Cohen stated that
"[e]mulating [a Chapter 11] model at the international level would
first require the establishment of an institution authorized to play a
role in [sovereign] debt negotiations comparable to that of the bankruptcy court in the Chapter 11 procedure." 353 He suggests that a multilateral convention create such an institution as a "wholly new and
35 4
independent entity to underscore its impartiality and objectivity."
States that apply to this intermediary for relief would "commit them355
selves irrevocably" to the process.
Creating international institutions that are costly to maintain or
that impinge on State sovereignty is politically tenuous, however, and
recent experience is not promising. Attempts by financial officials of
the Group of Seven ("G-7") industrial nations35 6 to create an authority
to regulate world markets, for example, have achieved little success:
Deeply divided about the best way to tame violent swings in
world financial markets, finance ministers from the world's biggest
industrial nations agreed here [Bonn, Germany] today [February
20, 1999] to create a modest forum to consult on the problem more
closely.
...

[T] he plan is notable more for what it would not do than

what it would.
In a flat rebuttal to demands by German and French political
leaders for a broad new "architecture" or "highway code" for world
markets, the plan would merely establish a new forum for top regulators that would meet twice a year to consult and look for ways to
3 7
improve the quality of financial information.
form legislation that is explicitly negotiated and agreed upon, eliminating the selectivity
feared by emerging-market States, see supra note 326 and accompanying text, as well as
providing an international mechanism of oversight, see generally infra Part II.C.3 (discussing
adjudication and enforcement under the Convention).
353 Cohen, supra note 4, at 124. Cohen's rationale is that "[if creditors and [sovereign] debtors were to be persuaded to accept the risks of an alternative debt relief strategy,

some impartial intermediary would have to exist that could assure both sides that their
rights and needs would be respected." Id. at 124-25.
354
Id. at 125. Cohen also suggests calling the institution the "International Debt Restructuring Agency," and proposes that it could be a joint subsidiary of the IMF and the
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Id.

355

Id,

The G-7 nations consist of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. See Bob Davis, G-7Summit Expected to Boost Supportfor Proposals
to Help Insolvent Nations, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at A4.
357 Edmund L. Andrews, MajorPowersAgree to Take Modest Steps on Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1999, at 21.
356
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Previous attempts by the G-7 nations to create an international bank35 8
ruptcy agency have also failed.
I do not agree, however, with Professor Cohen's proposition that
an administrative institution would be needed to "play a role in [sovereign] debt negotiations." 359 Cohen mistakenly believes that the bankruptcy court plays this role in the United States, while in actuality,
Congress prohibits courts from playing such a role.3 60 The experience of corporate debt restructuring confirms that the parties themselves-debtors and their creditors-do the negotiating: "[M ] ost U.S.
bankruptcies are self-executing in that creditors, in concert with the
debtor, collectively determine the economic terms upon which the enterprise will be restructured."3 61 Cohen's confusion may arise from
the fact that, prior to adoption of the Code in 1978, "the bankruptcy
judge was required to be intimately involved in all aspects of every
case. Virtually all of the administrative, supervisory and clerical functions were the responsibility of the bankruptcyjudges ....
-6 2 This
role for ajudge, however, "was in marked contrast to [ajudge's role]
in most litigation, in which the parties themselves largely manage the
progress of the case."3 63 A significant goal of the Code's adoption was
therefore "to remove the bankruptcy judges from their role in the administration of bankruptcy matters, assigning them a purely judicial
role."36 The Code achieved this objective by limiting bankruptcy
courts to an adjudicatory function, and by delegating administrative
358

See generally Chun, supra note 54, at 2677-84 (discussing the proposal to create the

MA).
Cohen, supra note 4, at 124.
See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., Inc., 72 B.1t 789, 793 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
As the majority explained,
[i]t has been suggested that this Court should take an active role in the
[plan] negotiations. This course of action, however, should and will be
avoided by this Court. With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,
Congress sought to remove the administration of bankruptcy cases away
from bankruptcy judges [to achieve impartiality and] ... to limit the evils
that occurred as a result of the bankruptcy judge's administration of business reorganization cases.

359
360

Id.

361
Hurlock, supra note 16, at 12; see also EPSTEIN Er A.., supranote 168, § 10-2, at 734
("It would be wrong to think of the Chapter 11 process as primarily a litigated, judgedruled adversarial process. Plans proposed and adopted in Chapter 11 almost always have
been produced by negotiation, not by litigation."). These negotiations take place in the
shadow of bankruptcy law provisions discussed in this Article. See id. (observing that plan
"negotiations go on very much in the shadow of bankruptcy law"). This Article later analyzes the phenomenon by comparing incentives for negotiation under the Code with those
contemplated by the Convention. See infra notes 371-84 and accompanying text.
362
1 CoLLiER, supra note 151, 1 6.30[3], at 6-103.
363
364

I&

Id. 1 6.30, at 6-101.
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functions to a separate official referred to as a United States trustee.3 65
However, the Code did not mandate United States trustees to perform
particular administrative activities.3 66 Rather, their role is "purely
oversight..., [and U.S. trustees should] limit[ ] their activity to fostering creditor involvement and review of disclosure statements and
fee applications."3 67 These activities are not relevant to sovereign debt
restructuring, where dollar amounts are large enough to stimulate
creditor involvement, and disclosure statements3 68 and fee applications3 6 9 are irrelevant.3 70 Moreover, the presence of a supervisory official such as a U.S. trustee may be unappealing to States, making them
reluctant to ratify the Convention.
Nonetheless, corporate bankruptcy negotiations in the United
States may be self-executing because they take place under the shadow
of bankruptcy law. To what extent, therefore, can we expect sovereign
debt negotiations to be similarly self-executing? To answer this, this
Article compares the incentives for negotiation under the Code with
those contemplated by the Convention.
From the debtor's standpoint under the Code,
bankruptcy [law] offers the debtor a number of powerful aids in its
negotiations, notably:
1. the automatic stay and the breathing room it brings [and the
motivation for creditors to negotiate a plan in order to obtain
payment],
2. the possibility of adopting a plan that will legally bind all
creditors even though a minority reject it, and
365
See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1994). The United States trustee is an executive official, appointed by and under the supervision of the United States Attorney General, see id. § 582,

and should not be confused with a trustee in bankruptcy, the generic term given to the
debtor under the Code.
366 The Code did delegate certain appointment responsibilities to the U.S. trustee that
are not relevant to this discussion. See 1 COLLIER, supranote 151, 1 6.20, at 6-78 to -86; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 586 (setting forth duties of United States trustees).
367 1 COLIER, supra note 151,
6.17[1], at 6-69. The Executive Office for United
States Trustees issued a policy statement on March 8, 1990, concluding, that this protocol
concerning trustees' responsibilities "is a reasonable and workable approach." See id. at 670.
368 A disclosure statement is a written statement containing information intended to
enable creditors to make an informed judgment about a proposed plan of reorganization.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
369 A fee application is an application by a party for payment or reimbursement from
the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 503.
370 The original rationale for widespread judicial involvement under the Code's bankruptcy statute predecessor focused on concern over bankruptcy's "potential for fraud, selfdealing, and diversion of funds." 1 COLLIER, supra note 151, 6.30[3], at 6-103 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this reasoning does not compel judicial
supervision because sovereign States appear less likely than private businesses to attempt to
commit these types of fraud.
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3. the turnover and avoiding powers, which can greatly augand provide powerful leverage over
ment the assets available
37 1
certain creditors.
A State already enjoys the first negotiation aid as a result of its sovereign status. 372 The Convention incorporates the second negotiation
aid through super-majority voting. The third aid, which focuses on a
bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid preferential payments to creditors
and fraudulent transfers, is less important in a sovereign than a business context.3 7 3 Hence, under the Convention, a debtor-State enjoys
substantially the same "powerful aids in its negotiations" 3 74 as a corporate debtor enjoys under the Code.
The Code also provides negotiation aids for creditors. First, creditors can threaten the debtor with liquidation if they do not reach a
negotiated plan of reorganization.3 73 This threat, however, is not always compelling. Under the Code, ajudge may convert a reorganization case to a liquidation only "for cause," such as "continuing loss [es]
and ...
[the] absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,"
"inability to effectuate a plan [of reorganization]," or "unreasonable
delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to the creditors. '37 6 The burden
of proof for showing "cause" is on the creditor moving for conversion,
not the debtor. 37 7 Even if the creditor satisfies that burden, the judge
ultimately has discretion to decide whether or not to convert the case
to liquidation.3 7 8 As a result, the threat of liquidation can be unrealistic, especially for large debtors:
[Liquidation of a large company] would occur only when the bankruptcy system malfunctioned. The ordinary outcome would be for
the firm to discharge its.., debt in bankruptcy while continuing its
operations. Empirical evidence shows this to have been universally
the case for the past twenty years with regard to large public com3 79
pany bankruptcies.
371
TORS

372
373

EuzABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE W=sTRooK, THE LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDI-

476 (3d ed. 1996).

See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic stay).
See supranotes 256-67 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 547 & 549 of the Code

and avoidance of preferences).
374
375

WARREN & WFSTROO, supra note 371, at 476.
See id. at 477 (observing that creditors can threaten the debtor with liquidation

under Chapter 7 of the Code, "even though both [sides] really want to avoid it"). Creditors also can threaten the debtor with a plan of liquidation if the debtor's exclusive period
to file a plan terminates. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994).
376 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
377 See 7 CoLuER, supra note 151, 1 1112.01 [2] [a], at 1112-7.
378 See id.
379 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing. A Reply to Professor
Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55, 63 (1999); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 72 B.R. 789, 790
(Bankr. N.D. Mll. 1987) (refusing to terminate the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan of
reorganization, which would permit creditors to file a liquidating plan, even though
"[n]early five years have passed since the commencement of the UNR bankruptcy case"
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Thus, large debtors, which are most analogous to debtor-States, almost always reach consensual plans in the absence of any realistic liquidation threat, thereby rendering that threat an unnecessary
negotiation aid. Accordingly, the absence of a creditor's ability to
threaten liquidation of a debtor-State should not undermine the selfexecuting nature of sovereign debt negotiations under the
Convention.
The other creditor negotiation aid is a senior creditor's threat to
cram down a plan of reorganization over a junior creditor's objection.38 0 Although cramdown is not presently part of the Convention,
this Article proposes that the Convention ultimately adopt a
cramdown procedure if experience demonstrates that it is needed to
38
make sovereign debt negotiations self-executing. '

Therefore, the Convention would effectively provide roughly the
same incentives for cooperation in sovereign debt negotiations that
the Code imposes on corporate bankruptcy negotiations. To the extent that corporate bankruptcy negotiations are self-executing, sovereign debt negotiations should similarly be self-executing, and the
parties would not need an institution generally to administer or supervise the process.38 2 However, the Convention could authorize the IME
or another neutral multilateral institution that monitors priority funding3 8 3 to perform any administrative tasks that arise on a case-by-case
4
basis.38
Finally, a sovereign debt restructuring process does not need an
administrative institution to prevent strategic manipulation: the narrowly circumscribed provisions of the Convention are already
designed to prevent manipulation. If, for example, an economically
healthy State files under the Convention in an attempt to take opportunistic advantage of its creditors, these creditors could challenge the
filing as lacking good faith.38 5 Further, even if the creditors lose their

challenge, the State would have little ability to manipulate the Convention unfairly to their disadvantage. Existing creditors would not be
harmed if the State borrows on a priority basis because the State, beand "progress toward the confirmation of any plan of reorganization in the UNR bankruptcy is not in sight"); EPs'EIN Er .. , supranote 168, § 10-2, at 734-35 (observing that the
Chapter 11 of a "big business usually leads to some form of reorganization").
380
See supra notes 294-304 and accompanying text.
381
See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text.
382
The Convention's self-executing nature is further reinforced, of course, by the fact
that it incorporates only three substantive provisions of bankruptcy reorganization law.
383
This institution might also impose conditionality when appropriate. See supranotes
194-204 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of utilizing the IMF in this role).
384 Thus, the Convention might designate the IMF as the location where States file
their debt-restructuring cases.
385 See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text (discussing the good faith filing
requirement).
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ing economically healthy, would be able to repay all of its creditors.
(The State also would have little incentive to borrow on a priority basis
because granting a priority would be unlikely to reduce borrowing
costs in those circumstances.38 6 ) Also, whether or not economically
healthy, a State would be unable to manipulate the use of loan proceeds because priority loans are monitored under the Convention to
prevent overinvestment.3 87 And the requirement of super-majority
voting by classes of claims gives veto power to each voting class,
thereby preventing a State from devising a plan to harm existing creditors or using the Convention in an attempt to divide and conquer
legitimate creditor opposition.3 8
3.

Adjudication and Enforcement

The remaining implementation issue is enforcement of the Convention and adjudication of issues arising thereunder. Relatively little
precedent exists for a body to adjudicate disputes between a State and
its creditors.38 9 Outside of expropriation cases, few disputes arise between sovereign States and foreign private parties.39 0 Established intemational courts, such as the International Court ofJustice, are only
competent to hear cases between States. 391 Although a State has the
right to bring a lawsuit against a foreign State on behalf of one of its
386 See Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 448 ("[T]he debtor often gains no interest rate
advantage from a secured [priority] loan if the lender would be comfortable making an
unsecured [non-priority] loan.").
387
See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text (discussing prevention of
overinvestment).
388
See supranotes 274-93 and accompanying text (discussing super-majority voting by
classes of claims).
389
See PAUL E. CoMEAux & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INvEsTMENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1997). As the prior discussion of the increasingly artificial
distinction between public and private international law hinted, "the traditional view of
state responsibility is that it runs only to sovereign states. Meaning, in a debtor-creditor
context, that a debtor-State would have no responsibility to a private creditor, although it
may have a responsibility to that creditor's State." Id. However, "[a]s a practical matter...
this view of international law has been superseded by modern practice." Id. For example,
the ICSID Convention, see infra notes 397-417 and accompanying text, "firmly establishes
the capacity of a private individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a State in
an international forum, thus contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as a
subject of international law." ARON BRocHEs, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND
OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 198 (1995); see also IGNAZ
SEiDL-HoHENVELDERN, COLLECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZAToNs 374 (1998) ("The ICSID Convention attempts to encourage foreign

investors to invest in developing countries by granting to them, in case of a dispute with
the host country, a status equal to that enjoyed by that State."). Seidl-Hohenveldern continues by explaining that the "Convention intends to grant to these foreign investors access
to international adjudication organs... on an equal footing with the State concerned." Id.
390 Sovereign immunity has historically blocked many of these disputes.
391 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 38-39.
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nationals, it may be reluctant to do so for political reasons.3 92 Moreover, although a creditor could attempt to sue a debtor-State directly,
the litigation would be governed by the debtor-State's local law and
93
may therefore be biased in favor of the debtor-State.
Possible solutions to this adjudication issue include a United Nations amendment to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Such an amendment would permit the court, or a lesser judicial body
formed under its auspices, to hear disputes between a State and its
creditors on an ad hoc basis.3 94 Another option is to create a new
international arbitral tribunal competent to adjudicate disputes be3 95
tween States and private creditors.
In that regard, a relatively low-cost and unbureaucratic procedure
presently exists under international law for adjudicating certain disputes between States and nationals of other States that might serve as
precedent for the new tribunal.3 96 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous body created
under the auspices of the World Bank, provides facilities for arbitration of investment disputes between contracting States and nationals
of other contracting States.3 9 7 A small Secretariat, consisting of a sec392 See Susan Choi, Note, JudicialEnforcement of ArbitrationAwards Under the ICSID and
New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 177 (1995-1996).
393
See id.; see also BROCHES, supra note 389, at 259 (arguing that "[i]finternational

disputes [involving non-governmental foreign nationals] are brought before national
courts the 'foreign' party is likely to consider itself to be at a disadvantage on several
counts").
394 To the extent that clauses contained in a State's financing agreements implement
the Convention, those clauses could also specify an appropriate tribunal to adjudicate disputes. Each State's internal laws would determine whether those clauses would bind the
state as a matter of contract.
395 See BROciHES, supra note 389, at 259 (referring to earlier similar proposals). Eichengreen and Portes argue that such an international arbitral tribunal could be formed under
IMF auspices, or could be independent. See EICHENGREEN & PORTEs, supra note 8, at 39.
Regarding an IMF-sponsored tribunal, their argument focuses on an administrative, as opposed to adjudicative, role for this tribunal, such as "help [ing] creditors and the debtor to
negotiate a debt restructuring," specifically by "examining the economic and financial situation of the country ... [and] consult[ing] with representatives of the creditors...." Id.
However, these administrative roles are unnecessary, and the only required role is the adjudication of disputes.
396 As Comeaux and Kinsella explain, "[t]he cost of an ICSID arbitration [discussed
below] is relatively low compared to other private arbitration institutes such as the International Chamber of Commerce." COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 389, at 205; cf. EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 42-43 (suggesting that an independent agency along the
lines of ICSID could be created).
397 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 1, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The ICSID Convention is sometimes
known as the Washington Convention, although this Article does not use that term. Many
authors have focused on the general background of ICSID and ICSID arbitration. See
BRocHEs, supra note 389, at 161-356; COMFAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 389, at 199-212;
SEIDL-HOHENVELDE N, supra note 389, at 371-82; Choi, supra note 392, at 177; Antonio R.

Parra, The Role of ICSID in the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 16 ICSID Naws, Winter 1999,
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retary-general, one or more deputy secretary-generals, and an administrative

staff,39 8

manages

ICSID

and maintains

a panel

of

multinational arbitrators3 99 with recognized competence in the fields
of law, commerce, industry, and finance.40 0 ICSID covers expenses by
charging for use of its arbitration facilities. 40 '
The arbitration itself is straightforward. The arbitral tribunal consists of one or more arbitrators upon whom the parties agree, 40 2 or
absent agreement, three arbitrators. 403 A Secretariat staff lawyer
serves as the tribunal's secretary and acts as a channel of communication between the parties. 4 4 The parties agree to rules of law, according to which the tribunal decides disputes by majority vote.40 5 Absent
party agreement on such rules, the tribunal relies on the law of the
contracting State and any applicable rules of international law.40 6 De40 7
cisions are binding on the parties and not subject to appeal.
The ICSID arbitration procedure is also well established. At least
147 States are signatories to the ICSID Convention, and 131 of those
States (including the United States) have ratified it.408 Provisions for
ICSID arbitration are "commonly found" in investment contracts between States and nationals of other States. 40 9 States have consented in
advance to submit their investment disputes to ICSID arbitration in
approximately "twenty investment laws and in over 900 bilateral investat 5; International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSJD (visited
Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htn> [hereinafter About ICSID]. See generally MosHE HIRscH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR THE SETLEMENT OF INvESrEt DisPuTEs (1993) (describing the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, its jurisdiction, and the applicable law).
398 See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at arts. 9-11. An Administrative Council
composed of one representative of each contracting State elects the secretary-general and
any deputy secretary-generals. See id. at arts. 4, 10.
399 ICSID also maintains a Panel of Conciliators. See id. at art. 12.
400
See id at arts. 13-14. Panel members are also representative of the principal legal
systems of the world. See id. at art. 14.
401
See id. at art. 61. Member States, however, are ultimately liable for shortfalls. See id.
at art. 17. The Secretariat's ordinary operating expenses are financed by the World Bank's
budget. See About ICSD, supra note 397.
402
See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at art. 37. The parties could even choose a
single arbitrator. See id. at art. 37, para. 2.
403
404
405
406

See id.

See Parra, supra note 397, at 2.
See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at art. 48, para. 1.
See id. at art. 42, par. 1. The tribunal is also authorized to require the parties to
produce documents or other evidence and to conduct appropriate inquiries. See id. at art.
43.
407 See id. at art. 53. Contracting States are required to "recognize an award rendered
pursuant to this [ICSID] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that
State." Id. at art. 54.
408 See ICSID List of ContractingStates (as of Oct. 1, 1999) (visited March 1, 2000) <http:/
/www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm>.
409 About ICSID, supra note 397, at para. 7.
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ment treaties." 410 Furthermore, ICSID arbitration is "one of the main
mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes under four recent multilateral trade and investment treaties," 41 1 including the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).412 As of February
2000, ICSID has concluded thirty-eight cases, 413 and thirty cases are
4 14
pending.
Thus, ICSID is a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is
needed to resolve sovereign debt restructuring disputes. 4 15 A tribunal
based on that model could maintain a panel of neutral arbitrators hav-

ing recognized competence in bankruptcy and insolvency law. Rules
could require panel members to have different nationalities, and to

be representative of the principal bankruptcy and insolvency law systems of the world. Similarly, the tribunal's expenses could be met by
charging a fee for the arbitration. 416 Finally, the arbitration could follow ICSID's simple format: it would involve a panel of up to three
arbitrators who decide disputes by majority vote in accordance with

applicable rules of international law, and who render decisions that
4 17
are binding and not subject to appeal.

410

Id.

411
412

Id.
See id.

413

See ICSID List of Concluded Cases (visited March 1, 2000) <http://www.world

bank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htmn>.
414 See ICSID List of Pending Cases (visited March 1, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/pending.htn>. This relatively small number of concluded and pending cases
actually belies ICSID's importance. As Seidi-Hohenveldern asserts:
[i]t would, however, be a fallacy to conclude from the small number of
awards that the ICSID Convention is of only small practical importance.
The link between ICSID and the World Bank appears to be so formidable
that host States endeavour to avoid as much as possible disputes with a foreign investor that may cause the host State adverse publicity in circles which
may have to decide on that State's creditworthiness. The ICSID arbitration
clauses thus are just as effective by their mere existence as the British Navy
was during the 19th century. The 'fleet in being' kept the peace on the
oceans without having to fight any spectacular battles.
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supranote 389, at 373; see also HinsCH, supranote 397, at 156 ("The
small number of disputes that have been addressed to [ICSID] does not necessarily attest
to its failure, for the aim of the founders of the Centre was not to increase activity in the
area of dispute settlement, but rather, to promote international investments.").
415 Surveys of the world's important arbitral institutions, for example, conclude that
ICSID arbitration is preferable to other forms of arbitration. See HmscH, supranote 397, at
155-56 (reviewing those surveys). Clearly, ICSID "isa truly international institution, which
is independent of municipal systems of law. The major international commercial arbitration institutions (the International Chamber of Commerce and the American Arbitration
Association) are subject to the laws of the states in which they operate, and the enforcement is sought." Id. at 158; cf.BENJAmIN J. COHEN, DEVELOPrNG-CouNTRY DEBT: A MIDDLE
WAY 31-32 (Essays in Int'l Fin. No. 173, 1989) (discussing ICSID as a possible "referee" of
negotiations between a debtor-State and its creditors).
416 Unpaid expenses might have to be paid out of the IMF's budget.
417 Similar to the rules under the ICSID Convention, one of the new organization's
staff lawyers could also be appointed to serve as the tribunal's secretary, and to act as a

20001

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING

1027

Distinctions would exist between ICSID and a sovereign debt restructuring tribunal, but those distinctions should not prevent ICSID
from being used as a model. For example, the ICSID Convention does
not necessarily bind contracting States to submit any particular dispute to arbitration; only disputes that the disputing parties agree to
submit to ICSID are subject to its jurisdiction. 4 8 In a sovereign debt
restructuring context, however, an unresolved dispute between a creditor and the debtor-State might disrupt an overall settlement among
all creditors. To facilitate prompt settlement, the Convention should
therefore provide that ratifying States thereby subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of the new tribunal. This requirement should not be
overly controversial: at least thirty States have already enacted legislation automatically submitting investment disputes with nationals of
41 9
other States to ICSID arbitration.
Another possible distinction is that ICSID primarily arbitrates disputes between contracting States and nationals of other contracting
States, whereas in a sovereign debt restructuring context the large
number of creditors suggests that some may be nationals of States that
have not ratified the Convention. Should the new tribunal adjudicate
a dispute between the debtor-State and a creditor from a noncontracting State? As discussed earlier, an unresolved dispute between a creditor and the debtor-State might disrupt an overall settlement among all
creditors; I therefore propose that the Convention authorize the new
tribunal to arbitrate disputes between contracting States and any creditor that subjects itself to the tribunal's jurisdiction. Most creditors
would prefer this scenario to the alternative of suing the debtor-State
directly.4 20 ICSID has actually taken this same approach since 1978 by
authorizing the arbitration of investment disputes between contracting States and nationals of noncontracting States that consent to
4 21
arbitration.
Another concern under the ICSID arbitration model is the difficulty ICSID has had in enforcing some awards against recalcitrant
States. 42 2 Nonetheless, even ICSID's critics concede that "most arbitral
channel of communication between the State and its creditors. The tribunal could also be
authorized to require the parties to produce documents or other evidence and to conduct

appropriate inquiries.
418
See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at art. 25, para. 1. However, once the parties
do consent to jurisdiction, the IGSID arbitration will exclude any other remedy. See id. at
art. 26.
419
See Parra, supra note 397, at 3.
420
See supra note 393 and accompanying text (explaining that a creditor would be
prejudiced in a lawsuit directly against the debtor-State).
421
See About ICI3D, supra note 397, at para. 5.
422
See Choi, supra note 392, at 180-81 (noting that although contracting States are
bound to recognize ICSID arbitral awards, execution of the award is governed by the
State's own law, which might give sovereign immunity against execution). Choi explains
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awards are satisfied through voluntary compliance of the parties. 4 2 3
Moreover, in a sovereign debt restructuring context, the Convention
could provide compelling remedies against a recalcitrant State, such
as depriving it of the benefits of the Convention, assessing money
damages, or making the State's failure to pay an arbitral award an
event of default under its new money financing agreement.
Thus, to the extent that a need exists for a tribunal to adjudicate
sovereign debt restructuring disputes, the ICSID model is compelling.
That need should be minimal, however, because disputes should
rarely occur in a sovereign debt context. The Convention's rules are
narrowly crafted, following the axiom that the rules should minimize
adjudicatory discretion. 4 24 The only interpretative disputes that might
arise would concern either the good faith requirement for filing or
the right of creditors to object to an excessive amount of new money
financing. Nonetheless, disputes over whether bankruptcy filings are
made in good faith are extremely unusual even in a corporate context.42 5 Also, corporate creditors "very rare [ly]" object to an amount
of DIP financing as excessive, 426 and in a sovereign debt restructuring,
the need to object should be equally rare because of the public scrutiny involved. A tribunal would therefore be required to settle interpretive disputes only in very limited circumstances.
It also is unlikely that creditors or debtor-States will need a tribunal to enforce the Convention. Debtor-States should want to adhere
to the Convention because its provisions are largely for their benefit
and also because their reputations-necessary to regain access to capital market funding at a later date-will depend on compliance. 42 7 If a
that as a result, "[i]n two of the three cases in which enforcement of an ICSID award was

sought, parties were unable to receive payment of the award because the funds they attached did not qualify for execution under national laws." Id. at 181. In a sovereign debt
context. execution is unlikely to become a significant issue because enforcement of the
underlying debt claim is outside the scope of the Convention.
423

Id. at 175.

See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. That axiom has not, however, made
the Convention's rules inappropriately narrow. A review of this Article's analysis of each
Code section reveals that minimizing adjudicatory discretion was only a marginal factor in
determining which section's rules should become part of the Convention. See supra Part
II.B.
425 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 110, at 927-42 (observing that bankruptcy
filings made by public corporations are never dismissed for lack of good faith, but noting
that courts are more likely to dismiss certain filings involving single-asset cases and tax
fraud, which would not appear to be relevant to sovereign debt restructuring).
426 Telephone Interview with Lester M. Kirshenbaum, Bankruptcy Partner, Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (May 28, 1999).
427 See ABRAM CHAYEs & ANToNzA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEv SOVEREGNT. CoMpUANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10, 27 (1995) (observing that in the
increasing world climate of interdependence, States are prone to comply with their treaty
obligations in order to preserve their international reputation). More reliable ways to ensure State compliance exist, although they do not appear necessary. For example, each
424
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creditor located in a nonsignatory State objects to a restructuring plan
achieved through super-majority voting or to another creditor's new
money priority, its only remedy would be to sue the debtor-State. If
the creditor brings the suit before the new tribunal, however, the tribunal would simply adhere to the rules of the Convention. The objecting creditor could attempt to bypass the tribunal, perhaps by suing
in a foreign court4 28 outside the debtor-State. 42 9 However, even if the

objecting creditor wins that lawsuit,430 the only practical remedy is to
attach the debtor-State's foreign assets, 43 1 a remedy that is inconse43 2
quential in most cases.
In sum, implementing the Convention should be relatively
straightforward. States themselves should want to become signatories
to the Convention because its primary goal is to foster the State's ultimate economic rehabilitation in a time of crisis. Under the Convention, debt negotiations should be self-executing, although a neutral
signatory State could be required to deposit money into an international escrow account,
equal to a percentage of the State's sovereign borrowings. The State would forfeit the
money ifit subsequently breached the Convention. A State that ex ante does not intend to
breach should be prepared to make this deposit, provided that the escrow account bears a
market rate of interest and is small enough to not impair the State's liquidity.
428 This scenario assumes that the objecting creditor has a proper jurisdictional basis
to commence such a lawsuit. Sovereign immunity would not impede such a suit if, as is
typical, the doctrine is waived as a defense in the financing agreement. See Greenwood &
Mercer, supranote 323, at 106; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of CrossBorder Finance, 8 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 235, 245 (1998) ("Requiring the company to
waive sovereign immunity may be a solution to [the sovereign immunity defense] problem."). As a practical matter, private creditors might be reluctant to commence such expensive litigation.
429 To prevent this, the Convention might provide that all lawsuits commenced outside
the tribunal should be moved to the tribunal.
430
A court might uphold the objecting creditor's claim. For example, in Allied Bank
Int'l v. Banco CreditoAgricola de Cartago,757 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1985), a member of a
bank syndicate that refused to join a restructuring agreement between Costa Rican sovereign debtors and other syndicate members sued in the United States for repayment of its
defaulted loan. See id. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the objecting
bank on the basis that the loan was clearly due and payable, notwithstanding Costa Rica's
unilateral regulation suspending its external debt payments. See id. at 522-23. The court
held that the U.S. act of state doctrine, which provides that "the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory," was inapplicable; the court found that the situs of the property in question-the
objecting bank's right to receive payment from the Costa Rican debtors-was New York,
where the debt was payable. Id. at 520-21. Costa Rica's unilateral suspension of debt pay.
ments was "inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt problems...
[and] contrary to the interests of the United States." Id. at 522. This case does not suggest,
however, that an objecting creditor will always be able to work mischief. The court might
have decided the case differently if the restructuring agreement was reached in accordance
with an international convention to which the United States was a party. Moreover, courts
in other States, faced with the same facts, might have reached a different outcome.
431
Cf., e.g., Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. U.S. Line Inc., 1989 Q.B. 360 (permitting
U.K. creditors to freeze a U.S. corporate debtor's assets in the U.K. notwithstanding a contrary order of the U.S. bankruptcy court).
432
See supra note 422-23 and accompanying text.
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multilateral institution such as the IMF will be necessary to monitor
and impose conditionality on priority financing. That same institution could also serve as a nonrecourse funding intermediary, or could
perform other administrative functions that may arise. To the limited
extent that disputes between a State and its creditors require adjudication, hearings could occur on an ad hoc basis before an existing international judicial body, or the Convention could establish a new lowcost tribunal based on the ICSID model.
CONCLUSION

Sovereign debt restructuring currently gives rise to various
problems. The conflicting interests of the State and its creditors, as
well as the collective action problem among creditors, make it difficult
to reach agreement on a restructuring plan. The increasing shift
from bank to bond financing exacerbates this difficulty. Multilateral
entities such as the IMF have attempted to aid the process of sovereign
debt restructuring, but may have worsened matters: their efforts create a risk of moral hazard and, to the extent that IMF funding is derived from member-States, foster taxpayer subsidy of foreign States
and their creditors. This Article has examined whether supranational
legal regulation based on principles of bankruptcy reorganization law
433
could effectively address these problems.
Although regulation should have normative underpinnings, no
existing scholarship purports to offer a normative legal theory of sovereign debt restructuring. I have attempted to do so by examining
how the conceptual basis of bankruptcy reorganization law can be
adapted to sovereign debt restructuring. Disputes over the conceptual basis of bankruptcy reorganization law complicate, but at the
same time universalize, my examination. Some scholars argue that
bankruptcy reorganization law should advance traditional goals; other
scholars argue that the only goal of bankruptcy reorganization law
433 In March 2000, concurrently with the final editing of this Article, the International
Financial Institution Advisory Commission, created by the United States Congress in November 1998 to study the future role of the IMF, issued its report (the "Report"). See

International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, Report (visited March 29, 2000)
<http://phantom-x.gsiacum.edu/IFIAC/USMRPTDV.html>. To the extent there is overlap, the conclusions in the Report turn out to be consistent with the conclusions in this
Article, including that the IMF should restrict its lending to providing liquidity loans to
economically sound States that are facing default because of irrational exogenous factors,
such as financial panics. See id. at 2, 5. There nonetheless might appear to be an inconsistency: the Report criticizes the "detailed conditionality... that has burdened IMF programs in recent years," id. at 6, whereas this Article contemplates that the IMF would
continue to impose conditionality. See supra notes 31-32, 203 and accompanying text. This
Article does not analyze, however, whether conditionality should continue; it merely assumes that conditionality will continue. To the extent conditionality is inappropriate,
nothing in this Article requires its continuance.
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should be economic efficiency. The disputes reflect the different initial axioms scholars use.
First, this Article analyzed these disputes in an attempt to understand which axioms should apply to sovereign debt restructuring.
Next, it used those axioms to derive a normative framework for regulation. The Article then completed this framework by accounting for
the previously identified problems of sovereign debt restructuring and
used the framework to model a simple but arguably effective system of
rules for an international convention on sovereign debt restructuring.
In so doing, the framework effectively blurred the distinction between
public and private international law.
Under my proposed Convention, financiers of a State's debt restructuring would have priority over claims of other creditors. Also,
the Convention would bind all creditors to a plan of reorganization
that classes of claims agree to by super-majority voting and, upon such
agreement, would discharge debts not provided for in the plan. This
benefits debtor-States by providing incentives for new credit and by
minimizing the collective action problem. States therefore should find
it in their interest to ratify the Convention.
Appendix I sets forth a proposed model form of the Convention.
To preserve the dignity of States seeking the protection of this Convention and to avoid discouraging its use, the Convention does not
speak in terms of bankruptcy or insolvency, nor does it require a State
to be insolvent to seek protection thereunder or otherwise differentiate between exogenous and endogenous factors that lead to default.4 34

Although

this construction

increases the potential for

strategic manipulation, the Convention's provisions are narrowly circumscribed to prevent opportunistic behavior.
Contrary to assumptions made in the economic literature, the
Convention would be largely self-executing and would not require supervision by a bankruptcy court. Only occasional monitoring is
needed to ensure that the priority financing does not result in overinvestment. A neutral international institution such as the IMF could
perform that monitoring, without raising the problems associated with
direct IMF funding. To the limited extent disputes must be adjudicated under the Convention, that task could be performed by establishing a low-cost arbitration procedure, perhaps based on the ICSID
model. Furthermore, by acting as an intermediary funding source,
the IMF or other institution could continue the current practice of
imposing conditionality on funding without causing the problems
presently associated with IMF lending.
434

An exception is the limited extent that irrational exogenous factors could justify

IMF funds for maintenance of temporary

liquidity.
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APPENDIX I
PROPOSED MODEL CONVENTION 43 5

Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms
ARTICLE 1: SCOPE

This Convention applies to debt restructurings between sovereign
States and their creditors.
ARTICLE 2: USE OF TERMS
For purposes of this Convention:
(1) "Contracting State" means a sovereign State for which this Convention is in force;
(2) "creditor" means an entity that has a claim for payment against a
Contracting State;
(3) "debtor-State" means a Contracting State that has filed for relief
under this Convention;
(4) "Plan" means a debt restructuring plan;
(5) "Supervisory Authority" means the [International Monetary
Fund].

Chapter lI: Invoking the Convention
ARTIcLE 3: PETITION FOR RELIEF
(1) A Contracting State may invoke application of this Convention by
filing a voluntary petition for relief with the Supervisory Authority.
(2) Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so
long as such filing has not been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority for lack of good faith, the provisions of this Convention shall apply
to the relationship between the Contracting State and its creditors.
ARTcLE 4: NOTFCATION OF CREDITORS
Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the debtor-State shall
notify all of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a Plan
under this Convention.

Chapter III: The Debt Restructuring Plan
ARTICLE

5:

SUBMISSION OF PLAN

(1) The debtor-State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time,
and may submit alternative Plans from time to time.
(2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan.
435 The author acknowledges with appreciation the assistance of Adam Munson in
drafting this model. I intend this model to be illustrative rather than definitive.
Therefore, I have simplified its provisions and omitted technical matters such as approval
of claims and voting disclosure.
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ARncLE 6: Co=NTs OF PLAN
A Plan shall:
(1) designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3);
(2) specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims; and
(3) provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class,
unless the holder of a claim agrees to a less favorable treatment.

7: VOTING ON THM PLAN
(1) A Plan shall become effective and binding on the debtor-State and
its creditors when it has been submitted by the debtor-State and
agreed to by each class of such creditors' claims. Thereupon, the
43 6
debtor-State shall be discharged from any debt then in existence,
except as provided in the Plan.
(2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least
[two-thirds] in amount and more than [one-half] in number of the
claims of such class [voting on such Plan 4 37] [entitled to vote on such
Plan] agree to the Plan.
(3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the debtor-State
that are pan passu in priority, provided that (a) pan passu claims
need not all be included in the same class, and (b) claims of governmental or multi-governmental entities each shall be classed separately.
ARTICLE

Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring
ARTICLE 8: TERMS OF LENDING
The Supervisory Authority shall have the right, but not the obligation,
to lend money to a debtor-State on such terms and conditions as the
Supervisory Authority deems appropriate, taking into account the
debtor-State's use of the loan proceeds.
ARTICLE 9: PRIomr OF REPAYMENT
(1) Debtor-States must repay loans made by the Supervisory Authority
prior to paying any other claims.
(2) Such priority of payment shall extend to any assignee of the Supervisory Authority.
ARTICLE 10: NONRECOURSE BORROWING BY SUPERVISORY

AuTHoRrry

(1) To finance its lending to a debtor-State, the Supervisory Authority
may borrow on such terms and conditions as it may negotiate, provided that neither the Supervisory Authority nor its assets shall be liable, contingently or otherwise, for repayment of such borrowing
except as set forth below.
436 [Alternatively, the Convention could except discharge of debts owed to entities that
neither had notice nor actual knowledge of the Plan.]
437 [The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but reliable
notice to creditors then becomes more important.]
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(2) As collateral for a borrowing, the Supervisory Authority may assign
as security its right to payment under the loan made from the proceeds of such borrowing.
(3) The Supervisory Authority may borrow on a general recourse basis
in order to make loans to debtor-States whose financial distress results
primarily from factors that are [unforeseeable and] beyond their
control.
Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes
[This Chapter could follow the model of ICSID's convention, except
that States ratifying this Convention would thereby subject themselves
and their nationals to submit all disputes arising under the Convention to the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal.]
Chapter VI: Ratification
AR-nor

11: PROCEDURES

(1) This Convention shall enter into force upon ratification or other
approval by at least [three] sovereign States.
(2) On or before ratifying or otherwise approving this Convention,
each Contracting State shall undertake such legislation or other measures as may be necessary for making this Convention effective as national law in its territories.
ARcLE 12: EFEcwr OF RATIFICATION
Ratification of this Convention shall be binding on each Contracting
State and on each national thereof, irrespective of contractual provisions that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention or
the date that a national's claim against a Contracting State arose.

